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All of our lives are permeated with the task of forming impressions of people we meet or 
about whom we learn. On occasion, we are able to see people in our environment as individuals 
who, for whatever reason, deserve enough of our attention to differentiate them from others we 
know, and from others with whom they share group membership. More often, however, we 
are unable or unwilling to commit ourselves to this task and, as a result, we may be more likely 
to forsake the chore of seeing people as individuals. In this case we are generally content to fall 
back on our stereotype of a group to which a person belongs when perceiving him or her, and 
see the individual as a typical group member. 
To illustrate, consider the example of the well-known comic line: "Some of my best 
friends are ." (Fill in the blank with any of your favorite social groups.) Here, the quip 
implies that while the speaker is generally unable to see members of a particular social group as 
individuals (usually due to bigotry), particular group members are perceived in isolation from 
their group membership because the speaker has had the opportunity to get to know them in 
settings in which discrepant group membership did not play a role. 
The theoretical message underlying this particular joke is that we do not always see 
people in the same way. Factors in the environment can (and as we shall see, often do) affect 
the way we view individual members of various groups. The situation in which we meet and 
interact with a person, for example, can influence the degree to which we view that person in 
terms of his or her group membership. In a setting in which a particular group membership is 
relatively important, we may tend to see individuals in terms of that group membership. 
Conversely, in a setting in which a particular group membership is unimportant, we may see an 
individual as such, rather than as a member of a larger group. 
Several factors may account for such an individuated perception but in the present 
dissertation we will limit ourselves to two main motives which may lead people to individuate 
others, in lieu of perceiving them in terms of their group membership. This thesis is a collection 
of studies which were designed to investigate the effects of group membership and changes in 
the social context on the cognitive organization of information about group members. 
2 CHAPTER 1 
Of particular interest in this dissertation is the differential perception, operationaJized in 
terms of information organization, of groups to which the perceiver belongs (i.e., in-groups) 
versus groups to which the perceiver does not belong (i.e., out-groups). In addition, we are 
also interested in changes in the social context on information processing. Generally speaking, 
social context may be defined in several different ways. Of these ways, three are of direct 
relevance here. First we may define the social comparative context. This refers to the social 
context in which information is communicated in terms of the presence of comparison groups. 
In particular, we define two levels of comparative context: intragroup and intergroup contexts. 
In the former, only one group is present. Consequently, no intergroup comparisons are made 
explicitly salient, as a result of which, interpersonal comparisons are facilitated, thus paving the 
way for the individuation of group members. In the latter, more than one group is present (in 
terms of, for example, the stimulus configuration) thus making intergroup comparisons 
relatively salient which increases the likelihood of the social categorization of group members. 
As the factor, "social context," refers to the social comparative context in all five studies 
described in this dissertation, it is deserving of a more detailed discussion. Later in this chapter, 
the theoretical underpinnings of social comparative context will be examined more completely. 
Second, we may also define social context in terms of the information that is being 
communicated in any given situation. Information that is particularly relevant to a group 
membership may make that group membership more salient than the presence of information 
which is irrelevant to a particular group. Thus, changing the topic of discussion among a group 
of people, for example, should simultaneously serve to change the salient categorization. To 
illustrate, consider a group of male and female psychologists talking to a group of male and 
female lawyers. If the topic of discussion is, for example, courtroom psychology, the 
lawyer/psychologist categorization should be the primarily salient category. Alternatively, if the 
topic of discussion concerns sex roles in household tasks, the gender categorization should take 
precedence over that of lawyer/psychologist. Though social context defined in this manner is 
not central to this dissertation, effects of the type of information being communicated are be 
addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Finally, social context may also be defined in a broad sense to encompass societal 
characteristics of groups or situations which lead to changes in the salience of a particular group 
membership. Differences in status between two groups, as we will argue in Chapter 4, 
represent an example of a contextual, societal factor which may influence the salience of a 
particular group membership. Here, simply the presence of a status discrepancy may, either as a 
main effect of in interaction with changes in the social context, affect the perceptions of and the 
processing of information about group members. 
In the pages to come, we examine the effects of in- and out-group membership and 
changes in the social comparative context on the processing of person information. We will 
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argue that people generally individuate members of in-groups more than members of out-
groups. In addition, we will argue that this effect is moderated by the social comparative context 
in which the communication of information about group members takes place. 
Before presenting the studies, it is important, however, to discuss various theoretical 
issues central to this dissertation: current themes in person perception, the cognitive structure of 
person information, in-group and out-group membership and comparative social context. 
Current Themes in Person Perception 
The joke described at the beginning of this chapter illustrates that perceivers are capable 
of seeing those perceived as either individuals or members of a particular category depending on 
various factors in the self and in the environment. Several theories attempt to specify the 
conditions which determine whether a target will be seen as an individual or in terms of his/her 
group membership. 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990), for example, have outlined a continuum-model in which 
they describe the factors leading to the perception of a person as an individual or as a member of 
a particular category. Specifically, they state that when we encounter a person, we are at first 
inclined to view him or her as just another member of his or her category. We assume that this 
person possesses category stereotypical traits and we are inclined to ignore any individuating 
information. However, given the proper circumstances, more individuating processing can 
occur. 
Specifically, Fiske and Neuberg posit that when we have sufficient cognitive capacity 
available to go beyond seeing an individual as a member of his or her category, and we are 
sufficiently motivated to incorporate individuating information into our impression of the target, 
and the target is sufficiently inconsistent with the stereotype, we will proceed to see the target in 
more and more individuating terms. In short, attention, motivation and/or the presence of 
stereotype inconsistent information1 are required for individuating processing to occur. If these 
requirements are met, a perceiver may place the target into a sub-type of the general category or 
completely individuate the target, depending on the perceiver's goals and the task demands. It is 
important to note that Fiske and Neuberg place categorization, sub-typing and individuation on 
one dimension which they see as a continuum. They do not define these three types of 
perceptions (categorization, sub-typing and individuation) as discrete processes but rather as 
one process which can occur to varying degrees. 
In contrast, Brewer's (1988) dual process model differs from Fiske and Neuberg's 
continuum model in two major ways. First, she sees the processes of individuation and 
categorization as two distinct processes. According to her theory, upon encountering a target, 
1
 One could argue though that stereotype-neutral information could also be used to individuate stimulus persons. 
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the relevant category is activated and used to label and categorize the target. However, should 
the target prove "relevant," and either "self-involving" or lacking in fit with existing categories, 
further processing will occur with sub-typing or individuation as the ends. Brewer views 
categorization as a top-down process in which the characteristics of the category are used to 
perceive the individual Conversely, sub-typing and individuation are supposedly more bottom-
up in nature, where an individual's characteristics form the starting point for a person-based 
perception. 
Second, Brewer suggests that the characteristics of the target (such as the presence of 
inconsistent information) are not the primary determinants of the degree of individuation. Rather 
a perceiver's processing goals, resulting from, for example, personal concerns, values and task 
requirements (Brewer, 1988), may play the main role m determining whether a target will be 
individuated, sub-typed or categorized. 
The theories outlined by Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Brewer (1988) concentrate 
primarily on the outcome of person perception That is, they describe the conditions necessary 
for an individual to be individuated or categorized Other theories, however, have focused more 
on describing the cognitive processes involved in person perception. Probably the two most 
prominent are exemplar-based (e.g., Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Lmville, Salovey & 
Fischer, 1986, Smith & Zarate, 1992) and abstraction-based theories (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988; 
Park & Judd, 1990) 
Specifically, exemplar-based models posit that when an exemplar of a group is 
encountered, information about him or her (or it, for that matter) is stored in memory When the 
perceiver is later asked for a group judgment, all exemplars belonging to the appropriate group 
are tallied and a judgment is reached based on these memory-based calculations. Alternatively, 
abstraction-based models argue that a running tally of a group is maintained and adjusted on-
line whenever a new group member is encountered. When a perceiver is asked to give a 
judgment about the group, he or she simply retrieves the relevant, continuously updated 
information 
Contrary to Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model and Brewer's (1988) dual 
process model, exemplar- and abstraction-based models are primarily concerned with the 
development of a group stereotype and the methods used to make judgments about the central 
tendency and variability of the group as a whole on a particular dimension 
While the lines of research described above are central to the study of person perception, 
in the present dissertation we are primarily interested in a line of study which is perhaps more 
basic Here, we concentrate primarily on the way incoming information is cognitively 
organized, rather than the degree to which a target is stereotyped or individuated We argue that 
information can be organized around individuals in a person-based manner under certain 
circumstances Alternatively, under different circumstances, we argue that the same information 
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about the same group members can be organized in a more group-based manner. (This 
distinction will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.) 
It is important to note that categorizing or individuating a target is not the same as 
organizing information about several group members in a person-based or group-based manner. 
The former refers to variations in the degree to which characteristics generally associated with 
the group are attributed to a newly encountered member. The latter, however, makes no 
assumptions about the degree to which an individual is seen in stereotypical terms, but rather 
simply makes statements about the cognitive organization used to structure the information 
about that individual and others in memory. Consequently, theories describing the processes 
involved in perceiving a target in stereotypical terms, or the development and maintenance of 
group stereotypes, have little implication for the present research. Conversely though, the 
present research (i.e., learning more about the way information is organized in memory) may 
have implications for the way we think about the development of stereotypes. That is, if we 
learn more about the basic cognitive organization of incoming information, we may also gain 
additional insights into the way stereotypes are created and maintained. 
At present, such implications remain speculative. In Chapter 7, the concluding chapter 
of this dissertation, we will discuss the consequences of the present line of research for 
stereotype development and use in considerably more detail. 
The Cognitive Structure of Person Information 
Structuring by Person 
In the present research the cognitive structuring of person information is primarily 
measured by assessing the cognitive organization of person information in recall. The notion of 
evaluating the way people perceive others by examining the manner in which they recall 
information is not a new idea. Hastie and Kumar (1979), for example, designed a paradigm in 
which subjects were presented with, and later asked to recall, behaviors referring to a particular 
trait. By examining recall protocols, they were able to formulate ideas with regard to the 
organization of information about an individual in memory. These were later refined to develop 
an associative network theory of the storage and retrieval of person information (Hastie, 1980; 
Srull, 1981; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985; Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
This associative network model of person memory primarily refers to the manner in 
which perceivers organize information about one particular individual. Much of the model 
describes the way in which a perceiver incorporates information inconsistent with expectations 
into an impression of a person. However, for our purposes, the general predictions regarding 
the cognitive organization of information are more important. 
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In a nutshell, the model predicts that subjects incorporate information on-line (i.e., as it 
is encountered) to form an impression of an individual. Each piece of information is attached to 
a central person node that forms the main fixture to which all information about a person is 
attached. Thus, perceivers will have a node for Jim, to which all information about Jim is 
attached. When Jim's node is activated, subjects gain access to information describing him. It is 
important to note that this model essentially predicts that information about different individuals 
is kept separate by maintaining separate nodes for each individual person (e.g., Wyer & 
Gordon, 1982). 
Consistently, most studies investigating the associative network model make the 
assumption that information is organized around person nodes (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989; Park, DeKay & Kraus, 1994; Srull et al., 1985; Wyer & Gordon, 1982). 
However, as the typical study presents information about only one target person, it is not 
possible to organize the information in any other way than according to that one person (cf., 
Wyer & Gordon, 1982). However, in studies involving multiple person settings, the 
associative model has also found support; information is, indeed, often found to be organized in 
terms of individuals (e.g.. Devine, Sedikides & Fuhrman, 1989; Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides 
& Li, 1993; Pryor & Ostrom, 1981; Sedikides, Devine & Fuhrman, 1991, Experiment 2; 
Sedikides & Ostrom, 1988; Wilder, 1990). 
In their study, for example, Devine et al. (1989) had subjects read attributes describing 
one target person and four additional stimulus persons. Subjects subsequently completed a free 
recall task. The probability with which one item from the target person followed another item 
from the target person in free recall formed the main dependent measure. The results showed 
that subjects were relatively likely to recall items from the same target person sequentially. In 
other words, subjects recalled information about the target person as a block of information, 
uninterrupted by the recall of information about the four additional stimulus persons. These 
results indicate that information about one target person, even in a multi-person setting, can be 
organized around that person. 
Consistent with an associative network model of person memory, it does seem that the 
person can act as a central organizing concept in the organization of information about 
individuals. But some evidence may suggest that this is not the only way to cognitively organize 
information about group members. 
Structuring by Group 
While the associative models of person memory suggest that the individual is the center 
of person information organization, there is considerable literature indicating that this is not 
always the case. Instead, when evaluating information about a whole group, the group may 
become the organizational entity (cf., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard 
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& Birrell, 1977). Essentially, the group label can be seen as replacing the person node. Hence, 
all descriptive information about the group would then be attached to the more appropriate 
group node (Stangor & Lange, 1994). 
Rothbart et al. (1977) showed that information can be either organized around the 
individual or around the group, given the proper circumstances. In their study, subjects read 
either 16 descriptive statements in a low memory load condition, or 64 descriptive statements in 
a high memory load condition. Each statement was representative of either a desirable or an 
undesirable trait. The relative frequency with which each desirable and undesirable statement 
was presented was systematically varied across conditions such that overall there were either 
more, less or equal numbers of desirable statements compared to undesirable statements. Each 
statement was randomly paired with one of four male names in the low load condition, or with 
one of 16 male names in the high load condition. Thus, each stimulus person was paired with 
four statements. Though the frequency of desirable and undesirable statements was varied 
across conditions, the absolute number of desirable and undesirable stimulus persons remained 
constant. Subjects' estimates of the percentage of desirable stimulus persons presented formed 
the main dependent variable. 
The results showed that subjects' estimates in the low load condition did not vary as a 
function of the relative frequency of desirable stimulus statements. The authors argue that 
subjects in this condition were able to take the absolute number of desirable stimulus persons 
into account when making estimation judgments. Indeed, like subjects' estimates, the absolute 
number of desirable stimulus persons remained constant across frequency conditions. In the 
high load condition, however, subjects' estimates of the percentage of desirable stimulus 
persons increased as a function of the relative number of desirable statements presented in the 
stimulus set; the more desirable statements presented, the higher subjects' percentage estimates. 
Thus, here, subjects' estimates indicated that they were more affected by the relative number of 
desirable statements presented rather than the absolute number of desirable individuals. The 
authors argue that subjects were able to individuate stimulus persons in the low load condition, 
while in the high load condition, subjects were more inclined to organize the stimulus 
information around the group as a whole. 
Data reported by Sedikides and Ostrom (1988) in a meta-analysis, and Ostrom et al. 
(1993) also suggest that information about individual group members is not always organized 
by person to the same degree. Data from the meta-analysis suggest that the organization of 
information about relatively familiar others is more likely to be organized according to the 
individual person than information about relatively unfamiliar others. Ostrom et al. (1993) went 
one step further and argued that an organizational strategy based more on the group as a whole 
may take the place of an individual mode of organization, as an inverse function of familiarity 
with the stimulus group and its members. 
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Information Clustering 
In the present dissertation, we argue that information is not always processed in terms of 
individual persons. Instead, under certain circumstances, perceivers are more likely to see target 
persons primarily as members of the group to which they belong. In the majority of the studies 
to be reported, the organization of information about group members is evaluated by examining 
the nature and degree of information clustering in memory using adjusted ratio of clustering 
(ARC) scores (Roenker, Thompson & Brown, 1971) 
The underlying assumption of clustering measures in general, and of ARC scores in 
particular, is that the order in which information is reproduced during recall informs us about 
the way this information is stored in and accessed from memory. Consider, for example, a 
study in which several stimulus persons are described by various "attributes" {e.g., squash) 
belonging to various "attribute categories" {e.g., favorite sports). When, in a free recall task, a 
subject reproduces consecutively all available information about one specific person, and then 
continues with another person, this is taken as an indication of a cognitive representation in 
terms of separate individuals (person clustering). Clustering in terms of attributes (for instance, 
first all of a particular group's members' different hobbies are recalled, then all the different 
favorite sports, etc.) presumably denotes a tendency to process and retrieve information for a 
group of people as a whole (Ostrom et al, 1993). By measuring the degree of individual versus 
attribute-based clustering, we will be able to assess the extent to which target persons are 
individuated as a function of various factors, one of which may be a targets' group 
membership. 
Group Membership 
One of the most investigated factors in group research is the difference between the 
perception of groups to which we belong (our family, our friends, our sports club) and of 
groups to which we do not belong (someone else's family, someone else's friends, a rival 
sports club), so-called in-groups and out-groups. Social psychological research has concerned 
itself with many aspects of in- and out-group perception, for example, that out-groups are often 
(but not always) seen as more homogeneous than in-groups (Park, Judd & Ryan, 1991; Simon 
& Pettigrew, 1990), that in-groups are usually evaluated more positively than out-groups 
(Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994), that out-groups are more often categorized and 
stereotyped than in-groups (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; van 
Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994), and that people allot more attention to and have 
better memory for in-group information than out-group information (Mackie & Worth, 1989; 
Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995). 
INTRODUCTION 9 
One effect that seems to emerge quite consistently is that the out-group is seen more 
categorically than the in-group. In a typical experiment, Judd, Ryan and Park (1991) had 
business and engineering majors rate both the in-group and the out-group (as defined by major) 
on eight traits. Half of the traits were stereotypical of business majors and half were 
stereotypical of engineering majors. Subjects were asked to judge the relative number of group 
members occupying a particular position on a particular trait dimension, along a unipolar scale 
ranging from not having a trait at all to having it to a large extent. This was accomplished by 
assigning dots of varying size to represent corresponding proportions of group members 
possessing differing degrees of the relevant trait. Subjects also indicated, on a similar unipolar 
scale, the range occupied by the target group on that dimension. From these measures, indices 
of group dispersion and stereotypicality were computed as indicators of perceived group 
variability. The results showed that, on both measures, the in-group was judged to be more 
variable than the out-group, which was judged to be relatively more homogeneous and less 
dispersed. 
Effects comparable to the ones just described surface in research concerning practically 
all areas of study listed above. Several explanations have been proffered in order to explain this 
differential processing of in-group and out-group information: we have more in-group 
exemplars readily available (Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990), we have 
more in-group sub-types at our disposal (Brewer, 1988; Park & Rothbart, 1982), and we are 
more familiar with in-group members than with out-group members (Judd, Ryan & Park, 
1991). However, none of these explanations seems to have consistently explained all available 
empirical results successfully. 
In a recent contribution to this issue, Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides and Li (1993) 
outlined the differential processing hypothesis, which forms the paradigmatic basis for much of 
the research reported in this thesis. They concede that we may indeed have more and easier 
access to cognitive representations of the in-group due to an increased familiarity with in-group 
members, as compared to out-group members. However, they argue that this need not lead to a 
superior memory for in-group information; other dimensions may be available along which to 
organize and store out-group information in memory which may be equally as effective as those 
used for the storage of in-group information. Specifically, Ostrom et al. posit that we may be 
prone to organize out-group information along the lines of taxonomies or attribute categories 
{e.g., preferred sport, favorite magazine or favorite TV show). That is to say that where out-
groups are concerned, the individual is no longer the basic unit of organization. Instead, 
according to Ostrom et al, out-group information organization is facilitated by using attribute 
categories, in lieu of the individual group member, as the basic cognitive unit. Empirically 
speaking, Ostrom etal.'s differential processing hypothesis predicts that information about in-
group members is more likely to be organized by individual group member (John reads Time, 
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John listens to the Rolling Stones, John plays baseball) while information about out-group 
members is likely to be organized by attribute category (John likes baseball, Tom plays 
basketball, Bob likes tennis). 
Across three studies, Ostrom et al. (1993) found seemingly compelling support for their 
hypothesis. In the first two studies, gender was used to operationalize the stimulus persons' 
group membership within subjects; of the eight stimulus persons presented to each participant, 
four were in-group members and four were out-group members. Subjects read four descriptive 
attributes, each from a different attribute category, about each stimulus person. Subjects were 
subsequently given a free recall task. From these data, the degrees of information organization 
by person and by attribute category were assessed in terms of information clustering. 
As predicted, Ostrom et al. found that information about in-group members was 
generally clustered by person. In the case of the out-group, however, information was generally 
recalled clustered by attribute category. These findings seem to support the hypothesis that, in 
contrast to information about the in-group, out-group information is not clustered by person in 
recall because, according to Ostrom et al, less familiarity with the out-group renders a person-
wise recollection relatively difficult. 
While Ostrom et al. seem to provide convincing evidence for the differential processing 
of in- and out-group information, a closer examination reveals a possible confounding in the 
stimulus information used in the first two studies, rendering the results of those studies at best 
difficult to interpret. Though gender was the basis for group membership, half of the stimulus 
material included attribute categories indicative of undergraduate students. In the other half, the 
attribute categories included categories characteristic of middle-aged adults, thus creating a 
second potential out-group for the college students participating in these experiments (cf., 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & Stewart, 1995). As a result, gender may not 
have been the only in-group/out-group categorization present, as Ostrom et al. intended, but the 
categorization of college students/middle-aged adults may have functioned as an unintended 
superimposed categorization, thereby confounding the design. When this is taken into account, 
it becomes impossible to interpret the data in terms of the (intended) gender categorization only. 
In a third study, Ostrom et al. employed an in-group/out-group categorization based on 
university major rather than gender. Here, the data showed that while in-group information was 
organized by person, out-group information was organized neither by person nor by attribute 
category. Consequently, while the organization of in-group information was consistent with the 
differential processing hypothesis, the organization of out-group information (or lack thereof) 
was not. 
As predicted, familiarity with the target group may have, in principle, affected the 
fashion in which person information was memorially organized in the first two studies. 
However, given the stimulus confounding in these two studies and the discrepant results found 
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in the third study, the conclusions drawn by Ostrom et al. regarding differential familiarity as 
the crucial mediating construct, may be, to some extent, premature. 
In the present dissertation, we draw on Ostrom et al. 's methods in order to examine the 
cognitive organization of in-group and out-group information, while correcting for the 
confound in the stimulus material. Consistent with the notion of the differential processing 
hypothesis and a large body of additional literature, one would indeed expect that in-group 
members will generally be individuated more than out-group members. However, this effect 
may be moderated by other important factors such as the social comparative context in which 
interaction takes place. 
Social Comparative Context 
As outlined above, Ostrom et al. (1993) base their differential processing hypothesis on 
the assumption that people are more familiar with in-group members than with out-group 
members and, as a result, have a richer mental repository of in-group exemplars which 
facilitates the individuated processing of in-group information. Although consistent with other 
views on social perception (see e.g., Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989), group membership 
may not be the only factor affecting the organization of person information in memory. From 
the point of view of self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & 
Wetherell, 1987), perception and memory of information about group members depend on the 
salient "level of categorization" at any given moment of perception (see also Ford & Stangor, 
1992; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994; 
van Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994). Of particular relevance to our present 
argument is the distinction between the personal level of (self-) categorization, that is when the 
individual self is seen as distinct from other individual (in-)group members, and the social level 
of categorization, that is when the perception of the in-group as a whole is perceived as distinct 
from relevant (comparison) out-groups. 
Self-categorization theory (Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1997; Turner, 1985; Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994) posits that different levels of comparison are triggered by 
cues in the environment and in the self. Comparisons between the in-group and the out-group 
or between the self and other individuals occur as a result of fit between these cues and 
cognitively available categorizations. According to the theory, an intragroup context, in which 
only members of the in-group are present, gives rise to an interpersonal level of social 
comparison. As a result, group members will be individuated, as this is the most informative 
type of social comparison in this context. Conversely, in an intergroup context {i.e., when 
comparison groups are present) perceivers are more likely to use group level comparisons in 
order to distinguish different groups from each other. 
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Building on this line of argumentation, it is important to note that any situation in which 
an out-group is present (either explicitly or implicitly) is likely to lead to a categorical perception 
of both the in-group and the out-group due to the relative salience of intergroup comparisons. In 
other words, while for in-group targets the level of categorization (personal or categorical) 
depends on the psychological presence of an out-group, information processing of out-group 
targets is invariably on the level of the category as a whole (instead of in terms of individual 
group members) due to the fact that the very judgment of out-group targets implies 
psychological in-group presence. In other words, even when, in terms of the stimulus 
configuration, only out-group members are perceived (an out-group miragroup context) the 
implicit comparison between observer (in-group member) and target (out-group member) 
should be sufficient to evoke an intergroup categorical level of comparison. 
To illustrate, consider the following example: several psychologists alone in a room (an 
intragroup situation) are unlikely to see themselves predominantly in terms of the group 
"psychologists" as this does not lead to informative social comparisons given this particular 
situation. Instead, they can be expected to differentiate among themselves using other, more 
informative dimensions such as individual characteristics. 
If a group of lawyers now enters the room, the level of comparison should shift from 
interindividual to intergroup, as a direct result of the presence of a now salient out-group (cf., 
Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Doosje, 1995). In this situation, our psychologists should 
see the lawyers in terms of their group membership (categorization). Moreover, due to the shift 
in the level of comparison, the way the in-group views itself also shifts. The psychologists 
should no longer see themselves as separate individuals, but rather in terms of the category; a 
group which is distinct and separate from the out-group. 
As mentioned earlier, whenever the out-group is present, an intergroup context becomes 
salient. If a group of psychologists participate in a discussion with a group of lawyers, it is 
assumed that an intergroup-level context would be salient. A so-called intragroup situation with 
the out-group, however, is characterized by an implicit rather than explicit in-group/out-group 
comparison. That is, if a single psychologist observes a group of lawyers engaged in 
discussion, an intergroup level of comparison is likely be employed even though the in-
group/out-group categorization is not explicitly made salient in terms of the stimulus 
configuration. In this case, both the out-group members (the lawyers) and the self as an in-
group member will be primarily perceived in terms of their respective group memberships. 
In an illustrative study, Haslam, Oakes, Turner and McGarty (1995), using a Katz and 
Braly (1933) checklist, asked subjects to assign five traits to Australians (the in-group) and/or 
to Americans (the out-group), which the subjects believed to be representative of the two 
groups. Subjects were subsequently asked to estimate the percentage of Americans and 
Australians who possessed the traits descriptive of the respective group. In an intragroup 
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condition, subjects completed the tasks for either Australians or Americans, only. In the 
intergroup condition, subjects completed the tasks for both Australians and Americans. 
The results in the intragroup condition revealed a significant out-group homogeneity 
bias. Specifically, a larger proportion of Americans (the out-group) were judged to possess the 
stereotype consistent traits than Australians (the in-group). The authors interpreted this finding 
to be indicative of a more homogeneous perception of the out-group than of the in-group. 
However, the data reveal that the observed out-group bias was notably absent in the intergroup 
condition. Rather, in the intergroup condition, stereotype consistent traits were judged to 
describe equally large proportions of both Australians and Americans. Moreover, the proportion 
estimates in the intergroup condition were equal to those of the out-group in the intragroup 
condition, indicating a relatively homogeneous perception of both groups in the intergroup 
condition. 
The authors argued that the data show that, in the intragroup condition, an interpersonal 
level of comparison was used to judge the in-group, thus leading to more perceived group 
heterogeneity. Alternatively, the out-group was apparently more likely to be perceived on an 
intergroup level in an intragroup condition, leading to a relatively homogeneous perception. In 
the intergroup condition, it was argued that both the in-group and the out-group were perceived 
on an intergroup comparison level rendering the perception of both groups relatively 
homogeneous. 
The Present Studies 
In the series of studies presented in this dissertation we will examine the effects of 
variations in the salient level of social comparisons on the perception of in-group and out-group 
members, using several dependent measures. 
According to the argument presented earlier, a change in the salient level of comparison 
should lead to changes in the degree to which stimulus persons are individuated, respectively, 
categorized. In the study presented in Chapter 2 the salient level of comparison is manipulated 
by varying processing instructions. Instructions to attend to the stimulus persons as individuals 
should lead subjects to perceive the stimulus persons using an interpersonal level of 
comparison. Conversely, instructions to attend to the stimulus persons as a group as a whole, 
should lead subjects to perceive the stimulus persons using an intergroup level of comparison. 
Thus, subjects in this study see descriptive information about eight in-group or eight out-group 
members, as defined by college major. During the presentation of the stimulus information, half 
the subjects are instructed to attend to the stimulus persons as individuals, and half are 
instructed to attend to the group as a whole. We hypothesize that when subjects' attention is 
directed to individual group members, more individuation will occur than when subjects are 
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instructed to attend to the stimulus persons as a group. Adjusted ratio of clustering scores are 
calculated to assess the degree to which information is organized by person (indicating 
individuation) or by attribute category (indicating categorization). 
The results described in Chapter 2 show that information about in-group members may 
be organized in memory differently than information about out-group members. However, the 
results also show that this effect is not moderated by individual or group processing 
instructions. In Chapter 3, we argue that manipulating processing instruction may not be strong 
enough to actually change the level of comparison on which subjects perceive stimulus persons. 
A study is subsequently described in which a stronger manipulation of the salient level of 
comparison is attempted by manipulating the stimulus configuration itself. Using a similar 
paradigm to that used in Chapter 2, the actual social context in which the stimulus information is 
presented can be varied. The underlying idea is that cues present within the stimulus 
configuration may lead to a heightened salience of the appropriate comparison level (and, hence, 
stronger effects of individuation and categorization) than only directing subjects' attentional 
focus via processing instructions. Using college major to operationalize group membership, 
subjects receive information about either the in-group only or the out-group only (the intragroup 
conditions), or both the in- and the out-group (the intergroup condition). Clustering scores are 
again used to assess degrees of individuation and categorization. 
In the first two studies described in this dissertation, group membership (defined as 
having a particular university major) plays a central role. However, it is important to realize that 
group membership in and of itself can provide social cues which may affect the level of 
comparison used when perceiving others. Factors such as being a member of the minority 
group may affect the degree to which a categorization is salient (e.g., Simon & Brown, 1987). 
Likewise, the relative status enjoyed by the in-group and out-group, be they low or high, may 
affect the relative likelihood that an intergroup or interpersonal level of comparison is used 
(e.g., Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Several researchers have suggested that gender groups enjoy 
just such a differential status in society (Bums, Branscombe & Klar, in press; Eagly & 
Chrvala, 1986; Eagly & Wood, 1982; Echabe, 1990; Fiske, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & Stewart, 1995; Pichevin & Hurtig, 1996; Vonk & Ellemers, 1993). 
The study described in Chapter 4 examines effects of changes in the salient social 
context on the clustering of information about gender groups. Unlike groups defined by college 
major, we argue that potential status differentials between men and women may lead to a 
discrepant perception of gender in- and out-groups. Specifically, we posit that men (the high 
status gender group) will individuate the in-group and categorize the out-group. On the other 
hand, women (the low status gender group) are equally likely to individuate both men and other 
women. Further, we argue that this effect may interact with the social comparative context in 
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which the communication of the stimulus information takes place. Information clustering and 
memorial accuracy on a cued recall task form the main dependent variables in this study. 
Up until now we have been primarily interested in the effects of group membership and 
changes in the social comparative context on information clustering found in free recall 
protocols. However, it has also been assumed that the order in which information is recalled is 
directly linked to the way that same information is organized upon encoding (Brown, Conover, 
Flores & Goodman, 1991; Holtgraves & Srull, 1990; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). However, 
this need not be the case. Conceivably, the order in which information is recalled may be 
primarily determined at retrieval rather than at encoding (Klein & Loftus, 1990; Murphy & 
Puff, 1982). In the final two empirical chapters, we address the effects of group membership 
and changes in the social comparative context on the encoding of person information and the 
differences between these effects and those observed at retrieval. 
In Chapter 5, the roles of social context and stereotype consistency on the encoding of 
information about, and the evaluation of, in- and out-group members are investigated. In this 
chapter, attention allocation as assessed by reading latencies forms one of the two main 
dependent variables. This measure allows us to gain insight into the processes occurring during 
the encoding of person information. Subjects' favorability judgments of stimulus persons 
formed the second main dependent variable here. 
Chapter 6 addresses the encoding of person information by evaluating the order of 
information acquisition. Using a modified information display board paradigm (Jacoby, 
Jaccard, Kuss, Troutman & Mazursky, 1987), we assess the order in which subjects acquire 
information about in- and out-group members in an intragroup or an intergroup comparative 
context. In addition, we also employ an information display board to assess recall of the 
acquired stimulus information. In this way, we are able to compare directly the separate, yet 
similar, measures of information acquisition (an indicator of information encoding processes) 
and information recall (an indicator of information retrieval processes). 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides an overview of the most important results. In addition, we 
discuss the implications of those results in regard to the way in which we process information 
about others in various social contextual situations. We address the roles of (gender) group 
membership and social context in the organization of descriptive information, attention 
allocation and favorability evaluations. In addition, we also offer some thoughts on the 
processes of information encoding versus retrieval. 
CHAPTER 2 
PROCESSINO INSTRUCTIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION 
OF IN-GROUP AND OUT-CROUP INFORMATION 
In the past, much research in the domain of person memory has been based on the 
assumption that we process information about people in terms of individuals (Hastie, 1980; 
Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985). Increasing evidence, however, suggests that under 
certain circumstances, we may actually forsake the individual for processing in terms of the 
group of which the individual is a member (Bardach & Park, 1996; Linville, Fischer & 
Salovey, 1989; Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides & Li, 1993; Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard 
& Birrell, 1977; Wilder, 1990). In this chapter, we will evaluate person-based and group-based 
information processing, specifically information organization, as a function of processing 
instructions and group membership. 
The associative models proposed by such researchers as Hastie and Kumar (1979) and 
Srull, Lichtenstein and Rothbart (1985) have contributed considerably to the way we think 
about the cognitive organization of information about people in our environment. These models 
posit that traits or behaviors associated with a particular individual are linked to that individual 
in memory. In recall, this person-trait association is often characterized by a recall structured 
around an individual "node." 
In contrast to the prevailing view that person information is organized by person, more 
and more research is suggesting that under certain circumstances, social information may be 
structured according to the group of which the individual is a member. For example, Ostrom et 
al. (1993), employed adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) scores in order to tap into the cognitive 
organization of information descriptive of in-group and out-group members. They found that 
only in-group information was clustered (organized) by individual; out-group information was 
clustered in memory in a more categorical or "groupy" fashion. Consistent with other research 
{e.g., Bardach & Park, 1996; Judd, Ryan & Park, 1991), Ostrom et al.'s findings suggest that 
while perceivers tend to be able to differentiate between in-group members, out-group members 
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are generally perceived in terms of their group and hence, are less differentiated than their in-
group counterparts. 
The studies mentioned above have, in general, succeeded in demonstrating differential 
perception as a function of group membership. However, for the most part, they do not 
explicitly take into account that the way in-group and out-group information is perceived may 
change over situations. Other studies, however, have demonstrated that the perception of in-
and out-group members may not be fixed, but can rather be adapted to meet the requirements of 
a particular situation (Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; Judd & Park, 1988; Lee & 
Otatti, 1989; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki & Van Manen, 1991; Wilder, 1990). 
Self-categorization theory suggests that the way in which a group and its members are 
perceived is a direct result of the level on which social comparisons take place in any given 
situation (Turner, Oakcs, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Thus, when the level of comparison 
changes, so does the perception of a group. When one is led to focus on the individual in a 
particular situation, interindividual comparisons become salient and individuation of group 
members is facilitated. Conversely, when one focuses on the group as a whole, interindividual 
comparisons are forsaken for those on an intergroup level. In this case, a person's group 
membership becomes salient and he or she is perceived in those terms rather than as an 
individual. 
Perceiving the in-group under circumstances conducive to interindividual comparisons 
should, by this analysis, lead to individuation. Oppositely, as we have explained in the 
previous chapter, perceiving the in-group when intergroup comparisons are salient should lead 
to a categorical perception of the in-group and its members. In contrast, any situation in which 
an out-group is present should automatically activate intergroup comparisons. Thus, 
theoretically, changing the comparative focus from the out-group as a whole to the individual 
out-group members should have little effect on the way in which they are perceived; the implicit 
intergroup comparisons between an in-group perceiver and the out-group should always lead to 
categorization. 
Vonk and van Knippenberg (1995) manipulated processing instructions in order to 
encourage subjects to process attitudinal information from the in-group or the out-group in 
either a more individual or categorical fashion. Consistent with the theory, their results showed 
that while the processing of out-group information always revolved around the category 
regardless of the specific instructions, the processing of in-group information was sensitive to 
changes in processing foci. Specifically, the in-group was individuated when subjects were 
instructed to focus on the in-group members as individuals, and categorized when the 
instructions were to focus on the stimulus persons as group members.1 
1
 Specifically, instructing subjects to focus on the in-group as a whole resulted in reading latencies of 
expectancy-inconsistent information which exceeded those of expectancy-consistent information. In all other 
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The present experiment will investigate the effects of group membership and processing 
instructions on the organization of descriptive information as indicated by ARC scores. We 
predict that in-group information will be organized primarily by individual when subjects are 
instructed to focus on the individual stimulus persons (person clustering). Contrarily, when 
subjects are focused on the in-group as a whole, information should be organized in a group-
wise fashion (attribute clustering). In contrast, we predict that the out-group will not be 
differentially sensitive to changes in processing instructions as a result of the "default" 




Subjects in all conditions read the same descriptive information about eight stimulus 
persons whose group membership was manipulated using university major (either law or 
psychology). In the in-group condition, all eight stimulus persons had the same university 
major as the subject. In the out-group condition, all stimulus persons' majors differed from that 
of the subject. In order to manipulate processing instructions, subjects were instructed to pay 
attention to either the stimulus persons as individuals or as a group. The between-subjects 
factors were Target Group (in-group, out-group). Processing Instructions (individual, group) 
and two Stimulus Presentation Order conditions to control for order effects. Information 
clustering served as the dependent variable. From the same free recall protocols, two measures 
of clustering were calculated: person and attribute clustering. Type of clustering (person versus 
attribute) was analyzed as a within-subjects variable. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 102 undergraduate students (35 men and 67 women; 56 law students and 
46 psychology students). They were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental 
conditions and received payment of DFL 5.00 for participation. 
Stimulus Material 
Pilot studies were conducted to insure that the attributes included in the stimulus sets 
were clusterable by both person and attribute category. (For a complete description of the pilot 
studies, see Appendix.) The stimulus sets resulting from this pre-testing are presented in Table 
2.1. 
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All subjects received all information about all eight stimulus persons, in other words, all 
subjects received both stimulus sets. The manipulation of the stimulus persons' group 
membership was realized by manipulating their major: for psychology majors, in the in-group 
condition, all stimulus persons were described as psychology majors, while all stimulus 
persons in the out-group condition were described as law majors. The opposite applied to 
subjects who were law students: in the in-group condition, all stimulus persons were described 
as law majors while all stimulus persons in the out-group condition were described as 
psychology majors. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted on Apple Macintosh computers. After short instructions 
about the use of the computer, subjects were asked to indicate their gender and major. 
Subjects were told that they were participating in an experiment about the way in which 
people form first impressions of others. Subjects read that they would receive information 
about eight people and that we were interested in how they formed their first impressions and 
what these were. In order to manipulate Processing Instructions, subjects in the individual 
condition were told that first impressions were often better, more reliable and more accurate 
when people paid attention to separate individuals. In the group condition, subjects were told 
that first impressions were often better, more reliable and more accurate when people paid 
attention to groups of people. These instructions were repeated and amplified. Subsequently, 
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subjects read the stimulus persons' names and major, and were informed which attribute 
categories would be used to describe which stimulus persons. Finally, subjects were instructed 
to read the descriptive information carefully, as they would be asked to answer questions about 
it later. At this point the stimulus information was presented. 
The stimulus information was presented blocked by stimulus person. In each block, the 
stimulus person's name was shown followed by four sentences, each containing one 
descriptive attribute.2 In order to avoid unintended gender effects, the gender of the stimulus 
persons was always the same as that of the subject. The stimulus person blocks were presented 
one by one on the computer screen for 15 seconds each, in one of two fixed orders. The order 
of the descriptive sentences within each person block was Fixed over the various conditions. 
The presentation of the blocks of person information was alternated by Set (Set A, Set B, Set 
A, etc.). In the first presentation order, a Set A stimulus person was presented first (followed 
by a Set В stimulus person, etc.). In the second presentation order, a Set В stimulus person 
was presented first (followed by a Set A stimulus person, etc.). 
Subsequent to the presentation of the stimulus information, subjects were given a free 
recall task in which they were asked to reproduce as much of the presented information as they 
could, in the order in which it came to them. Afterwards, subjects were asked to indicate which 
groups they had read about: law students (1) or psychology students (2), and to indicate 
whether they had been instructed to pay attention to the individual stimulus persons (1) or to the 
stimulus group as a whole (2). These questions were used to check the Target Group and 
Processing Instructions manipulations, respectively. Finally, subjects were again asked to 
indicate their gender and major to check if their responses were consistent with those given at 




The manipulation check for Target Group revealed that all 102 subjects correctly 
perceived the stimulus group's major. When asked whether they had been instructed to 
concentrate on the individual stimulus persons or on the group, eight subjects (7.8%) 
incorrectly answered that they were to concentrate on the individuals, while they had in fact 
1
 Though the stimulus information was blocked by person, we do not believe this constitutes a problem. 
Unpublished data (Young, van Knippenberg, Ellemers & de Vries, 1994) shows that when presentation format 
was manipulated to be either blocked by person, by attribute category or in randomly constructed blocks of four 
descriptive sentences neither a main effect for nor interactions with Presentation Format were found. 
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been assigned to the group condition. However, a chi-square test shows that overall, subjects 
perceived the Instructions manipulation as intended, c2(l) = 72.5, p< 001 3 
Recall Analyses 
As was addressed in Chapter 1, ARC-scores are indicators of the way information is 
memonally organized.4 In the present studies we evaluate the degree to which the information 
recorded m recall protocols is organized according to the individual stimulus persons (i.e., 
person clustering indicating individuation) and according to the attnbute categories used to 
describe the stimulus persons (attribute clustering indicating categorization) 
ARC-scores are computed by noting the number of times an item from one category (in 
this case either a person or an attnbute category) is followed in recall by another item from the 
same category These so-called repetitions are summed for all categories represented in the 
recall protocol, and subsequently corrected for the total amount of information recalled. The 
final ARC-score represents the number of observed repetitions on the scored dimension, 
occurring as a proportion of the maximum possible repetitions given the number of items 
recalled. ARC-scores can vary between -1 and +1. A positive score indicates clustering along 
the scored dimension while a score of zero suggests that no more clustering occurred along this 
J
 The eight subjects who did not correctly answer the manipulation check were not omitted from the analyses as 
doing so would have been in violation of the random assignment assumption Furthermore, debriefing revealed 
neither suspicion on their part regarding the manipulations nor confusion regarding the experimental procedure 
Nevertheless, an ANOVA without the eight subjects was also conducted and yielded a pattern of results 
consistent with that described here 
4
 Adjusted ratio of clustering scores are calculated according to the following formula (Roenker, Thompson and 
Brown, 1971) 
R - E(R) 
ARC= 
maxR - E(R) 
where R represents the total number of repetitions (i e , when an item from one person or attnbute category 
follows another item from the same person or attribute category), maxR represents the maximum possible 
repetitions given the number of items recalled, and E(R) represents the expected number of répétions based on 
chance 
Note that 
maxR = N- к 
where N is the total number of recalled items and к is the number of persons or attribute categories represented in 
the recall protocol 
Further, 
S л,2 
E(R) = 1 
N 
where n, represents the number of Hems recalled from category ι, and Wis as before 
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dimension than would be predicted by chance. Negative clustering scores indicate that 
clustering is actually occurring less than chance would predict. 
In the present study, four ARC-scores were computed for each subject: one for person 
clustering for Set A and one for attribute clustering for Set A; one for person clustering for Set 
В and one for attribute clustering for Set B. As a result, the factors Stimulus Set and Clustering 
Dimension were treated as within-subjects factors and thus, were included in the experimental 
design as such. 
Preliminary analyses of variance produced no effects involving Subject Gender, 
Subject's Major, Presentation Order or Stimulus Set. As a consequence, the final ANOVA's 
were collapsed over these factors yielding a 2 (Processing Instructions: individual, group) χ 2 
(Target Group: in-group, out-group) χ 2 (Clustering: by person, by attribute category) design 
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Figure 2.1. Person and attribute clustering as functions of Target Group 
The predicted interaction between Processing Instructions, Target Group and Clustering 
failed to reach significance, F( 1,98) = .60, ρ < .45. The two-way interaction between Target 
Group and Clustering, however, was reliable, F(l,98) = 4.46, ρ < .04. Examination of the 
means, which are presented in Figure 2.1, reveals that subjects clustered in-group information 
more by person than by attribute, F(l,98) = 5.93 ρ < .02. In addition, there was a statistical 
trend indicating that subjects clustered in-group information more by person than out-group 
information, F(l,98) = 3.00, ρ < .09. Note that while the means for the person and attribute 
clustering of both in-group and out-group information are in the predicted directions, the 
degrees of person and attribute clustering only differ significantly for in-group information. The 
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difference between person and attribute clustering of out-group information, while in the 
predicted direction, does not reach significance, F < 1. 
No other effects on information clustering reached significance; the Processing 
Instructions manipulation did not affect information clustering either on its own or in interaction 
with other factors. 
In addition to the clustering of information, the amount of recalled information was also 
analyzed. For this measure, a statistically reliable main effect for Processing Instructions was 
found, F(l,98) = 4.35, ρ <.04. Subjects recalled more items in the individual instructions 
condition (M = 17.7) than in the group instructions condition (M = 15.5). However, overall the 
amount of recalled information did not correlate with either type of clustering (number of 
recalled items with person clustering: r (101) = .07, n.s.\ with attribute clustering: r (101) = 
-.14, ρ < .15). 
Discussion 
The study described above set out to test the effects of group membership and 
instructions to focus on either the individual group members or on the group as a whole, on 
information clustering. The results show that while in-group information is clustered more by 
person than by attribute category, there is no organizational preference for out-group 
information in terms of the experimental clustering dimensions. Furthermore, this pattern was 
not particularly affected by processing instructions. In the remainder of the discussion, we will 
address these results in more detail. 
Consistent with past research, information describing in-group members was organized 
by individual group member. Information describing the out-group was not. Furthermore, even 
receiving explicit instructions to form an impression of the group as a whole, did not lead to a 
decrease in the individuation of in-group members. Several explanations of a stronger 
individuation of in-group members than out-group members have been proposed, for example 
increased familiarity with the in-group as compared to the out-group (Linville et al, 1989; 
Ostrom et al. 1993; Judd, Ryan & Park, 1991) or greater availability of in-group exemplars. 
However, it is impossible to conclusively state the cause of the pervasive in-group 
individuation given the present data. 
The organization of out-group information is especially puzzling. Why subjects failed to 
cluster out-group information by either experimental dimension is not clear. Perhaps, though 
subjects were willing to impose an organizational structure on in-group information, they were 
either unwilling or unable to do the same with out-group information. Alternatively, subjects 
may have indeed organized out-group information, but along dimensions other than those 
analyzed in this study. However, it is impossible to discover the character of such alternative 
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(possibly idiosyncratic) organizational dimensions. It is also important to note that while in-
group and out-group information is differentially clustered, this is not the result of a differential 
recall of in-group and out-group information. The data show that the degree of clustering was 
not reliably correlated with the number of recalled items. 
An additional point of interest is that, unlike Vonk and van Knippenberg's (1995) 
findings, the mere manipulation of processing instructions (making the individual or the group 
salient) does not seem to lead to differential organization of either in-group or out-group 
information. Numerous differences between the two studies may account for the discrepant 
results: the stimulus material employed in the two studies differed considerably both 
qualitatively and quantitatively; Vonk and van Knippenberg measured reading latencies of 
stereotype-consistent versus inconsistent information to indicate mental processing, while the 
present study measured information clustering of stereotype neutral information; and different 
stimulus categorizations were employed in the two studies. Any of the differences just 
mentioned could have potentially been responsible for the discrepant patterns of results. 
One discrepancy in particular, however, deserves special attention. In their study, Vonk 
and van Knippenberg instructed subjects to pay attention to individuals or to the groups in the 
different conditions. In doing so, they explicitly directed subjects' attention to the individual 
stimulus persons (respectively, to the groups). In the present study, subjects were instructed to 
form impressions of the individual or of the group, depending on condition, rather than where 
to direct their attention. Conceivably, subjects may perceive forming a first impression of 
a group as a rather unusual and possibly confusing instruction. As a result, they may not attend 
to the group as desired. This explanation may also account for the eight subjects in the group 
condition who did not correctly answer the manipulation check regarding the instructions 
manipulation. In any event, the possible causes of the discrepancies between the two studies are 
manifold, none of which can be ruled out on the basis of the present data, nor can they fully 
account for the obtained effects of group membership on information clustering. 
In the present chapter, we succeeded in demonstrating that in-group information is not 
necessarily organized in the same way as out-group information. In the next chapter, we will 
examine this effect further in different social environments. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE ORGANIZATION OF IN-CROUP AND OUT-CROUP 
INFORMATION IN INTRACROUP AND INTERCROUP 
CONTEXTS^ 
As discussed earlier in this dissertation, several theories attempt to describe the factors 
responsible for differential cognitive processing of in-group and out-group information. 
Recurring possibilities include effects of differential familiarity with in- and out-groups 
(Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides & Li, 1993; Judd, Ryan & Park, 1991) and more readily 
available sub-types and exemplars of the in-group than of the out-group (Brewer, 1988; 
Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982). In addition to 
such cognitive explanations for differential effects of in-group and out-group information 
processing, self-categorization theory argues that the social context in which information is 
communicated may primarily determine the degree to which a group's members are 
individuated or categorized (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam & McGarty, 1994). 
Specifically, self-categorization theory maintains that finding one's self in an intragroup 
situation should render interpersonal comparisons relatively likely, due to a lack of salient 
comparison groups. Alternatively, an intergroup situation may be more likely to lead to the 
categorical perception of group members due to salient intergroup comparisons. Note that while 
in-group members can be perceived on either a personal or a categorical level, perceptions of 
the out-group are theoretically restricted to category-based comparisons. Because out-group 
presence always implies a psychological comparison with the own group, regardless of 
whether the in-group is actually present or not, intergroup comparisons are consistently more 
salient than interpersonal comparisons. 
In Chapter 2 we demonstrated that in-group and out-group information was 
differentially clustered in memory. Specifically, in-group information was clustered primarily 
1
 This chapter is currently in press in the European Journal of Social Psychology entitled "The effects of group 
membership and social context on information organization" by Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemers & de Vries. 
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by person while out-group information was not clustered more along one dimension than along 
the other. However, we failed to find any effects as a result of manipulating the focus of 
attention; subjects did not cluster the descriptive information differentially as a result of being 
asked to focus on individual group members or on the group as a whole. 
One possible explanation for the failure to find any effects of the focus of attention 
manipulation may be that changing the focus of subjects' attention was not strong enough to 
successfully encourage subjects' perceptions of group members to shift from intergroup to 
interpersonal comparisons. Conceivably, it may be that the actual social context in which the 
communication of information takes place must change in order to change the salient level of 
comparison. In short, the effects of changes in the relevant level of comparison may depend on 
external, social factors which actually exist in the subject's perceptual field, rather than on 
factors which exist only in the subject's mind, such as attentional foci. 
In order to examine this possibility in more detail, we manipulate the salient level of 
comparison in the present study by manipulating the actual social context in which the 
experiment takes place. In this case, subjects will be presented with information either about 
members from either the in-group or the out-group (intragroup context), or about members 
from both the in-group and the out-group (intergroup context). Individuation and categorization 
will again be assessed on the basis of information clustering. Individuation should be 
characterized by increased person clustering relative to clustering by attribute category, which 
should be indicative of increased categorization. 
The predictions for the present study are the same as those made in Chapter 2. 
Specifically, we predict that in-group information will be organized primarily by person in an 
intragroup condition due to the facility of interindividual comparisons under these conditions. 
Conversely, in an intergroup context, due to the salience of intergroup comparisons, in-group 
information should be organized in a more group-wise fashion, that is, by attribute category. 
In regards to the organization of out-group information, we could make the same 
predictions as in Chapter 2, that is, that the mere presence of an out-group should evoke an 
intergroup comparison whether the in-group is explicitly salient or not. Thus, in both an 
intergroup context as well as a so-called out-group intragroup context, the organization of out-
group information should occur by group, as indicated by attribute clustering. However, 
considering the results found in the experiment described in Chapter 2 (in addition to those of 
Ostrom et al., 1993, Experiment 3), we could alternatively predict that out-group information 
may not be organized along either experimental dimension. This would result in little or no 
clustering of out-group information either by person or by attribute category. 
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Method 
Overview 
Subjects in all conditions read descriptive information identical to the information 
presented in the experiment described in Chapter 2. Group membership, defined by university 
major, was also manipulated in the same way as in Chapter 2. In order to manipulate Social 
Context, subjects were told that either all eight stimulus persons had the same university major 
(intragroup context) or that four of the stimulus persons had the same major as the subject and 
that the other four had a different major (intergroup context). The between-subjects factors were 
Social Context (intragroup, intergroup), Target Group (in-group, out-group) and two Stimulus 
Presentation Order conditions to control for order effects. Information clustering served as the 
dependent variable. From the same free recall protocols, two measures of clustering were 
calculated: person and attribute clustering. Type of clustering (person versus attribute) was 
analyzed as a within-subjects variable. 
Subjects 
Fifty-six university students (34 women and 22 men; 24 law students and 32 
psychology students) participated in the study and were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
cells of the design. Subjects received DFL 5.00 for participating. 
Stimulus Material and Manipulations 
The present study employed the same stimulus material as the experiment described in 
Chapter 2. The factor, Target Group, was also manipulated in the same way as in the first 
study. In the present study, however, we employed an alternative manipulation of the salient 
level of comparison, namely Social Context. 
In order to explain the manipulation of the factor, Social Context, it is useful to think of 
the eight stimulus persons as comprising four target stimulus persons and four context stimulus 
persons. The four stimulus persons described by Set A constitute the target stimuli whose 
group membership is varied to manipulate Target Group. The four stimulus persons described 
by Set В constitute the context stimuli whose group membership is varied to create either an 
intragroup or an intergroup context for the target stimulus persons in Set A. 
As in Chapter 2, our subjects were from two different undergraduate disciplines, 
psychology and law, constituting an additional between-subjects factor, Subject's Major. For 
psychology majors, the four target stimulus persons were psychology majors in the in-group 
target condition, and law majors in the out-group target condition. Conversely, for law majors, 
the four target stimulus persons were law majors in the in-group target conditions, and 
psychology majors in the out-group target condition. 
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The four context stimulus persons (described by Set B) were used to manipulate Social 
Context. In the intragroup conditions, identical to the method used in Chapter 2, the four 
context stimulus persons were from the same group as the four target stimulus persons. That is, 
when the target persons were law students, the context persons were also law students, and 
when the target persons were psychology students, so were the context persons. In the 
intergroup context conditions, the group membership of target and context stimulus persons 
differed, thus law target stimuli were accompanied by psychology context stimuli and vice 
versa. 
Table 3.1 depicts schematically how the Target Group and Social Context manipulations 
were achieved. Cells I and II show in-group target stimuli in an intragroup and intergroup 
context, respectively. Cells III and IV show out-group target stimuli in an intragroup and 
intergroup context, respectively. 
Table 3.1 
Schematic Overview of the Design in Which Set A Describes Target Group and Set В 


























It is important to note that, for the design just described, the recall data pertaining to the 
(target) stimulus persons described by Set A were used to calculate the dependent variable 
(clustering scores). However, the free recall task was not limited to recall of information 
concerning Set A stimuli, but it also incorporated recall of Set В stimulus information. The 
latter allows us to extract a second experimental design from our data. If one treats Set В as the 
target stimulus persons and Set A as the context stimulus persons, a second experimental 
design emerges as depicted below in Table 3.2. 
Note that in this second design, the levels of the factor Target Group in Cells II and Г 
are reversed compared to the first design presented in Table 3.1. As one can see, on the basis of 
the recall data of Set В one can draw up a design in which Cells I and Г show in-group target 
persons in an intragroup and an intergroup context, respectively. Conversely, Cells II and III 
show out-group target persons in an intragroup and an intergroup context, respectively. 
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Table 3.2 
Schematic Overview of the Design in Which Set В Describes Target Group and Set A 
Manipulates Social Context 
























Design Implications for Data Analysis 
Having gathered data from Set A as well as Set В from the same subjects enables us to 
analyze data in terms of two conceptually identical Target Group by Social Context between-
subjects designs, although data from the same cell may be interpreted differently, depending on 
whether Set A or Set В is used as the target set. This feature of our study is highly exceptional; 
to our knowledge there is no precedent of such a "dual design" in the experimental 
psychological literature. It seems, therefore, in order to elaborate somewhat on its implications 
for data analysis. 
First, Set A versus Set В is not a within-subjects factor. In Cell II, target group is in-
group in the first and out-group in the second design. In Cell IV, target group is out-group in 
the first and in-group in the second design. This factor level reversal (for the same subjects) 
precludes an analysis of Set as within-subjects or repeated measures factor. 
Second, one may segment the data of each subject into two parts, that is, data from Set 
A and data from Set B. These two data sets could then be analyzed as separate experiments and, 
because they are conceptual replications of each other (i.e., only the stimulus materials differ), 
the results of these analyses could be subsequently subjected to a meta-analysis (cf. Mullen, 
1989) in order to perform tests of our hypotheses across experiments. Alternatively, the two 
data sets could be inserted into one single ANOVA-design with Set A versus Set В as a 
between-subjects factor. As these two approaches to data analysis are essentially similar, one 
would expect identical patterns of results to emerge. 
One might object to the latter method of data analysis, because it would look as if we 
had artificially inflated the error degrees of freedom (and hence, the power of the test) by using 
each subject twice. However, this objection cannot be upheld considering the assumptions 
underlying the ANOVA model. The mere fact that the same subjects participate in different 
experiments, even when these are conceptually identical, or for that matter, in different cells of 
the same experiment, does not violate ANOVA assumptions. It should be noted in this regard 
that the "independence of error" assumption pertains to the requirement that the observations 
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within each cell be independent (see Winer, 1971, p. 150/151, for an explicit formulation of 
this assumption) and not to between-cells or between-experiments independence of 
observations. There may be obvious other reasons to refrain from using subjects twice, such as 
for example order effects due to practice, suspicion or changes in frame of reference, but these 
do not apply to our present study. 
On the basis of these considerations, both an ANOVA, with Set as between-subjects 
factor, and a meta-analysis across the two "built-in" replications would be generally 
appropriate. Though both methods yield identical results, in the present chapter we will report 
the results from the meta-analysis, as this may be considered the methodologically more correct 
of the two possible tests. 
Procedure 
The same basic procedure was used as in Chapter 2 with only small differences. First, 
as part of the context manipulation, subjects were informed that they would read about law 
students or psychology students (similar to the last study) or both. 
Second, the manipulation check was naturally altered to check the factors manipulated in 
this study. After completing the recall task, subjects were asked to indicate which groups they 
had read about: law students (1), psychology students (2) or both (3). This question was used 
to check both the group membership and context manipulations. 
The stimulus information was presented blocked by stimulus person in the same manner 
as in Chapter 2. However, in this study, in addition to the stimulus person's name and the four 
descriptive sentences in each block, in the intergroup condition each stimulus person's major 
was presented in parentheses after their name so that subjects would make no confusions 
regarding a stimulus person's group membership. In the intragroup conditions, this repeated 
presentation of the stimulus person's major together with the other descriptive information was 
not adopted, as all stimulus persons had the same major. Indeed, doing this would have 
appeared rather strange and redundant, and could have led to suspicion on the part of the 
subjects. Again, in order to avoid unwanted gender effects, the gender of the stimulus persons 
was always the same as that of the subject. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Subjects indicated about which group(s) they had received information, law students 
(1), psychology students (2) or both (3). Fifty subjects (89%) correctly indicated that they had 
read about the group of students about which they had indeed received information. A chi-
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square test revealed that overall, subjects indeed perceived the manipulations as they were 
intended (c2(l) = 31.5, ρ < .001). 2 
Recall Analyses 
Identical to the experiment described in Chapter 2, clustering was computed using the 
adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) Index. Again, four ARC-scores were computed for each 
subject: one for person clustering for Set A and one for attribute clustering for Set A; one for 
person clustering for Set В and one for attribute clustering for Set B. As is described in the 
Method section, two separate designs can be extracted from this experiment, which can be 
analyzed in one meta-analysis (Mullen, 1989). To this end, separate ANOVA's were conducted 
for Set A and Set В data. Each contained a 2 (Social Context: intragroup, intergroup) χ 2 
(Target Group: in-group, out-group) χ 2 (Subject Gender) χ 2 (Presentation Order) χ 2 
(Clustering: person, attribute) design with repeated measures on the last factor.3 Meta-analyses 
were subsequently executed for all main effects and interactions. Neither main effects nor 
interactions were found for either Subject Gender or Presentation Order. 
The unpredicted two-way interaction, Social Context by Clustering, reached 
significance (Z = 2.15, ρ < .016, average effect size = .24). Here, subjects clustered 
information by person more in the intragroup condition (M = .29) than in the intergroup 
condition {M = .06; Ζ = 2.08, ρ < .019, average effect size = .23). Social Context, however, 
had no effect on the amount of attribute clustering (A/ = .11 and .18 for intra- and intergroup 
conditions, respectively; Z= .22, n.s.). 
The two-way interaction described above, however, only shows part of the overall 
picture, as it is qualified by the three-way interaction, Social Context χ Target Group χ 
Clustering (Z= 2.30, ρ < .011, average effect size = .25; see Figure 3.1 for means). Further 
analysis of the relevant effects shows that this interaction is the result of differential clustering 
of in-group information as a function of social context (Z = 2.74, ρ < .003, average effect size 
= .30) and of the intragroup context resulting in differential clustering of in-group and out-
group information (Z = 2.37, ρ < .009, average effect size = .26). By contrast, Social Context 
has no effect on the clustering of out-group information (Z= .90, ρ < .18, average effect size = 
. 10) nor does an intergroup context lead to differential organization of in-group and out-group 
information (Z = .50, p< .31, average effect size = .06). 
2
 As in the first experiment, these subjects were not deleted from the sample. 
3
 In the interest of statistical power, all factors which were shown to have F-values smaller than 1 in 
preliminary analyses were not included in the final analyses. Given this criterion and the fact that there were 
neither predictions pertaining to nor significant effects involving Subject's Major, this factor was omitted from 
the final analyses. 
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Taking a closer look at the clustering of in-group information in the left half of Figure 
3.1, consistent with our hypotheses, it becomes clear that the degrees of person and attribute 
clustering have reversed across social context conditions. Specifically, we see more person 
clustering in the intragroup condition and more attribute clustering in the intergroup condition. 
Analysis of the relevant simple effects shows substantially more person clustering in the 
intragroup condition than attribute clustering (Z = 2.56, ρ < .005, average effect size = .28). 
Furthermore, subjects in the intragroup condition clustered in-group information by person 
significantly more than subjects in the intergroup condition (Z = 2.85, ρ < .002, average effect 
size = .31). Finally, there appears to be more attribute clustering than person clustering of in-
group information in the intergroup condition, though this simple effect fails to reach a 
conventional level of significance (Z = 1.24, ρ < . 11, average effect size = . 14). 
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Figure 3.1. Person and attribute clustering as functions of Target Group and Social Context. 
In regards to the clustering of out-group information, our main predictions were not 
statistically supported. We predicted that out-group information would be clustered primarily by 
attribute category. Clearly, this is not the case; the right half of Figure 3.1 shows that there is 
no clustering dimension preference for out-group information (person vs. attribute clustering 
intragroup: Ζ = .68, ρ < .25, average effect size = .08; person vs. attribute clustering 
intergroup: Ζ = -.06, ρ < .52, average effect size = -.006). Furthermore, testing the cell means 
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against zero reveals that none of the cell means differs significantly from chance clustering (M = 
.19 comes the closest: Z= 1.43,ρ < .08, average effect size = .16). 
In regards to the simple interaction present in the intragroup condition, looking at the 
means it becomes clear that, while equal amounts of attribute clustering were occurring for the 
out-group and the in-group (Z= -.81, n.s.), person clustering of in-group information well 
exceeded that of the out-group (Z = 2.63, ρ < .004, average effect size = .29). Note also that 
this simple interaction is identical to that obtained in the experiment in Chapter 2, which was 
also conducted in an intragroup context. 
In sum, the clustering scores for in-group information show that subjects appeared to 
systematically organize information about in-group members. However, this organization, as 
predicted, was not stable across situations, as the fluctuations across comparative contexts 
attest. The clustering of out-group information reveals a different picture. Here, subjects do not 
seem to organize the information systematically according to either of the analyzed dimensions. 
Furthermore, this lack of clustering does not appear to be affected by the social context. 
Finally, the total number of recalled items was compared. No main effects or 
interactions approached statistical significance. 
Discussion 
The studies presented in the present chapter and in Chapter 2 set out to test predictions 
concerning the person- versus category-based processing of information about in-group and 
out-group members. In Chapter 2, we examined the effects of an individual- or group-directed 
focus of attention and group membership on information clustering. Specifically, in-group 
information was individuated, as can be seen in the amount of person clustering versus attribute 
clustering, but out-group information was not clustered along either of the experimental 
dimensions. However, while the results showed that in-group information was clustered 
differently than out-group information, this was not found to be a function of thinking in terms 
of interindividual or intergroup comparisons. 
In the present experiment, we took the manipulation of the salient level of comparison 
one step further by actually conducting the experiment in an intragroup or an intergroup 
situation, in terms of the stimulus configuration. Here, the data show that the results from the 
experiment in Chapter 2 were replicated in the intragroup condition, which was in fact the social 
context in which that experiment had taken place. 
In extension of Chapter 2, however, the present study also shows that in-group 
information is clustered differently as a function of the salient social context in terms of the 
stimulus configuration. An intragroup context leads to interindividual comparisons with in-
group members and, as a result, individuation. Conversely, an intergroup stimulus 
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configuration provides the necessary comparison level salience for categorization effects to 
occur. Indeed, we find that in the intergroup condition, in-group members are individuated 
significantly less than in the intragroup condition, and show a more categorical organizational 
strategy. Finally, regardless of salient social context, out-group information was not clustered 
along either experimental clustering dimension, similar to the findings observed in Chapter 2 
{cf. Sedikides & Ostrom, 1988). 
The results described above have considerable implications for the way we think about 
the consequences of external versus internal influences on the way we process information. 
Comparing the two experiments, it is clear that the goal in both was to induce subjects to make 
interindividual or intergroup comparisons, depending on experimental condition. Instructing 
subjects to think about the stimulus group in terms of individuals or the group as a whole, as in 
the first study, did not effectively activate different levels of comparison. In the end, the actual 
intragroup context in which subjects perceived the information was more important for 
determining clustering than trying to manipulate the focus of their thoughts. 
The present experiment shows that when interindividual or intergroup comparisons are 
made salient by manipulating the social context in which the experiment takes place, subjects 
use these external cues when processing information about - at least - in-group members. The 
cues provided by the situational context lead perceivers to individuate or categorize, 
accordingly. In sum, we could conclude, based on the results of these two experiments, that in 
order for an interindividual or intergroup level of comparison to become salient, it is not 
sufficient for perceivers simply to think about group members as individuals or as a group. The 
external situation in which social comparisons take place must actually exist in order to induce 
individuation or categorization, regardless of the perceiver's cognitive focus. 
In general the clustering patterns in the present study are consistent with the findings on 
different measures in other studies in which social context was examined (Doosje et al, 1995; 
Haslam, et al., 1995; Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995). 
Specifically, it would seem that the more a situation lends itself to interpersonal comparisons, 
the more likely one is to organize descriptive information about the in-group in an individuated 
manner and the less likely one is to perceive the group categorically. Conversely, whenever an 
out-group is salient, intergroup comparisons become salient for both the in- and the out-group, 
as reflected by decreased individuation and tendencies towards attribute clustering. 
The present results demonstrate that social context can and does affect the way in which 
social information about in-group members is stored in and retrieved from memory. The 
implication of this finding with regard to cognitive explanations such as differential familiarity 
with in- and out-groups, and the extent of available subtypes and exemplars, remains somewhat 
unclear. On the one hand, familiarity with a group or subtype availability cannot be the decisive 
factor, as social context is unlikely to change a perceiver's cognitive repository. On the other 
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hand, cognitive explanations seem as such not implausible (see also Linville et al, 1989). As it 
stands, however, a high level of familiarity with and availability of exemplars or subtypes may 
be a prerequisite, rather than the ultimate determinant, of adequate person clustering in memory. 
Having diverse sub-types of a particular group available or being relatively familiar with 
that group may not necessarily lead to increased individuation of that group's members. It may, 
however, result in a more differentiated image of the group which may actually provide 
perceivers with a basis upon which to structure incoming information. As such, perceivers may 
have a large number of in-group subtypes and exemplars stored, with which they are relatively 
familiar. However, we speculate that though this extensive repository may make a subsequent 
general structuring of the information possible, the form this structure takes on may be 
determined by other {e.g., external and social) factors. 
As suggested above, a lack of out-group information clustering may have been the result 
of decreased familiarity with the out-group. Alternatively though, subjects may have simply 
lacked incentive, rendering them unable to cluster out-group information along experimental 
dimensions. Subjects may still have clustered the information, but along dimensions of their 
own making such as in reference to themselves, their friends or according to preference for the 
information (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; 
Sedikides, Devine & Fuhrman, 1991). 
It may also potentially be that the absence of clustering in the out-group condition is 
merely a question of statistical power. The present study employed 56 subjects, possibly 
rendering it not powerful enough to detect post-hoc significances between individual cells in the 
three-way interaction, thereby increasing the chance of Type II errors. However, we believe 
that this is rather unlikely as no differential clustering was found for out-group information in 
the Chapter 2 experiment either, which employed 102 subjects, thus rendering it statistically 
relatively powerful. 
Overall, the results indicate a differential organization of in-group and out-group 
information. Though the individuation of in-group members is possible, it was only observed 
under circumstances conducive to interpersonal comparisons. Furthermore, while out-group 
information is clearly not organized in the same way as in-group information, our results 
indicate that out-group information may not necessarily be organized by attribute category either 
(cf. Ostrom et al, 1993). Indeed, out-group information may either not be systematically 
organized or may be organized along dimensions we have yet to discover. 
In conclusion, consistent with self-categorization theory and the findings of previous 
studies, the experiments described in both Chapter 2 and the present chapter show that the 
perception of information about group members is flexible, and dependent not only on group 
membership, but also on the salient comparative context (cf. Turner et al., 1994; van 
Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994). In addition, it seems that the actual existence of a 
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particular context is a prerequisite for the emergence of the corresponding processing (either 
individuation or categorization). That is, the context must exist externally, not just in a 
perceiver's mind. As a result, proposals that the existence of differential processing of in- and 
out-group information is solely a function of cognitive factors such as differential familiarity or 
the availability of subtypes and exemplars seem difficult to maintain. 
CHAPTER4 
¿ENDER ASYMMETRIES IN INFORMATION 
ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that, aside from group membership, the social context in 
which information about in- and out-group members is communicated is of considerable 
importance in determining the form in which the incoming information is organized. In short, a 
comparative context in which interpersonal comparisons are salient leads to an individual-based 
organizational strategy. This individuation subsequently decreases in a context in which 
intergroup comparisons are explicitly or implicitly salient. In this case, the organizational 
flexibility of social information, specifically in-group information, is the result of variations in 
the level on which social comparisons are being made. Depending on the situation, either an 
intragroup (interpersonal) or an intergroup level of comparison may become salient. In the 
present chapter, we view these effects from a slightly different angle. Here, we are interested in 
the way in which newly acquired information about men and women in intra- and intergroup 
contexts is organized in free recall. As we shall argue later in this section, men and women, as 
groups, may not enjoy equal status in society. Consequently, the effects of potential status 
discrepancies, and how they interact with other factors take center stage in the present chapter. 
When we encounter new people, say at a party, we learn things about them which we 
proceed to store in our memories. We may leam that someone plays tennis, likes to watch 
horror movies and recently bought a house. Aside from the things we may forget, this new 
information is encoded and stored in our memory so that it may be retrieved for future 
reference. By measuring the way stored information is clustered in recall protocols, we are able 
to evaluate the form in which the information is organized in our heads, thus providing valuable 
insights into some of the cognitive functions used in person perception. 
1
 This chapter is currently under review at the European Journal of Social Psychology entitled "The 
Asymmetrical Perception of Men and Women" by Young, Van Knippenberg, Ellemerc, de Vries & Ekels. 
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Information Organization 
Much research in the past 15 years or so, which has concerned itself with the 
organization of person information, has been driven primarily by the assumption that 
information about individuals is organized in memory by individual (Fiske, 1993; Hamilton, 
Driscoll & Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Park, DeKay & Kraus, 1994; 
Smith & Zarate, 1992; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & 
Gordon, 1982). That is to say that all information descriptive of a particular person is chunked 
together. 
Contrary to suppositions of a uniformly person-based organization, however, recent 
research has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, information may be organized 
around whole groups of people, rather than around individual group members {e.g., Ostrom, 
Carpenter, Sedikides & Li, 1993; Wilder, 1990). Ostrom et al, for example, argued that while 
information about in-group members is organized according to the individual group member, 
information about out-groups is organized in a group-wise manner owing to decreased 
familiarity with the out-group. 
Employing the adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC) index as an indicator of information 
clustering (Roenker, Thompson & Brown, 1971), Ostrom et al. were able to evaluate the 
organization of information about gender in-groups and out-groups {i.e., men and women) in 
memory. Consistent with their hypotheses, Ostrom et al. found that subjects organized in-group 
information using person clustering, while out-group information was clustered by attribute 
category. 
Although Ostrom et al. appeared to find support for their hypotheses, closer examination 
of the stimulus information revealed that the intended categorization, namely gender, may have 
been confounded with an additional categorization, namely middle-aged versus young people. 
Consequently, while Ostrom et al. unambiguously demonstrated that person information is not 
always memorially organized by individual, it is difficult to draw any specific conclusions about 
the organization of information about gender groups. 
Gender and Status 
Despite the possible shortcomings of Ostrom et al.'s (1993) studies, other research 
using gender groups has yielded similar results {e.g., Park & Judd, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 
1989; Park & Rothbart, 1982; van Twuyver, 1996). Using dependent variables as diverse as 
free recall of stimulus information, name-matching, perceived group homogeneity and 
variability, and information clustering, these authors reported finding differential perceptions of 
gender in- and out-groups. None of these studies reported any effects of the perceiver's own 
gender. 
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In direct contrast, several studies have reported asymmetries in the result patterns of 
male and female subjects concerning their responses to gender categorizations (Branscombe, in 
press; Branscombe, Deaux & Lemer, 1985; Burris, Branscombe & Klar, in press; Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Deaux, Kite & Lewis, 1985; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & 
Stewart, 1995). For instance, Lorenzi-Cioldi and his colleagues (1995) found that, using a cued 
recall task (a name-matching paradigm, see Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978), the way 
in which male subjects perceived men and women differed considerably from female subjects' 
perceptions. 
Specifically, their results revealed that men were significantly better at correctly 
matching stimulus persons' names with the traits used to describe them when the stimulus 
persons were men, compared to when they were women. Conversely, female subjects did not 
differ in their ability to correctly match the names and traits of men and women; for stimulus 
persons of both genders, the degree of correct matches made by women equaled that of male 
subjects' matches for the male stimulus persons. In other words, while men showed less use or 
desire for differentiated knowledge about women than about other men, women clearly 
perceived men to be equally as differentiated as they perceived their own group. Additionally, 
while they did not interpret it as such, statistical trends reported by Linville, Fischer and 
Salovey (1989, Experiment 3) also indicate a similar male-female asymmetry in perceptions of 
group variability and differentiation. 
One possible explanation for the particular asymmetry described above might be that it 
was a direct result of actual gender differences. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that women 
rely chronically less on categories than men because they are more oriented towards 
interpersonal relations (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). However, this "gender" effect is rarely 
reported in studies using categorizations other than gender (e.g. Linville et al., 1989; Vonk & 
Α. van Knippenberg, 1995; Young, Α. van Knippenberg, Ellemers & de Vries, in press), 
suggesting that men and women do not display differential sensitivity to social categorization as 
a matter of principle, but only yield different patterns of results when gender is made salient as a 
social category. 
Alternatively, several researchers have suggested that gender is a legitimate cue by 
which people infer status differences in many societies (Berger, 1992; Bums et al., in press; 
Eagly & Chrvala, 1986; Eagly & Wood, 1982; Echabe, 1990; Fiske, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 
1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi et al., 1995; Pichevin & Hurtig, 1996; Vonk & Ellemers, 1993). 
Specifically, men occupy high status positions while women are frequently relegated to low 
status positions where they are forced to rely on men for rewards and positive outcomes. Being 
in such a position, it is advantageous for a woman to "get to know" the high status group at 




In indirect support of this hypothesis, D. van Knippenberg, Blaauw and Vermunt 
(1996), found an asymmetrical pattern of results when prisoners and prison guards were asked 
to make homogeneity judgments of the two groups. They found that guards perceived the (low 
status) prisoners to be homogeneous while the prisoners perceived the (high status) guards to 
be heterogeneous, thus indicating a tendency to categorize low status groups and to individuate 
high status groups. Other authors have also presented evidence to corroborate the assumption 
that people pay close attention to those who control their outcomes (Erber & Fiske, 1984; 
Fiske, 1993) and that people in dominant roles pay relatively little attention to individual 
subordinates (Fiske, Morling & Stevens, 1996). 
Note though, that while group status has been shown to profoundly affect the perception 
of social groups, it cannot change the social comparative context in terms of stimulus 
configuration. In essence, it is a factor inherent in a group which seems to influence the 
comparison level used to perceive that group. Indeed, factors other than comparative context, 
such as group size and status, have been shown to naturally affect the comparison level salience 
(Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Though these factors may not affect the actual 
social context in which comparisons may be taking place, they seem to influence the 
comparison level salience used in the perception of in-groups and out-groups. Thus, knowing 
that a group has a high status may encourage perceivers to make interpersonal comparisons 
among the group members (individuation), while knowing that a group has low status leads 
perceivers to engage in social categorization (see also Sedikides & Ostrom, 1986). 
Like the interaction between group membership and situational comparative context 
discussed in previous chapters, it is possible that factors inherent in a group, such as status, 
which influence perception in their own right, may also interact with social context. In the 
experiment reported in this chapter, we explore not only the effects of group status, but also re­
examine the effects of social context in terms of its interaction with gender-based group status 
as well as group membership. 
The Present Study 
In the present study we are specifically interested in the organization of descriptive 
information about men and women in intragroup and intergroup contexts. Given that 
asymmetrical processing of information about men and women has been found in several other 
studies using a variety of measures, it is uniquely interesting to examine possible asymmetrical 
processes occurring at a more basic, cognitive level. Examining the way in which incoming 
information is organized in memory allows us to examine the cognitive workings that may be 
the foundations for other, more global perceptions and judgments of groups. The present study 
evaluates the degree of clustering in free recall by means of ARC scores in order to assess 
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degrees of individuation and categorization in the perception and organization of information 
about gender in- and out-groups. 
Our specific predictions are based on the empirical research and theories discussed 
above. In particular, we predict that male subjects, being the high status group, will be likely to 
individuate men as indicated by the degree of clustering by person. Conversely, male perceivers 
are expected to organize information about women in a more group-wise fashion as indicated by 
increased clustering by attribute category. Mirroring this effect, a similar 
individuation/categorization effect should also be present in a name-matching task; men should 
correctly match more in-group items than out-group items. 
In regard to our predictions about women, we expect an equal individuation of members 
of both gender groups, as indicated by the amount of person clustering. Likewise, female 
subjects should be able to match equal numbers of names and attributes for both male and 
female targets. 
Further, it is possible that social comparative context will interact with gender group 
status. Specifically findings discussed earlier have shown that, on its own, members of high 
status group are likely to be individuated. Conversely, interpersonal comparisons occur with a 
low status in-group, but when the out-group has low status, intergroup comparisons are 
employed. According to self-categorization theory, an intergroup context should always lead to 
an intergroup level of comparison (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). As a 
result, when an intergroup context is explicitly salient, all interpersonal comparisons may be 
forsaken for intergroup comparisons regardless of differential group status and membership. 
Thus, in an intergroup context, members of high as well as low status groups in- and out-
groups could conceivably be categorized. 
Categorization and Stimulus Fit 
Aside from gender group membership, one additional factor will be included in this 
study. Lorenzi-Cioldi (1993) notes that many group perception studies employ a stimulus 
content which is not stereotypical of the categorizations used (for example, using a gender 
categorization and presenting stimulus information about favorite food). In other words, the 
stimulus information has little or no fit with the stimulus categorization. Lorenzi-Cioldi urges 
that studies should pay more attention to this "fit" because the degree of fit may play an 
important mediating role in person perception (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Basow, 1986). In his 
1993 study Lorenzi-Cioldi makes an explicit effort to examine fit by giving subjects information 
about men and women in either public (masculine) or private (feminine) settings. However, in 
this study the nature of the settings was such that they were gender laden, regardless of whether 
they were public or private. The use of, for example, a garage as a stimulus setting consistently 
implies a masculine place regardless of whether it is public or private. 
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In their study, A. van Knippenberg, van Twuyver and Pepels (1994) also examined fit 
between stimulus group and stimulus information. Their findings indicate that fit may affect 
categorization processes by allowing a categorization with a high fit to be more readily 
employed than one with less fit. However, they draw no conclusions as to the effects of this fit 
on the categorization or individuation of group members. All in all, the question as to the role of 
fit in the perception of groups is still open to discussion. 
In the present study, we manipulate fit between the categorization and the stimulus 
information. Past research suggests that category relevant information is better processed and 
recalled than category irrelevant information (e.g., Cissé & Heth, 1989; Hamilton, Driscoll & 
Worth, 1989). If this is the case, then subjects should show superior processing of 
stereotypical information compared to stereotype irrelevant information regardless of social 
context, group membership or group status. We therefore predict a main effect of Fit, in which 
it should be easier for subjects to cluster high fit information by both person and attribute 
category than low fit information. In addition, it should be easier for subjects to make correct 
matches in the name-matching task when the stimulus information is high rather than low in 
category relevant fit. We know of no studies in which information fit led to differential effects 
under varying circumstances. For this reason, no interactions are predicted with either subject 
gender, social context or group membership. Stimulus information will either be stereotypical 
of the group (gender typical descriptive attributes) in order to create a high fit condition, or 
neutral in regards to the group stereotype (gender neutral descriptive attributes), thereby creating 
a low fit condition. 
Method 
Overview 
Subjects read descriptive information about eight stimulus persons: four target persons 
and four filler persons who were described by stereotype-consistent or stereotype-neutral 
attributes (Fit manipulation). The manipulations of Social Context and Target Group were 
similar to those employed in Chapter 3, using gender instead of major. The factors Social 
Context (intragroup, intergroup), Target Group (in-group, out-group) and Fit between the 
categorization and descriptive information (high, low) were manipulated between subjects. 
From free recall protocols ARC-scores, measuring person and attribute clustering, were 
calculated, which together with a name-matching task (Taylor et ai, 1978), formed the main 
dependent variables. Finally, subjects indicated their identification with the in-group and out-
group and reported how stereotypical they found the stimulus information. 
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Subjects 
One-hundred and nine undergraduates (35 men and 74 women) participated in the 
present experiment and were randomly assigned to one of 16 between-subjects conditions. The 
subjects were paid DFL 5.00 for taking part. Three subjects' ARC-scores could not be 
calculated as they had failed to recall sufficient information with which to compute the scores. 
Hence, 106 subjects were included in the final analyses. 
Stimulus Material and Manipulations 
The target and filler stimulus sets were pre-tested with a separate group of subjects from 
the same population (N = 33), to assure clustering flexibility by both person and attribute 
category (see Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the pilot studies). This yielded four 
stimulus sets: three to describe the four target persons (target sets), and one to describe the four 
filler persons (filler set). All sets consisted of four attributes per stimulus person (for an 
overview of all stimulus material, see Table 4.1). 
Of the resulting target sets, one was gender-neutral, one was male stereotypical and one 
was female stereotypical. These three sets were used to manipulate Fit of the stimulus 
information to the stimulus groups. In the high fit condition, male and female target persons 
were described by the stereotypical target sets corresponding to the appropriate gender. In the 
low fit condition, target persons of both genders were described by the attributes belonging to 
the gender-neutral target set. Target stimulus persons were never described by out-group 
stereotypical information. 
The filler stimulus set always consisted of gender-neutral attributes and was used to 
describe the four filler stimulus persons each with four attributes. The same set of gender-
neutral attributes was used to describe the filler persons in all conditions. The filler set and 
gender neutral target set differed in that different attribute categories were used in the two sets. 
The manipulation of Target Group was achieved by varying the gender of the target 
stimulus persons relative to that of the subject. For female subjects, the in-group was made up 
of female target stimulus persons and the out-group of male target stimulus persons. For male 
subjects, the in-group was defined as male target stimulus persons and female target stimulus 
persons formed the out-group. Group membership was indicated to the subject by the gender of 
the stimulus persons' names; female names indicated female stimulus persons and male names 
indicated male stimulus persons. 
The same basic method was used to manipulate Social Context as in Chapter 3. In the 
intragroup context conditions both the target and filler sets described members of the same 
gender group. Conversely, in the intergroup context conditions, the target set described the 
gender group indicated by the Target Group condition, while the filler set described members of 
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Table 4 2 
Schematic Overview of Stimulus Group Membership Described by the Target and Filler 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure prior to the stimulus presentation was identical to that used 
in the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3. However, no explicit reference was made to the 
stimulus persons' gender group membership; it was assumed that the use of gender 
stereotypical names to indicate the stimulus persons would be sufficient to accurately indicate 
gender group membership. 
Presentation of the stimulus person blocks was also identical to the procedure used in 
Chapters 2 and 3 with two exceptions. First, a different presentation order was used. Two of 
the filler persons blocks were presented first and the other two last in order to control for 
primacy and recency effects. The target person blocks were always presented in the third 
through sixth positions in one of two fixed orders, the purpose of which was to counterbalance 
for presentation order effects. Second, the presentation of each block was self-paced; when 
subjects had read about one stimulus person, they went on to the next person by pressing the 
Return key on the keyboard.2 
After the stimulus information presentation, subjects were given a free recall task in 
which they were asked to reproduce as much of the presented information as they could, in the 
order in which it came to them. From these protocols, the ARC-scores by person and attribute 
category were computed. 
Following the recall task, subjects completed a name-matching task (Taylor et al., 
1978), in which the names of all eight stimulus persons were displayed on the computer screen 
together with a number from 1 to 8. One by one, the descriptive attributes were shown on the 
screen. The subjects were instructed to indicate to which person a particular attribute belonged 
by typing the number corresponding to that stimulus person's name. 
Subsequently, subjects were asked to what extent they identified with both men and 
women in general. This was assessed by four questions to which the subject responded on a 
scale ranging from 1 (no identification) to 15 (strong identification; see van Twuyver & A. van 
Knippenberg, 1992). The questions measured the degree to which subjects felt connected to 
men and women; the degree to which they generally agreed with men and women; to degree to 
which they felt involved in matters concerning men and women; and the degree to which they 
cared about men and women. Finally, to check the degree of fit between the stimulus 
information and the categorizations, subjects indicated how stereotypical they found the 
stimulus information on a 15-point scale (1 = stereotypical of women, 8 = stereotype neutral, 
15 = stereotypical of men). After completing the final questions, subjects were debriefed and 
paid. 
Reading latencies were measured but failed to yield any significant effects. They will not be discussed further. 
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Results 
All analyses of variance were performed on a 2 (Social Context: intragroup, intergroup) 
χ 2 (Group: in-group, out-group) χ 2 (Fit: high, low) χ 2 (Subject Gender: men, women) 
between-subjects design unless otherwise noted. Finally, as the only purposes of the filler 
persons were to eliminate primacy and recency effects, and to manipulate the salient social 
context, only the data on the target stimulus persons will be reported. 
Manipulation Checks 
Identification. Subjects' responses to the four questions assessing own gender group 
identification and the four questions assessing other gender group identification were averaged 
separately (Cronbach's a = .81 for own gender identification questions; a = .77 for other gender 
identification questions). An ANOVA was conducted on the identification scores (Identification 
Target: own group, other group) which were treated as repeated measures. This analysis, 
yielded a main effect for Identification Target (F (1,90) = 81.14, ρ < .001); both male and 
female subjects identified significantly more with their own gender (M = 10.8) than with the 
other gender (M = 8.0). 
Stereotype/Information Fit. Prior to analysis, the manipulation check for fit 
between the stimulus information and the categorizations was recoded to reflect the three 
stimulus sets (female stereotypical, male stereotypical, and gender neutral), instead of the two 
Fit conditions (high versus low fit). This resulted in a new between-subjects factor with three 
levels, Stimulus Set, which was subjected to an analysis of variance. The main effect of 
Stimulus Set was highly significant (F(2,90) = 82.17,p < .001). Subjects perceived the female 
stereotypical stimulus set as being feminine (M = 2.5), the neutral stimulus set as gender neutral 
(M = 8.3), and the male stereotypical stimulus set as masculine (M = 12.1). The means of all 
three sets differ significantly from each other (male/neutral: F(l,65) = 42.52, ρ < .001; 
female/neutral: F(l,68) = 110.34, ρ < .001; male/female: F(l,47) = 652.64, ρ < .001). 
Subjects' ratings of the neutral set did not differ significantly from the mid-point of the scale 
(F(l,50) = .90, n.s.). These data indicate that subjects perceived the stimulus sets to have the 
desired level of fit between the information presented and the target group. 
Recall Analyses 
Clustering Data. As in Chapters 2 and 3, the factor Clustering (by person, by 
attribute category) was analyzed as a repeated measures variable. 
As predicted, a significant main effect of Fit was obtained (F(l,90) = 7.97, ρ < .006). 
Subjects in the high fit condition showed considerably more overall clustering (M = .26) than 
subjects in the low fit condition (M = .06). Note that this effect is collapsed over person and 
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attribute clustering. Apparently, subjects do not use the two clustering dimensions differentially 
as a function of category-stimulus fit. 
The main effect for Clustering dimension also proved to be reliable (F(l,90) = 8.22, ρ 
< .005) but is qualified by two-way interactions with Target Group (F(l,90) = 9.68, ρ < .002) 
and Subject Gender (F(l,90) = 4.80, ρ < .04) both of which are encompassed in the triple 
interaction, Target Group χ Subject Gender χ Clustering (F(l,90) = 10.85, ρ < .001; the means 
are presented in Figure 4.1). Figure 4.1 shows a clear asymmetry of the effects of Subject 
Gender. The left half of Figure 4.1 shows the clustering of in- and out-group information by 
male subjects. Consistent with our hypotheses, male subjects prefer to cluster information about 
other men more by person, indicating an individualized organizational strategy, than by attribute 
category (F(l,90) = 8.94, ρ < .004). Conversely, male subjects tend to engage more in attribute 
clustering of information about women, indicating a more category-based organizational 
strategy, than person clustering (F(l,90) = 4.67, ρ < .04; simple interaction within men, 
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Figure 4.1. Person and attribute clustering as functions of Target Group. 
Alternatively, the right half of Figure 4.1 reveals that women, unlike men, prefer to 
organize information about both groups in an individual-based fashion, as revealed by more 
person clustering than attribute clustering for both the in-group and the out-group (simple 
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interaction within women, F < 1; simple main effect for Clustering Dimension, F(l,90) = 
21.83, ρ <.001). 
The predicted qualifying interaction with Social Context did not reach significance 
(F(l,90) = 1.14, ρ < .29). Indeed, examination of the means revealed that the overall pattern 
found in the triple interaction, Target Group χ Subject Gender χ Clustering, is present in both 
intragroup and intergroup context conditions.3 
Amount of recalled information. In addition to the analysis of the ARC-scores, 
the number of recalled items was also examined. This yielded a main effect of Target Group 
(F(l,90) = 14.48, ρ < .001), of Subject Gender (F(l,90) = 5.25, ρ < .03), and an interaction 
between the two (F(l,90) = 4.43, ρ < .04). Overall, subjects recalled more in-group items (Λ/ = 
9.0) than out-group items (M = 6.3), and women recalled more items (Λ/ = 8.5) than men (Af = 
6.7). The interaction shows, however, that while men and women recalled equal numbers of în-
group items (Mmen = 8.8, Mwomen = 9.1; F(l,90) = 1.67, ρ < .20), women recalled more out-
group items than men (M
m e n
 = 4.1, Af
women
 = 7.8; F(l,90) = 4.42, ρ < .04). 
Note though, that the amount of recalled information is not correlated with person 
clustering (K105) = - .03 , ρ < .76) and negatively correlated with attribute clustering (r(105) = 
-.32 ,p < .001). Consequently, even though this effect parallels the triple interaction. Target 
Group by Subject Gender by Clustering, reported above, a higher recall of in-group items 
cannot account for the increased person clustering of in-group information, as compared to the 
clustering of information about the out-group. 
Name-Matching Data 
Generally, the more subjects individuate stimulus persons, as opposed to seeing them in 
terms of categories, the more stimulus items they should be able to correctly attribute to the 
stimulus persons (van Twuyver, 1996). Consequently, the name-matching data were scored for 
the number of times a subject correctly ascribed an attribute to the proper person. In the present 
study, four attributes were used to describe each target stimulus person, so that 16 attributes 
were available for the target group. As a result, a subject's score can range from 0 (no attributes 
correctly assigned) to 16 (all attributes correctly assigned). 
3
 In addition, the unpredicted interaction, Social Context by Target Group, was also significant (F(l,90) = 7 20, 
ρ < 009) Examination of the means shows that this interaction is primarily the result of increased overall 
information clustering of out-group information in an intragroup condition (M = 38), relative to the other three 
conditions (m-group/intragroup M= 04, in-group/intergroup M = 17, out-group/intergroup M = 08) The 
cause of this interaction is not entirely clear Indeed, theoretically, increased organization of out-group 
information in an intragroup condition would not be predicted, making this effect comparatively difficult to 
interpret 
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Like in the clustering analyses, a significant main effect of Fit was found (F(l,90) = 
4.44, ρ < .04). Subjects correctly identified more items in the high fit condition (M = 7.7) than 
in the low fit condition (M = 6.1). 
A main effect of Subject Gender (F(l,90) = 5.02, ρ < .03) and the hypothesized two-
way interaction Target Group by Subject Gender (F(l,90) = 7.23,ρ < .009) were also reliable. 
The main effect shows that women accurately ascribed more attributes (M = 7.5) than men (M = 
5.6). This effect was, however, qualified by the interaction with Target Group. The two left 
bars in Figure 4.2 show that — paralleling both Lorenzi-Cioldi et al.'s data and the clustering 
data in the present study — male subjects correctly ascribed more attributes to other men (the left 
white bar) than to women (the left black bar), indicating they individuated men more than 
women (F(l,90) =4.23, ρ < .05). Conversely, the two right bars in Figure 4.2 show that 
women correctly matched equal numbers of attributes and names for both the in- and the out-
group indicating equal amounts of individuation of both women (the white bar) and men (the 
black bar; F(l,90) = .87, n.s.). Upon further examination of the means, we see that the number 
of correct assignments made by female subjects for men and women do not differ significantly 
from the number of correct assignments made by men for other men. Thus, these data indicate 
that less individuation occurs when men consider the out-group, compared to the other three 
conditions. Like in the clustering analyses, the qualifying interaction with Social Context failed 
to reach significance (F(l,90) = 1.43, ρ < .24) and examination of the means showed that the 
data pattern observed in the double interaction between Target Group and Subject Gender was 
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Figure 4.2. Number of correct name-attribute matches on the name-matching task. 
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Finally, a main effect for Social Context was also significant (F(l,90) =11.33, ρ < 
.001) in which subjects in an intragroup context correctly ascribed fewer attributes (M = 5.6) 
than subjects in an intergroup condition (M = 8.4). An effect in this direction would not be 
predicted based on past research. Indeed, one would expect just the opposite, namely that 
subjects would be better able to correctly match attributes with stimulus persons in an 
intragroup condition, where individuation is facilitated, than in an intergroup context, where 
individuation is hindered. In our view, this particular effect may be the result of subjects being 
able to "chunk" the stimulus information by group (males and females) in the intergroup 
condition. In the intragroup condition, this may have been more difficult due to the fact that the 
stimulus material was made up out of eight persons from one group rather than four persons 
from each of two groups. 
In order to assess the relationship between information clustering and name-matching, 
the correlations between the number of attributes correctly assigned to the target persons on the 
name-matching task and person and attribute clustering were examined. Person clustering 
showed a positive correlation with the number of attributes correctly assigned to a stimulus 
person (r(105)= .21, ρ < .03). Thus, the more subjects engaged in person clustering, the more 
they were able to individuate the stimulus persons by correctly matching names and attributes. 
Conversely, attribute clustering, implying categorization, was negatively correlated with correct 
name matches (r(105) = -.20, ρ < .04). In sum, the correlational data suggest that both the 
information clustering and name-matching data may be related to the same underlying constructs 
(viz., individuation and categorization). 
Discussion 
Information Organization and Categorization 
The purpose of the present experiment was to examine the effects of social comparative 
context, group membership and gender on the way in which descriptive information about 
group members was organized in memory, and on the degree to which stimulus group members 
were categorized, or individuated. 
Specifically, we predicted that men would generally be more likely to categorize the out-
group and individuate the in-group. Thus, the information organization shown by male subjects 
should reveal clustering of information about other men by person, and about women by 
attribute category, and they should be better able to individuate men than women in the name-
matching task. Conversely, it was predicted that female subjects would not differ in either the 
way they organized information about the two sexes or in the degree to which they individuated 
men and women in the name matching task. Furthermore, we predicted that this effect would be 
qualified by social context such that the pattern described above should only occur in an 
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intragroup context. An intergroup context was hypothesized to lead to categorization regardless 
of either group membership or subject gender. 
The data supported the hypothesized asymmetrical effects for men and women on both 
dependent variables. The clustering scores as well as the name-matching data indicate that men 
processed information about men in a more individualized manner than they processed 
information about women, information about the latter being organized using a more category-
based method. Women, on the other hand, processed information about both men and other 
women in a similar, relatively individualized, manner. The predicted qualification by social 
context, however, failed to reach significance. 
It is important to note that the obtained information processing asymmetry is not the 
result of men and women's degree of identification with the two gender groups. Conceivably, 
the extent that women increased their identification with a particular group could have led to the 
use of a more individualized organizational strategy. However, women identified considerably 
more with the in-group than with the out-group while they individuated members of both 
groups equally. Conversely, while men clearly discriminated between the groups in terms of 
information clustering and name-matching, the discrepancy between in-group and out-group 
identification was much smaller for male than for female subjects. Note further, that neither in-
group nor out-group identification was significantly correlated with either clustering dimension 
or with performance on the name-matching task (all p's are non-significant). 
Consistent with the point made by Ostrom et al. (1993; see also Wilder, 1990), the 
present study demonstrated that the organization of information about others is not ordered by 
definition around the individual. The present data show that information about group members 
is sometimes organized around the group as a whole in lieu of an organization centered around 
the individual. Assuming that descriptive attributes are organized in a manner comparable to that 
of traits and behaviors, the present findings are in direct contrast to assertions made by such 
person memory models as the associative network model (e.g.. Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981), 
which are based on the assumption that trait and behavioral information is organized around a 
central person node and that each individual has his or her own node. 
Though students of the associative models assume that person information is organized 
around individuals, there are, to our knowledge, very few studies directly testing this 
assumption. Several studies, for example, involve descriptive information about only one 
stimulus person (Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth, 1989). As a result, while the ordering of 
stimulus information in recall may be assessed from such information, as only one person is 
described, the organization can only be by individual, thus excluding any chances for alternative 
organizational strategies. Additionally, other studies have investigated memory for groups as 
well as individuals (e.g., McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton, 1994; Wyer & Gordon, 1982, 
Experiment 1). While they often do not find organizational differences between individual and 
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group targets, they do not directly address the strategies used to organize the stimulus 
information such as we have done here. 
Gender Effects? 
As we pointed out in the introduction, gender asymmetries similar to those found in the 
present study have been reported by other researchers (Branscombe, in press; Branscombe, 
Deaux & Lerner, 1985; Burris, Branscombe & Klar, in press; Crocker & Major, 1989; Deaux, 
Kite & Lewis, 1985; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & Stewart, 1995). However, 
sometimes only non-qualified effects of group membership are reported, in which in-group 
members are individuated and out-group members are categorized, regardless of gender (e.g., 
Park & Judd, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Park & Rothbart, 1982; van Twuyver, 1996). 
Why should asymmetrical gender effects sometimes emerge and sometimes not? 
Perhaps the answer lies not in the data themselves, but rather in a hypothesis-driven testing of 
effects. Note that in the present study, the general effect of group membership on information 
clustering emerged in addition to the qualifying interaction with subject gender. Note also that 
we only find the three-way interaction because we directly tested for subject gender effects. By 
contrast, other researchers had not predicted or expected such asymmetries. As a result, an 
examination of studies in which no effects of subject gender were reported shows that it is not 
always clear if those researchers actually tested for such effects. Had these effects been 
explicitly examined, in addition to the general effects of group membership, a gender 
asymmetry similar to the one observed here could have conceivably been obtained. This would 
have qualified the general pattern reported, similar to the case in the present study. Admittedly, 
the argument presented here is only one possible explanation for the varying findings over 
studies, but one which we believe may start to explain some of the discrepancies and bring 
these seemingly incongruous bodies of research closer together. 
In the past, researchers have drawn links between gender and power or status differen-
tials. Note though that this connection remains somewhat tentative. Despite the support this 
assumption has received in previous research (Burris et al., in press; Eagly & Chrvala, 1986; 
Eagly & Wood, 1982; Echabe, 1990; Fiske, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi et al., 
1995; Pichevin & Hurtig, 1996; Vonk & Ellemers, 1993), it is not self-evident that differences 
in social status are actually made salient by activating a gender categorization when presenting 
person information. Indeed gender is linked to several social factors other than status and power 
in our society, for example differential social roles, which may be equally important and salient 
in determining the way in which males and females perceive the sexes. Nevertheless, studies 
manipulating group status experimentally (e.g., Simon & Hamilton, 1994) and other studies 
using real-life groups other than gender, which can be more reliably assumed to have discrepant 
status (e.g., D. van Knippenberg, Blaauw & Vermunt, 1996), have found asymme-trical 
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effects similar to those reported here. Thus, although we cannot directly assess if gender makes 
status differentials salient, other operationalizations of social status provide converging evidence 
in support of gender status differences and their effects on social perception. 
Social Comparative Context 
As mentioned earlier, the present data failed to yield the predicted effects of social 
context. Indeed, neither of the relevant interactions between subject gender and target group, 
observed in the clustering and name-matching analyses, were qualified by social context. 
Examination of the means revealed that, for both measures, the observed pattern of results was 
present in both context conditions. These findings seem to indicate that, though the paradigm is 
essentially identical to that used in the experiment reported in Chapter 3, the use of men and 
women as stimulus groups resulted in a diminished effect of changes in the social contextual 
environment on the individuation and categorization of the stimulus persons. 
This could have conceivably been the direct result of the hypothesized status differences 
between the stimulus groups used in the present study. As self-categorization theory argues 
(Turner, et al. 1987), we desire to place as much psychological distance as possible between 
our own group and comparison out-groups. Internal and external cues provide us with tools 
with which to achieve this maximum intergroup distinctiveness. Status differentials may act as 
cues by which we can implicitly distinguish the in-group from the out-group, and if successful, 
may automatically lead to an intergroup level of comparison even when the actual comparative 
context is intragroup. Consequently, manipulating the explicit social comparative context does 
nothing to increase intergroup comparisons, which are already present as a result of implicit 
status differences. Essentially, the effects of an explicit intergroup context on the level of 
comparison may become superfluous when the most likely categorization to be employed is one 
of unequal status groups. 
Note that the argument presented above remains tentative. As we know of no studies in 
which both the social context and group status were experimentally manipulated, there is also 
no empirical evidence suggesting the validity or invalidity of this possible explanation. 
Additional research is clearly needed in order to test the ideas described above. 
Fit 
In addition to the effects elicited by group membership and subject gender, the fit 
between the stimulus information and the stimulus category was also studied in the present 
experiment. As hypothesized, Fit resulted in main effects for both the clustering and the name-
matching analyses, in which increased fit was found to generally aid in the cognitive 
organization of person information. However, as this main effect was not qualified by the 
clustering dimension measured or other experimental factors, the data suggest that it is more a 
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question of the amount of clustering in which subjects engaged as a function of fit, rather than a 
differential type of clustering. In other words, increased fit between the category and the 
dimensions used to describe it generally seems to aid in the organization and recognition of 
descriptive information, but does not appear to lead to differential organization or recognition. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
The present data provide an interesting perspective on the processing of social 
information which so far has not been addressed explicitly by major theories. Linville et al. 
( 1989) and Ostrom et al. ( 1993), for example, do not pay much attention to the effects of social 
factors such as comparative context and group status on person perception. Instead, relative 
familiarity with a particular group is primarily thought to lead to more available sub-types of that 
group and, hence, an increased ability to individuate that group's members. However, as most 
people know equal numbers of men and women (Linville et al., 1989), this is not a particularly 
plausible account for the differential individuation of gender groups. 
Though in the literature status differentials have not been systematically discussed as a 
factor associated with categorization, it should not come as a great surprise that social factors, 
such as the status of groups in our social world, can color the way in which we perceive 
ourselves in comparison to others and the way in which we perceive others in comparison to 
ourselves. Why, though, would one of low status (in this case, women) want to get to know 
the individual members of a high status out-group (in this case, men)? Consistent with Fiske's 
(1993) reasoning, we believe that low status group members may perceive this as a strategy to 
aid in the creation of accurate expectancies of future behavior and to increase their chances of 
attaining desired rewards and outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Much of the literature to date on person information processing assumed that the 
organization of such information occurred in terms of the individual person. Recently, 
however, some factors have been identified that may elicit different kinds of information 
organization. In the present study we successfully demonstrated that the gender of the perceiver 
and the perceived interact to affect the fashion in which information about group members is 
organized in and recalled from memory. Though studies like the present one are important in 
pointing out the effects of social factors on our basic cognitive processes, more empirical and 
theoretical work needs to be done in order to incorporate social and cognitive perspectives. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECTS OF CONTEXT, CROUP MEMBERSHIP AND 
STEREOTYPE CONSISTENCY ON ATTENTION ALLOCATION 
ANP FAVORABILITY RATINCS 
In recent social psychological literature there has been an up-and-coming interest in the 
effects of changes in the social comparative context on the perception of groups and their 
members (Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Doosje, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, Turner & 
McGarty, 1995; Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995; 
Young, van Knippenberg, Ellemers & de Vries, in press). Specifically, this growing line of 
research has shown that shifts in the social context from the presence of only one group 
(intragroup context) to the presence of more than one group (intergroup context) affects the 
degree to which in-group members are categorized. Conversely, shifts in comparative context 
do not generally affect the degree to which perceivers categorize out-group members (though 
see Young, van Knippenberg, Ellemers, de Vries & Ekels, 1996, for an exception). In the 
present study, we are interested in the effects of changes in the social comparative context from 
intragroup to intergroup on the perception of in-group and out-group members and their 
attitudes. To this end, the present study employs two measures: reading latencies and person 
evaluations. 
Reading Latencies 
Reading latencies are generally accepted as measures of attention allocation. 
Supposedly, increased attention is given to a portion of information that is more salient than the 
rest. Often this is achieved by using information contrary to stereotypical expectations which 
generally elicits longer reading latencies in order to incorporate the inconsistencies in 
impressions (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Belmore, 1987; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982; Stern, 
Marrs, Millar & Cole, 1984; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995). 
In a typical study, Vonk and van Knippenberg (1995), for example, presented subjects 
with a discussion among either six in-group stimulus persons or six out-group stimulus 
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persons whose attitudes exemplified varying degrees of stereotype consistency. Subjects were 
instructed to attend either to the group of discussants as a whole or to each discussant as an 
individual. Reading latencies formed the main dependent variable. Generally, subjects paid 
more attention to a stereotype inconsistent out-group member than to one who was stereotype 
consistent, regardless of the processing instructions. Conversely, the attention given to 
consistent and inconsistent in-group members depended on the processing instructions subjects 
had received. When instructed to attend to the group, the inconsistent in-group members were 
clearly in conflict with stereotypical expectations. As a result, subjects read inconsistent in-
group members' attitudes longer than those belonging to consistent in-group members. When 
subjects were instructed to focus on the individual in-group members, however, they did not 
attend to inconsistent attitudes longer than to consistent attitudes. 
Such findings do not only converge with ideas surrounding inconsistency resolution but 
also with arguments made by self-categorization theory, which would tend to qualify the simple 
effects of stereotype consistency (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Specifically, self-categorization theory would posit that the 
degree to which stereotype inconsistent information is actually more attention getting and 
expectancy inconsistent than stereotype consistent information, depends upon the level of social 
comparisons being used at the time. Generally, self-categorization theory argues that there are 
different levels available at which to make social comparisons. These levels are activated by 
factors within the self and the environment in which a social interaction takes place. When a 
perceiver finds him or herself in a situation with only one group present (an intragroup 
situation), interindividual comparisons can be made among group members because there is no 
comparison group present against which to compare the group as a whole. 
Alternatively, when a comparison between two or more groups becomes either' 
implicitly or explicitly salient, interindividual comparisons are discarded in exchange for 
intergroup comparisons. When this occurs, perceivers should be more likely to view a group as 
one unit, as a result of which, inconsistent group members become increasingly salient and 
deserving of attention. It is important to note that the mere presence of an out-group is 
supposedly enough to elicit intergroup comparisons regardless of whether the in-group is 
present or not. Interindividual comparisons are generally only possible between in-group 
members. 
Empirically speaking, when subjects make interindividual comparisons, stereotype 
inconsistent information should not be more unusual than stereotype consistent information. 
Because the group stereotype against which (in)consistent information would be compared is 
not salient, inconsistent information should not be more attention getting than consistent 
information. Rather, only when an intergroup comparison level is salient, should stereotype 
inconsistent information lead to longer reading latencies than stereotype consistent information. 
STEREOTYPE CONSISTENCY 57 
In the present experiment, we examine reading latencies of consistent and inconsistent 
in-group and out-group attitudes, in intragroup and intergroup contexts. Because the presence 
of an out-group should lead to intergroup comparisons, only in an intragroup context with the 
in-group, would similar reading latencies be expected for stereotype consistent and inconsistent 
information. Under all other conditions studied in this experiment (intergroup with the in-
group, and both intragroup and intergroup with the out-group) intergroup levels of comparison 
should become salient thus rendering it comparatively likely that the subject's attention would 
be affected by the salience of inconsistent attitudes. In sum, increased reading latencies for 
inconsistent information, relative to consistent information, may be expected under all 
conditions with the exception of an intragroup condition with the in-group. 
Evaluations 
Up until now, we have focused primarily on reading latencies which may inform us 
about the encoding of information about group members. However, the effects of social context 
are not limited to encoding effects such as differential reading latencies; evaluations of the group 
and its members may be affected equally by changes in social conditions. In an attempt to 
explore the effects of changes in social context on dimensions other than attention allocation, 
the present study also examines the favorability of the evaluations of stimulus persons 
perceived in different social contexts. 
Our hypotheses in regard to the evaluation of stimulus persons are based on the same 
underlying arguments as those regarding reading latencies and hence should show parallel 
effects. Namely changes in the comparative context are hypothesized to result in changes in the 
relevant level of categorization and thus the degree to which people are socially categorized. 
When a comparative context is conducive to interindividual comparisons, an evaluator is free to 
accept differences between group members. Consequently, in an intragroup situation, a 
perceiver may favorably evaluate a group member whose attitude is inconsistent with the group 
norm. Conversely, when the social context is more likely to elicit intergroup comparisons, the 
group norm is more likely to be used as a reference point for the evaluation of others (Turner, 
1991). Thus, that same inconsistent group member may be negatively evaluated when the 
group norm becomes salient in an intergroup context. 
As mentioned earlier, however, this process may only take place for in-group members; 
a chronic intergroup comparison level with the out-group renders individuation of out-group 
members unlikely, regardless of the explicit social context (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
In regards to our specific hypotheses, we first predict an interaction between the group 
being evaluated and the stereotype consistency of the stimulus information. Specifically, we 
expect that both in-group and out-group members, who agree with the stereotypical attitude 
held by one's own group, will be more positively evaluated than those who disagree with the 
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general attitude held by one's group. Thus, consistent in-group and inconsistent out-group 
members will be more favorably evaluated than inconsistent in-group and consistent out-group 
members. 
Second, following from the arguments outlined above, we predict that the two-way 
interaction between the evaluated group and the consistency of the group members will be 
qualified by the social context in which the information is communicated. In particular, we 
expect that the evaluation of consistent and inconsistent in-group members will be influenced by 
the social context. While no evaluative differences are expected between consistent and 
inconsistent in-group members in an intragroup context, salient intergroup comparisons in an 
intergroup context should lead to a more positive evaluation of consistent in-group members 
than inconsistent in-group members. 
Conversely, we expect that inconsistent out-group members will always be more 
positively evaluated than consistent out-group members because their attitudes are so 
compatible with those supposedly held by the in-group. Social context should be of little 
consequence to the evaluation of out-group members because out-group presence is assumed to 
evoke a social categorical level of comparison (and hence activate group norms) in all contexts. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Eighty-one undergraduate students took part in the present study (52 women and 29 
men). They received DFL 5.00 in exchange for participation. The factors Social Context 
(intragroup, intergroup), Target Group (in-group, out-group) and three Presentation Orders 
were manipulated between subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 12 
experimental cells. 
Stimulus Materials and Manipulations 
The manipulation of Social Context was achieved in the same fashion as in the study 
described in Chapter 4. The second between-subjects factor, Target Group, was operationalized 
in terms of gender groups. Finally, the order in which the stimulus material was presented was 
manipulated in order to control for presentation order effects. This resulted in three Order 
conditions which will be discussed in more detail later in this section. 
Twelve stimulus persons were presented, six of which were "target" persons, who were 
presented in the fourth through ninth positions. The other six stimulus persons were "context" 
persons, who were presented first through third, and tenth through twelfth, the functions of 
which were to manipulate the social context and simultaneously control for primacy and recency 
effects. 
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The stimulus information in the present study described attitudes concerning affirmative 
action towards women in employment procedures. Attitude statements were piloted for attitude 
direction (in favor of or opposed to affirmative action), attitude extremity and the degree to 
which the attitude was stereotypical of men and women (see Appendix for more details). Of the 
12 statements selected for the experimental stimulus material, six strongly favored and six 
strongly opposed affirmative action, and all were approximately 20 words long. 
Note that statements endorsing affirmative action were consistent with stereotypical 
expectations about women and inconsistent with stereotypical expectations about men. 
Conversely, statements opposing affirmative action were consistent with expectations about 
men and inconsistent with expectations about women. This additional factor, Information 
Consistency (stereotype consistent, stereotype inconsistent), was manipulated within subjects 
and was crossed with the context and target stimulus sets, such that three context and three 
target persons were presented as being in favor of affirmative action while the remaining three 
context and three target persons appeared to be opposed. By crossing favoring and opposing 
statements with male and female stimulus persons, as represented by the stimulus persons in 
the target and context stimulus sets respectively, we were able to give the impression that within 
each gender group, some group members were stereotype consistent, in terms of their attitudes 
towards affirmative action, and some stereotype inconsistent. 
In order to make the experiment more "life like," subjects were given descriptive 
information about each stimulus person, in addition to the stimulus attitude statement. This 
information held no particular value for the subjects other than to make the stimulus persons 
seem more real. The descriptive information was made up of five pieces of information about 
each stimulus person: their name, age, occupation (or college major) and two additional items 
regarding favorite sports, hobbies, interests or other aspects of their private lives. The 
information was gender stereotypical and essentially uninformative in terms of the stimulus 
persons' attitude regarding affirmative action. 
At this point, it seems useful to describe the manipulation of the order in which the 
stimulus information was presented in more detail. First, it is important to note that the 
descriptive information about each stimulus person was always presented in a fixed position. 
For example, in conditions in which the target stimulus persons were female, Anne, who was 
presented eighth in Order 1, was also presented eighth in Orders 2 and 3. Furthermore, Anne 
was described by the same descriptive information in all order conditions. Alternatively, in the 
conditions in which the target stimulus persons were men, the descriptive information about the 
person in the eighth position was always about Tom (not Anne), and was also identical in all 
order conditions. 
Consequently, the manipulation of the presentation order refers only to the presentation 
of the attitude statements in a different random sequence in each order condition. For example, 
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in Order 1, Anne (or Tom, depending on the condition) is opposed to affirmative action as 
reflected by her (his) attitude statement. Conversely, she (he) is in favor of affirmative action in 
Order 2, as reflected by a different attitude statement. As a result of manipulating the 
presentation in this fashion, the presentation order of the attitude statements themselves is 
varied over conditions, the attitude statements are randomly combined with varying descriptive 
information, and order in which favored versus opposed opinions are presented is also varied. 
Procedure 
Like previous experiments, the present study was conducted on Apple Macintosh 
computers. Before starting the actual experiment, subjects were given short instructions on the 
use of the computer. 
Subjects were told that they were taking part in an experiment about how people 
perceive and follow group discussions. They were told that they would see excerpts from a 
discussion which had taken place between 12 people on affirmative action towards women in 
employment procedures. No mention was made of the fictitious discussion participants' gender 
prior to the stimulus presentation, as it was assumed from prior research (see Chapter 4) that 
the use of gender stereotypical names would be sufficient to unambiguously indicate gender 
group membership. Subjects were told that they would see one attitude statement for each of the 
12 stimulus persons, which essentially represented a summation of their views on affirmative 
action. In addition, they were told that they would also receive some descriptive information 
about each discussant so that they could form a more vivid impression of each person. Subjects 
were instructed to follow the discussion as well as possible because they would receive 
questions about it later. In addition, they were instructed not to hurry through the information, 
but to take their time, be careful and concentrate on the task. 
At this point the stimulus information was presented. As in earlier studies, all 
information about each stimulus person (attitude statement and descriptive information) was 
presented blocked by person on the computer screen. When subjects had finished reading about 
a stimulus person, they pressed the Return key on the keyboard in order to continue on to the 
next person. In this way, we were able to measure subjects' reading latencies, which 
constituted one of the main dependent variables. 
After the presentation of the stimulus information, subjects indicated the degree to which 
they had a favorable impression of each stimulus person. Subjects were asked to indicate on a 
scale from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive) how positive their impression was of each 
respective stimulus person. 
Subsequently, subjects indicated their own attitude about affirmative action on a scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The Target Group and Social Context 
manipulations were checked by asking subjects to indicate about which group(s) they had 
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received information: men (1), women (2), or men and women (3). Finally subjects were asked 
if they had read attitude statements which were in favor of affirmative action (1), opposed to 
affirmative action (2), or both statements which were in favor of as well as opposed to 




The manipulations of Social Context and Target Group were checked by means of 
asking subjects to indicate about which group(s) they had read: men (1), women (2), or men 
and women (3). Of the 81 subjects, 80 correctly indicated the answer corresponding to their 
assigned condition. The subject who indicated an incorrect response was not omitted from the 
final analyses (see previous chapters). 
Subjects were also asked to indicate whether they had read information that was in favor 
of affirmative action (1), opposed to affirmative action (2), or information which had reflected 
both standpoints (3). All 81 subjects correctly indicated that they had read statements which 
were both in favor of, as well as opposed to, affirmative action. 
Finally, examination of the subjects' own attitudes with regards to affirmative action 
indicates that female subjects were more in favor of affirmative action (M = 6.1) than male 
subjects (M = 5.0; F(l,57) = 5.07, ρ < .03), consistent with pre-test findings.1 No other 
effects or interactions were found for this measure. 
Main Dependent Measures 
Analyses of variance were performed on all main dependent measures using a 2 (Social 
Context: intragroup, intergroup) χ 2 (Target Group: in-group, out-group) χ 2 (Subject Gender: 
men, women) χ 3 (Presentation Order) χ 2 (Information Consistency: stereotype consistent, 
stereotype inconsistent) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on the last factor. 
Identical to the analyses reported in Chapter 4, the only functions of the context set were to 
control for primacy and recency effects and to manipulate Social Context. Consequently, only 
the data from the target stimulus set were analyzed. 
Reading latencies. The hypothesized main effect for Information Consistency was 
marginally reliable, F(l,57) = 3.60, ρ < .07. Subjects took longer to read information 
1
 Note lhat, while women were more in favor of affirmative action than men, men's scores indicate that they 
were not particularly opposed; men's average score of 5.0 places them on the mid-point of the 9-point response 
scale. In an analysis in which a median split was conducted on male subjects' attitudes, comparable effects 
emerged for men who were opposed to affirmative action and men who were in favor of affirmative action. 
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inconsistent with stereotypical expectations (M = 15.7 s) than information conforming to 
stereotypical expectations (M = 14.5 s). 
The predicted triple interaction, Social Context χ Target Group χ Information 
Consistency, failed to reach significance, F(l,57) = .00,ρ < .99. However, the main effect of 
Information Consistency was qualified by a significant two-way interaction with Social 
Context, F(l,57) = 5.11, ρ < .03. Here, subjects read information about both consistent and 
inconsistent stimulus persons for equally long amounts of time in the intragroup condition. 
Conversely, in the intergroup condition, information about inconsistent group members was 
read longer than information about consistent group members. 
Table 5.1 
Reading Latencies in Seconds as a Function of Social Context, Target Group, Subject Gender 
and Information Consistency 
Subject Gender 
men women 
Social Context intragroup intergroup intragroup intergroup 
Information 
Consistency 
Target in-group consistent 16 2 17.3 14.2 a 14.4 a 
Group inconsistent 17 6 17.2 12.5 a 19.9 b 
out-group consistent 16 2 13.6 13.6 12.6 
inconsistent 13 6 17 3 14 5 14 3 
Note different letters denote significant differences between cells at or below the 05 level as indicated by 
ANOVA planned comparisons. 
This two-way interaction was in turn qualified by the four-way interaction, Social 
Context χ Information Consistency χ Target Group χ Subject Gender (F(l,57) = 5.92, ρ < 
.02). Examination of the means presented in Table 5.1 shows that the two-way interaction 
between Context and Information Consistency was only present when female subjects 
evaluated in-group members (upper right quadrant of Table 5.1; F(l,57) = 15.05, ρ < .001). 
No differential effects were observed for the evaluation of out-group members by either gender 
(simple interaction within the out-group conditions: F(l,57) = 1.55, ρ < .22) or for men's 
evaluation of the in-group (F(l,57) = .33, n.J.).2 
Evaluations. The favorability ratings of the three consistent target stimulus persons 
were averaged as were the favorability ratings given to the three inconsistent target stimulus 
persons, resulting in two scores per subject on which the analyses were conducted. The 
hypothesized interaction, Target Group χ Information Consistency, reached significance 
2
 A four-way interaction between Target Group, Subject Gender, Information Consistency and Presentation Order 
was also significant, F(2,57) = 16 58, ρ < 001. As this higher order interaction is highly significant, it should 
be taken seriously However, it does not in any way qualify any other observed effects, as context is not 
implicated Furthermore, as it was not predicted and is extremely complex, we were unable to interpret it in any 
meaningful way 
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(F(l,57) = 6.78, ρ < .02). Examination of the means presented in Table 5.2 reveals that this 
interaction reflects the fact that consistent in-group members and inconsistent out-group 
members are evaluated more positively than either inconsistent in-group members or consistent 
out-group members. 
Table 5.2 




Consistency in-group out-group 
consistent 5 9 a 4 1b 
inconsistent 4 6 b 5 8 a 
Note different letters denote significant differences between cells at or below the .05 level as indicated by 
ANOVA planned comparisons 
In addition, this two-way interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction with 
Subject Gender (F(l,57) = 155.11, ρ < .001). As shown in Table 5.3, it seems that the pattern 
described above is only present for female subjects. Males show a reversed pattern in which 
inconsistent m-group members and consistent out-group members are evaluated more favorably 
than either consistent in-group members or inconsistent out-group members. In other words, 
both male and female subjects rate both male and female stimulus persons more favorably when 
they are in favor of affirmative action. This may be a reflection of a social desirability effect in 
which men are uncomfortable endorsing standpoints which are not considered politically correct 
or normative (cf. Stolte, 1995). 
Table 5.3 















4 0 a 




5 9 b 
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Note· different letters denote significant differences between cells at or below the 05 level as indicated by 
ANOVA planned comparisons 
The predicted triple interaction between Social Context, Target Group and Information 
Consistency again failed to reach significance (f (1,57) = .58, ρ < .45). However, an 
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examination of in-group and out-group member evaluations, separately, revealed the predicted 
two-way interaction between Social Context and Information Consistency for the evaluation of 
in-group members (F(l,57) = 4.70, ρ < .04). Table 5.4 shows that while both consistent and 
inconsistent in-group members are rated equally favorably in an intragroup context, inconsistent 
in-group members are rated less favorably than consistent in-group members in an intergroup 
context. 
Table 5.4 























Note: different letters denote significant differences between cells at or below the .05 level as indicated by 
ANOVA planned comparisons. 
Conversely, analyses of out-group member evaluations revealed a highly significant 
main effect for Information Consistency (F(l,57) = 30.57, p< .001) in which inconsistent out-
group members were evaluated more positively (M = 5.8) than consistent out-group members 
(M = 4.1). Moreover, as hypothesized, out-group members were not differentially evaluated as 
a function of the comparative context; neither a main effect for nor interactions with Social 
Context were found for out-group evaluations. 
Discussion 
The study described in the present chapter investigated the effects of the stereotype 
consistency of group members' attitudes, the social context in which information is 
communicated, and gender group membership on reading latencies and group member 
evaluations. In short, female subjects were found to be differentially sensitive to changes in the 
social context when reading attitude statements from other in-group members. Specifically, 
women did not spend differential amounts of time reading consistent and inconsistent 
statements in the intragroup condition. However, in the intergroup condition, the salience of a 
comparison group supposedly increased, leading to an increased salience of inconsistent 
information, resulting in increased reading latencies of inconsistent in-group attitude statements 
relative to consistent in-group attitudes. Male subjects, on the other hand, did not spend 
differential amounts of time reading consistent and inconsistent in-group statements, and neither 
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male nor female subjects spent differential amounts of time reading consistent and inconsistent 
out-group statements. 
The evaluations of the individual stimulus persons in terms of favorability ratings 
showed different results. Here, the in-group was differentially evaluated as a function of social 
context by both men and women. Specifically, while the evaluation of consistent and 
inconsistent in-group members differed in an intergroup context, attitude consistency had no 
effect on in-group evaluation in the intragroup condition. Stereotype inconsistent out-group 
members, on the other hand, were always evaluated more favorably than consistent out-group 
members irrespective of the implicit or explicit social context. 
These results seem to confirm the theoretical supposition that when intergroup 
comparisons become salient, perceivers are more likely to use the group stereotype against 
which to judge group members. Essentially, the category becomes salient and, consequently, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for perceivers to view newly encountered group members as 
individuals. As a result, group members who hold attitudes inconsistent with those 
stereotypically held by the group, are increasingly seen as unexpected and — in the case of the 
in-group — as undesirable as well. Subjects cease to rely on individuating methods of 
information processing and person perception; social circumstances essentially lead them to use 
the category to process information about group members. 
Though context was found to have a basically similar effect on reading latencies and 
favorability evaluations, the effects obtained for these dependent measures were not identical. 
The presence of inconsistent in-group information in an intergroup context led only female 
subjects to read inconsistent information longer than consistent information. Alternatively, 
subjects of both genders showed a sensitivity to social context when making favorability 
evaluations of in-group members. 
Given the present stimulus topic, namely affirmative action in employment proceedings, 
the effects observed for reading latencies may be the result of differential involvement in the 
topic {cf. Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978; Mummendey & Simon, 1989; Spears & Manstead, 
1989). Affirmative action primarily affects women's positions in society; men have 
considerably less personal involvement with such movements. Consequently, men may not be 
particularly sensitive to differential attitudes and hence do not spend more time reading one type 
of attitude statement than another. Women, on the other hand, have a higher involvement in 
issues such as affirmative action and the pilot studies conducted here further showed that 
women generally favor affirmative action more than men. Potentially, then, given the political 
nature of the topic, achievement of this equality goal may be aided if women perceive each other 
to be of one mind on such issues, specifically when intergroup comparisons are salient. Thus, 
in an intergroup context, women who hold opinions contrary to stereotypical expectations may 
be particularly salient to other women, thereby eliciting increased amounts of attention. 
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It is important to note that reading latencies were also measured in the study in Chapter 
4, but yielded no significant effects or interactions. However, these findings are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the analysis of the effects found in the present chapter. Note that here the 
findings are the result of differential reading latencies of stereotype inconsistent attitude 
statements as a function of changes in the social context. In the study in Chapter 4, however, 
the stimulus material consists of descriptive attributes none of which were ever inconsistent 
with stereotypical expectations of the gender group members. As a result, there was no 
stereotype inconsistent information to which subjects could differentially attend as a function of 
the manipulation of the social context. 
Contrary to the effects found for reading latencies, both men's and women's 
favorability ratings of in-group members were sensitive to the level of comparative context. 
Subjects seemed to make allowances for inconsistent in-group members under circumstances in 
which no comparison groups were salient; ratings were equally favorable for both stereotype 
consistent and inconsistent in-group members in the intragroup context. In contrast, stereotype 
consistent in-group members were more favorably evaluated than stereotype inconsistent in-
group members in an intergroup context. 
On the other hand, however, the ratings of out-group members were apparently not 
affected by the explicit social context. Instead, mere out-group membership appeared to be the 
driving factor upon which subjects could base evaluations by providing normative expectations 
about the out-group (Gilbert, 1995). Based on the present research it would seem that neither 
reading latencies nor evaluations of out-group members are particularly sensitive to changes in 
extraneous factors such as social context. 
Taken together, the two measures, reading latencies and favorability ratings, would 
seem to be driven by different mechanisms. In other words, different processes may be 
responsible for the allocation of attention and the making of evaluative judgments {cf. Erber and 
Fiske, 1984). Inconsistency in an out-group member may not prompt a perceiver to allocate 
increased attention to that person relative to a consistent out-group member. However, this does 
not seem to mean that the perceiver will negate out-group membership when making evaluative 
judgments in an intragroup context. Even though inconsistent out-group members do not attract 
more attention, in terms of reading latencies, than consistent members, the evaluations of 
consistent and inconsistent out-group members may be based on normative expectations about 
the out-group as a whole. 
In the present study, changes in the social comparative context have again been 
demonstrated to affect perceptions of group members. Considering the results observed in 
Chapter 3, for example, in which social context had a differential effect on the clustering of in-
and out-group information, we see seemingly similar effects. Specifically, differential 
evaluations were found for members of in- and out-groups as a function of the social context in 
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which the information was communicated. However, even though the patterns observed in both 
experiments seem to converge at first glance, they are most likely the result of functionally 
different processes. While the cognitive organization of incoming information can be interpreted 
as the filing away of information for the facilitation of later retrieval, it does not necessarily 
have to lead to an evaluation of either the stimulus information or the person whom it describes. 
Conversely, the evaluation of a stimulus person may occur simply on the basis knowledge of 
that person's group membership. 
To illustrate, consider that knowing that someone is a terrorist will probably lead a 
perceiver to make an unfavorable evaluation of that person even before any other information is 
acquired and cognitively organized. Conversely, a perceiver can receive and cognitively 
organize information about a stimulus person without committing themselves to either a 
favorable or unfavorable evaluation. Indeed, in the present experiment, subjects were asked to 
evaluate the stimulus persons on a 9-point scale after receiving information about their 
standpoint on affirmative action. Note that in the intragroup condition subjects evaluated the in-
group close to the mid-point of the scale indicating that they were not yet ready to commit 
themselves to a polarized evaluation as a function of the information they had received. 
Nevertheless, findings reported in earlier chapters indicated that incoming information subjects 
received was encoded and cognitively organized as a matter of course. 
Though it is difficult to compare the processes of information organization with person 
evaluation, it is clear that changes in social context affected them both. Similar converging 
evidence can also be found in other research (Chapters 3 of this dissertation; Doosje, 1995; 
Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van 
Knippenberg, 1995), thus testifying to the potentially robust effects of social context on the 
way we perceive the people around us and on the processes affecting these perceptions. In the 
next, and final empirical chapter, we will continue the investigation of social context as a 
determining factor of person perception by examining the way in which perceivers choose to 
acquire social information and how this affects the structure of information recall. 
CHAPTER 6 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION VERSUS RETRIEVAL 
Previous experiments reported in this dissertation (Chapters 3 and 5) have successfully 
shown that the comparative context in which social information is communicated can and does 
affect the way in which information is processed. Implicitly or explicitly, though, we have 
consistently made the assumption that the social context affects the way information is encoded, 
and that this accounts for differences found in, for example, clustering in recall (viz. Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986). Self-categorization theory supports this assumption by suggesting that it is 
the situation in which groups and group members are encountered that affects our perception of 
them (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). The study described in Chapter 5 
and Vonk and van Knippenberg (1995) found that indeed when the situation called for more, 
respectively less, social categorization, (female) subjects adapted the amount of attention given 
to inconsistent in-group members, as measured by reading latencies, to reflect situational 
demands. In other words, when the social context changed, subjects changed the amount of 
attention allotted to stimulus information during encoding accordingly. 
Aside from data provided by reading latencies however, the use of retrieval measures in 
earlier chapters has not allowed us to investigate directly the encoding of stimulus information. 
The present experiment was designed to examine the effects of social context and group 
membership at the encoding stage of processing, in addition to the retrieval stage, using a so 
called information display board paradigm to trace the course of information acquisition and 
recall (Jacoby, Jaccard, Kuss, Troutman & Mazursky, 1987; see also Aarts, 1996). 
In all other studies described in this dissertation, subjects received stimulus information 
presented in a fixed order and blocked by person. Assumingly, subjects employed an on-line 
encoding strategy to organize the incoming information in a meaningful way, given personal 
and situational demands. The assumption behind the information board paradigm is we can tap 
into the employed encoding strategy by assessing the method used by subjects to freely and 
actively acquire information. In principle, the strategy used by subjects to actively acquire 
information should reflect the organizational processes directly following the passive reception 
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of pre-structured stimulus information (v. Brown, Conover, Flores & Goodman, 1991; 
Holtgraves & Srull, 1990; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rothbart, Evans & Fulero, 1979). 
Generally, the information display board paradigm is used in conjunction with decision 
making (see e.g., Harte, Westenberg & van Someren, 1994) or social judgment research (see 
e.g., Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults & Doherty, 1989). In these lines of study, subjects are 
instructed to acquire as much information as necessary in order to make a choice between 
various options (e.g., which mode of travel to use or which refrigerator to buy) or to make a 
judgment about the various options (e.g., likeability ratings of stimulus persons). 
In a typical information display board study, subjects are presented with a matrix in 
which the cells are represented by characteristics corresponding to "options" on the vertical axis 
(e.g., travel mode choices, refrigerators or people) and "properties" on the horizontal axis 
(e.g., distance of trip, price or favorite sports). The cells are presented blank, and subjects must 
select various cells (either by turning over corresponding index cards or by indicating particular 
cells on a computer screen) in order to acquire information about the various options. 
An information display board paradigm allows us to examine several different aspects of 
the encoding process. First, we can evaluate the depth of processing. The more items a subject 
views and the longer a subject takes to inspect the contents of a cell, the deeper the processing 
of the information. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, by evaluating the sequence in 
which a subject selects the cells for viewing, we can get an idea of the way in which subjects 
prefer to receive information for encoding under various circumstances, and thus infer the 
processes driving these preferences. 
In the present study, this paradigm will allow us to follow subjects' encoding strategies 
as they acquire information about various stimulus persons in a person perception task. The 
"options" will be represented by four stimulus persons. The "properties" will be represented by 
four attribute categories: character trait, reading preference, favorite sport and part-time job, 
resulting in a 4 χ 4 matrix. Subjects will be asked to acquire or collect as much information 
about the four stimulus persons as they need to "get a good idea what these people are like." If 
a subject acquires information by primarily viewing cells sequentially by person (e.g., view all 
cells about Mike first, then all cells about Aaron), we may conclude that this person-based 
strategy is indicative of individuation. Conversely, subjects may choose to acquire information 
by viewing the cells sequentially by attribute category (e.g., first all favorite sports, then all 
character traits). This would be indicative of a less individuating acquisition strategy. By 
recording or "tracing" a subject's path during the acquisition of stimulus information, we will 
be able to assess which strategy is preferred under different conditions (Payne, 1976). 
In addition to the appropriate nature of process tracing measures for the evaluation of 
information acquisition, these techniques can also be applied, in principle, to evaluate the recall 
of information, though we know of no studies in which this has been done. Nevertheless, by 
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evaluating the sequence in which a subject recalls items, using the same matrix structure as the 
information display board, it is theoretically possible to examine the memorial organization of 
the stimulus information at retrieval as opposed to during encoding. 
The tracing measure employed here is strikingly similar to the adjusted ratio of 
clustering index used in previous chapters. They both provide indices to assess the degree to 
which subjects use one dimension or another for information organization. Indeed, in the 
framework of this dissertation, it is conceivably possible to substitute one for the other. 
However, as the tracing measure described here was designed specifically for use with the 
information board paradigm (Payne, 1976), we will employ this measure in the study described 
in this chapter rather than the clustering measure used in earlier studies. 
In keeping with prior studies, subjects will be asked to acquire information about either 
in-group or out-group members, as defined by gender groups, in either an intragroup or an 
intergroup context. Theoretically, the differential organization of social information is 
hypothesized to occur at the encoding stage of processing and still be present at retrieval 
(Brown, Conover, Flores & Goodman, 1991; Holtgraves & Srull, 1990; Klein & Kihlstrom, 
1986; Rothbart, Evans & Fulero, 1979). As a consequence, predictions for the acquisition 
phase of this study are identical to predictions made for the recall phase. 
Overall, we expect that information about in-group members will be acquired and 
recalled more by person than information about out-group members. Further, consistent with 
other research on the effects of social context, we expect that only the acquisition and 
recollection of in-group information will be sensitive to changes in the social context. 
Specifically, we expect that subjects in an intragroup context will prefer to acquire and recall 
information more by person than subjects in an intergroup context. Changes in social context 
should not have any effect on the acquisition and recollection of out-group information. 
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Thirty-five undergraduates (7 men and 28 women) took part in the present study. They 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental cells, and were paid DFL 5.00 for their 
participation. Social Context (intragroup, intergroup), and Target Group (in-group, out-group) 
were manipulated between-subjects. 
Stimulus Materials and Manipulations 
Information display board. In the present study a process tracing paradigm 
(Jacoby et al., 1987) was used to assess the way in which subjects collected or acquired 
information about members of the in-group in intra- and intergroup contexts. In the version of 
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this paradigm used here, subjects were given an information display board in a 4 χ 4 matrix 
format (16 cells) which was presented as a computer task {cf. Aarts, 1996). The four stimulus 
persons were displayed on the vertical axis and the attribute categories {e.g., favorite sport, 
character trait), on the horizontal axis (see Figure 6.1). The cells themselves were presented 
blank. 
Subjects were able to view an attribute belonging to a particular stimulus person by 
clicking on the corresponding matrix cell with the computer mouse. At this point, the 
information corresponding to the selected cell was displayed in the appropriate cell on the 
computer screen. When subjects had read the attribute, they went on to the next attribute by 
clicking on a different cell, at which point the inspection latency for the first cell was registered. 
The first cell was then covered by a gray pattern so that subjects could keep track of which cells 
they had selected previously {e.g., top left cell in Figure 6.1). Furthermore, a cell could only be 
selected once; after a subject had viewed a particular cell and then gone on to another, the first 
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Figure 6.1. Information display board matrix. 
The stimulus information presented in the information matrix was identical to the 
gender-neutral target stimulus set used in the experiment in Chapter 4. By using gender neutral 
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attributes, the same stimulus information could be used for both male and female stimulus 
persons. 
Manipulations of Target Group and Social Context. As in previous studies, 
Target Group and Social Context were manipulated. Group membership was operationalized in 
terms of gender, as in the two previous chapters. However, a different context manipulation 
was employed from that used in earlier experiments. 
Subjects in the intergroup condition were told that they were to acquire information 
about either men or women (depending on their own gender and the Target Group condition). 
They were further informed that other subjects would be doing the same task, but about 
stimulus persons of the other gender. In this way we attempted to focus subjects' attention on 
men and women as groups and to simultaneously increase the salience of intergroup 
comparisons. 
In the intragroup condition, no mention was made of stimulus gender; subjects were 
informed that they were to acquire information about "people." What subjects in other 
conditions were doing was not addressed. Here, even though gender group membership was 
indicated by gender-stereotypical names, gender as a basis for categorization was not made 
explicitly salient. 
Procedure 
The present experiment was conducted on Apple Macintosh computers, as were all 
previous studies. After short instructions on the use of the computer in general, and the mouse 
in particular, subjects indicated their gender. 
Subjects were told they were participating in a study about person perception in which 
we were interested in the way people perceive others as a function of who the others are and 
under what kind of circumstances the perception occurs. 
Subjects were instructed to "collect" or acquire information about four stimulus persons 
(either "men" or "women" in the intergroup condition; or "people" in the intragroup condition) 
by clicking on the matrix cells with the mouse. They were to acquire as much information as 
they needed in order to "get a good idea what the men/women/people are like." Subjects could 
view the contents of as many cells as they liked in any order they liked; they were not required 
to click all 16 cells, though they could if they desired. When subjects felt they had acquired 
sufficient information to form a "good idea" what the stimulus persons were like, they clicked 
on a square on the computer screen marked READY (see Figure 6.1). Once subjects had 
clicked the READY square, the computer program continued with the rest of the experiment. 
The information acquisition task was followed by a cued recall task using an 
information display board identical to the one used in the acquisition task. Subjects were 
instructed to recall a piece of information which they had read in the acquisition task, click the 
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cell corresponding to the appropriate stimulus person and attribute category, type the recalled 
attribute in the cell, and press the Return key on the computer keyboard to register the recalled 
attribute in the computer. This process was repeated until the subject could no longer recall any 
attributes. At this point they clicked on a READY square, similar to that used in the acquisition 
task, to continue with the rest of the experiment. 
Subsequent to the recall task, subjects were asked to indicate their gender a second time 
to check if their responses were consistent with those given at the onset of the experiment. 




All 35 subjects indicated correctly that they had collected (and recalled) information 
about men (or women, according to condition). 
Main Dependent Measures 
Process Tracing 
The primary dependent measure in the present study is a "trace" of the path a subject 
uses to acquire information. In other words, it is an evaluation of the sequence in which a 
subject chooses the various matrix cells in order to acquire information about the four stimulus 
persons. An acquisition strategy in which a subject chooses to view information "by person" 
would be indicative of individuation. This would be characterized by a relatively sequential 
viewing of all desired information about one stimulus person before continuing on to the next. 
In terms of Figure 6.1, a person-based strategy would be characterized by information 
acquisition by row. 
Alternatively, a subject may prefer to acquire information by attribute category. This 
would be more indicative of a category than a person-based strategy. Here, a subject would 
choose to view all the favorite sports, and then continue with all the character traits, for 
example. In terms of Figure 6.1, an attribute category-based strategy would result in 
information acquisition by column. 
In order to evaluate the degree to which subjects in the various conditions used a 
person-based versus an attribute category-based acquisition strategy, a process tracing index 
(T,) was calculated. For the calculation of T„ let p¡ denote the number of within-person 
transitions made by subject ι, and let q¡ denote the number of within-category transitions made 
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by subject ¿. A within-person transition is defined as the consecutive inspection of information 
contained in two cells from the same stimulus person. Conversely, a within-category transition 
is the consecutive inspection of the information contained in two cells from the same attribute 
category. Given the number of within-person and within-category transitions, one can calculate 
the tracing index T¡, indicating i's preference for a person-based search strategy over one which 
is more attribute-based, in the following way (see Payne, 1976): 
T; = (p¡ - q¡) I (Pi + qù 
If (ρ,-+ fi) = 0,Tï = 0 
The value of T,· can range from -1 to +1. A positive T, is indicative of more within-
person transitions than within-category transitions, and hence, a more person-based acquisition 
strategy. Conversely, a negative T,· indicates a more category than person-based strategy. T; = 
0 if pi = q¡, including p¡ = q¡ = 0. Though in the latter case T, would be arithmetically 
undefined (because then p¡ + q¡ = 0), in all cases we interpret a T,~score of zero to be generally 
indicative of no preference for one acquisition strategy above the other. 
To illustrate, consider the following example: subject A viewed a total of 10 cells. If 
seven transitions were within persons and three transitions within attribute categories, then Тд 
= (7 - 3) / (7 + 3) = .4, indicating a greater tendency towards information acquisition by person 
than by category. Alternatively, if five transitions were within-person and five transitions 
within-category, then Тд = (5 - 5) / (5 + 5) = 0, suggesting no preference for a person-based 
strategy over a attribute category-based one. 
Information acquisition. An analysis of variance was conducted on the trace score, 
T„ resulting from the information acquisition task using a 2 (Social Context: intragroup, 
intergroup) χ 2 (Target Group: in-group, out-group) χ 2 (Subject Gender) between-subjects 
design. The predicted main effect for Target Group was statistically reliable (F(l,27) = 5.89, ρ 
< .03). As predicted, subjects employed a more person-based strategy for the acquisition of 
information about the in-group (M i n . g r o u p = .85) than about the out-group (Mout.group = .27). 
The predicted interaction between Target Group and Social Context failed to reach significance 
(F(l,27) = 1.57, ρ < .23).i 
Information recali Similar to the tracing measure used in the information acquisition 
stage of the experiment, it is also possible to trace the path used by subjects during recall. T, 
was calculated in the same way for the recall task as for the acquisition task. A 2 (Social 
Context) χ 2 (Target Group) χ 2 (Subject Gender) between-subjects analysis of variance, was 
1
 Given the p-value of this particular interaction, one may be inclined to think that the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis may be the result of low power. However, closer examination of this particular effect reveals that the 
means are not in any way in the predicted direction, suggesting that accepting the null hypothesis is not 
necessarily unwarranted. 
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performed using the recall trace as the dependent measure. This yielded a main effect for Social 
Context (F(l,27) = 12.42, ρ < .002) and an interaction between Social Context and Subject 
Gender (F(l,27) = 5.53, ρ < .03). 
Examination of the means presented in the rightmost column of Table 6.1 shows that 
subjects in the intragroup condition recalled information more by person than did subjects in the 
intergroup condition, who used a more attribute-based strategy. The interaction with Gender 
(these means are also presented in Table 6.1) shows that both men and women employed a 
more person-based recall strategy in the intragroup condition than in the intergroup condition. 
This difference, however, was bigger for men (F(l,31) = 12.78, ρ < .001) than for women 
(F(l,31) = 2.18,/? < .15), for whom it was marginally significant. Note though, that the means 
for subjects of both genders are in the same direction as the means observed in the Social 
Context main effect 
Table 6.1 
Recall Trace as a Function of Social Context and Subject Gender 
^ — ^ ^ ^ — ^ ^ — — ^ ^ — • — — — - - ~ ~ — ^ ^ — — — ~ 
Subject Gender 
Social 
Context men women Total 
intragroup 1.0 .23 .36 
intergroup - .73 - .13 - .27 
When considering the recall trace, it may be important to take into account that the order 
in which people acquire information may affect the order in which they choose to recall it. 
Indeed, the two measures are highly correlated (r(34) = .57, ρ < .001). In order to examine the 
recall trace while controlling for the variance accounted for by the acquisition trace, an analysis 
of covariance is in order. Preliminary analyses, employing the recall trace as the dependent 
measure and the acquisition trace as a covariate, revealed a moderately significant interaction 
between the covariate and the factor, Target Group (F(l,33) = 3.23, ρ < .08), thus violating the 
parallel regression lines assumption. Consequently, in the final analysis of covariance 
conducted on the recall trace, we controlled for the discrepant regression lines in the two Target 
Group conditions, in addition to the variance accounted for by the acquisition trace. 
The predicted main effect for Social Context remained highly significant (F(l,25) = 
15.53, ρ < .001). The interaction between Social Context and Subject Gender also remained 
marginally reliable (F(l,25) = 3.90, ρ < .06). The main effect of Target Group, complementary 
to that found for the acquisition trace, was not significant (F(l,25) = 1.21, ρ < .29; M¡n.group = 
.054, Moul.group = .048). 
Alternative analyses. Alternative to analyzing the data resulting from the acquisition 
and recall tasks separately, one may also treat the two tracing indices as repeated measures, and 
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analyze them as such. This analysis was conducted in addition to the ANOVAs and ANCOVAs 
reported above. Here, a main effect of tracing task emerged (F(l,27) = 17.17, ρ < .001) in 
which subjects acquired information more by person (M = .56) than they recalled it (M = .05). 
In addition, the main effect of social context was also significant, showing that subjects in the 
intragroup condition performed the tracing tasks generally more by person than subjects in the 
intergroup condition (F(l,27) = 5.16, ρ < .04; M
mtragroup = .46, Mmtergwup = .15). 
This latter effect was qualified by a two way interaction with the tracing tasks (F(l,27) 
= 14.33, ρ < .001). Consistent with the separate analyses reported above, we see that the 
context manipulation only affected the tracing measure in the recall task (M
mlragroup = .36, 
M
mtergroup = -.27). Information acquisition was not affected by changes in the social context 




Finally, a two-way interaction between Target Group and the tracing tasks was 
observed (F(l,27) = 9.73 ρ < .004). Again the means reveal a picture consistent with that seen 
in earlier analyses. The degree to which subjects used person and attribute strategies to acquire 
information was affected by group membership (M
m
.group = .85, Moul.group = .27), while the 
strategy subjects used to recall the information was not (M
m
.group = .05, Moul.group = .05). 
In sum, these analyses reveal results consistent with those reported earlier in the 
separate acquisition and recall analyses. 
Amount of Acquired Information 
The number of cells viewed by the subjects in the acquisition task is generally a 
reflection of the depth of processing. However, the means resulting from the present study 
show a ceiling effect: in six of the eight between-subjects conditions, subjects inspected all 16 
cells. Consequently, Cochran's test of homogeneity shows a violation of the ANOVA 
homogeneity assumption (C(4,7) = 1.00, ρ < .001). As a result no analyses of variance were 
performed on this variable. 
Additional Analyses 
In addition to the number of items acquired, analyses were also done on the difference 
in the amount of information recalled and acquired. Essentially, we analyzed the amount of 
information subjects forgot. Analyses of variance revealed no significant effects or interactions. 
The content of the recall protocols was also examined for errors. An error was defined 
as an entry in a matrix cell that was not consistent with what had been presented in that cell in 
the acquisition phase of the experiment. An error occurred either when an attribute from one cell 
was entered in another cell or when subjects "recalled" an attribute which had not been 
presented at all. Tests were performed over the sum of both types of errors. Analysis of 
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variance revealed no significant effects or interactions regarding the number of errors made in 
recall. Indeed the amount of erroneously recalled items was remarkably low (overall error 
mean: .94 items) which may in part be attributable to the small amount of stimulus information. 
Finally, the inspection latencies measured in the acquisition task were examined. 
Analyses of variance, however, failed to yield significant effects or interactions. 
Discussion 
In this, the last empirical chapter in this dissertation, we attempted a preliminary 
examination of the effects of group membership and social context on the encoding, as well as 
the retrieval, of person information. By using an information display board paradigm (Jacoby et 
ai, 1987) we were able to evaluate the process of information acquisition in addition to the 
process used in the recall of previously encoded information. The results, in short, revealed a 
main effect of target group on the order in which descriptive information about the stimulus 
persons was acquired. Though subjects generally preferred a person-based acquisition strategy 
to one that was attribute-based, this preference was much stronger for the acquisition of 
information about in-group members than about members of the out-group (the acquisition trace 
was only marginally different from zero for out-group information, F(l,27) = 3.12, ρ < .09). 
By contrast, the pattern of results found for the recall of stimulus information showed 
that instead of an effect of target group, the social comparative context was the main 
determinant of the degree of use of person- and category-based recall strategies. Specifically, 
more person-based recall, indicative of individuation, was found in the intragroup context 
condition than in the intergroup condition, in which subjects preferred category-based recall. 
This main effect proved to be statistically significant even when the sequence in which subjects 
had chosen to acquire the information was taken into account (i.e., controlled for). 
Unexpectedly, the hypothesized interaction between the social comparative context and 
the target group failed to reach significance on either the acquisition or the recall task tracing 
measures. This is notably different from results found in other studies reported in this 
dissertation (viz. Chapters 3 and 5). Why this should occur is not entirely clear. One obvious 
(and probable) explanation lies in the paradigmatic differences between the present study and 
those described in previous chapters. 
Possibly one of the most significant differences is that in the present experiment subjects 
were required to actively acquire the stimulus information on their own. In all previous studies, 
subjects were passive receptors of stimulus information which had been neatly pre-packaged 
for encoding. Perhaps the active role subjects were required to play in the acquisition of 
information in the present study led them to process the stimulus information differently than 
when it was pre-structured, as in earlier studies. 
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A second notable difference between the present and previous studies is the way in 
which social context was manipulated. In three of the last four studies, context was manipulated 
by changing the subject's social perceptual field. Subjects in intragroup conditions were literally 
confronted with information about only one group, while subjects in intergroup conditions 
were confronted with stimulus information about the in-group as well as a comparison out-
group. In the present study, subjects were only made aware of the existence of comparison 
groups; they were never actually confronted with members of more than one group. 
Indeed, it may be that the very nature of the stimulus presentation task plays a direct role 
in determining which factors are vital to the perception of group members, be this in the form of 
active versus passive information acquisition or a actual versus psychological manipulation of 
the social comparative context. Consequently, the experimental manipulations may have had a 
different type of effect on the encoding of information in the present study as compared to past 
studies. The information could have, therefore, been perceived differently upon encoding and, 
hence, retrieved differently during recall. 
Encoding and Retrieval 
As mentioned earlier, differential information acquisition was found as a result of in-
and out-group membership, while differential information retrieval was the result of changes in 
the social comparative context. What does it mean when information encoding is influenced by 
different factors than retrieval, as is the case here? The most obvious conclusion is that different 
processes drive the encoding and recall of person information. On the one hand, the data seem 
to indicate that who the information is about drives the order in which subjects prefer to acquire 
it. On the other, this does not seem to be the primary determinant of differential information 
retrieval. 
Note that every subject took part in both an acquisition and a recall task. Thus the 
tracing strategies used by subjects differed within subjects on the two tasks. In other words, 
subjects may have used a person-based strategy to acquire the information but then changed 
strategies during retrieval to one more accommodating to the social comparative context. As a 
result, these data may imply that subjects, though capable of being influenced by both group 
membership and social context, may have found them differentially useful cues at different 
stages during the course of information processing. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the retrieval strategy employed by subjects in the present 
experiment is the result of a qualitatively different encoding in intragroup and intergroup 
contexts. While different context conditions did not lead to different acquisition strategies, it is 
possible that subjects in an intragroup condition were better able to maintain a person-based 
organization of the information, due to the relative salience of interpersonal comparisons. This 
would have rendered a person-based retrieval strategy relatively accessible at recall. 
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Conversely, it may have been comparatively more difficult for subjects in an intergroup 
condition to retrieve information in a person-based fashion, potentially due to a qualitatively 
diminished person-based encoding of the stimulus information. Consequently, these subjects 
may have had to engage in an attribute-based recall, as a person-based strategy had become less 
easily accessible (Day & Sulsky, 1995). 
Such implications are in contrast with various existing theories concerning information 
processing and even assumptions made in this dissertation (Brown, Conover, Flores & 
Goodman, 1991; Holtgraves & Srull, 1990; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rothbart, Evans & 
Fulero, 1979). It is often assumed that incoming information is organized on-line as a perceiver 
receives it. When the encoded information is subsequently recalled, the on-line organization 
during encoding then determines the order in which it is retrieved. The present data suggest that 
this may not be the case and that, organizationally speaking, the information may not come out 
the way it went in (see Klein & Loftus, 1990; Soraci, Franks, Bransford, Chechile, Belli, Carr 
& Carlin, 1994). 
Given the data presented in this dissertation, it is impossible to draw definite 
conclusions about the processes occurring between encoding and retrieval. Indeed, the effects 
we find over studies may be the result of encoding differences or they may be the result of 
functionally different processes occurring during encoding and recall. In any event, the present 
data are obviously not enough to cause a Kuhnian paradigmatic revolution, however, we feel 
that they are provocative and that serious consideration and further experimentation are clearly 
warranted. 
Group Membership and Social Context 
On the one hand, the notion of different processes controlling information encoding and 
recall is rather incongruent with past ideas. On the other hand, though, the present data do not 
discount past results in that, here too, both group membership and social context were shown 
to be influential in the perception of information about others. 
Ideas put forth by researchers in the past (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 
1987; Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides and Li, 1993, for example) make various assertions 
concerning the factors affecting information processing and the form the encoded information 
takes on. For example, it is argued that information about the in-group and the out-group is not 
processed in the same manner, the social context is vital in determining the degree to which 
group members are individuated, and that individuation of group members results in the use of 
person-based processing strategies. The present research has not necessarily challenged these 
ideas; the in-group was still individuated more than the out-group and an intragroup context still 
led to more individuation than an intergroup context. Instead, the present data may help qualify 
these ideas in terms of constraints imposed by the experimental situation, such as the 
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presentation of pre-structured stimulus information rather than an active acquisition task 
environment, or a physically present rather than psychologically present comparison group. 
Depth of Processing 
Though social context and group membership seem to have an effect on the sequence of 
information processing, note that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the depth of 
processing. In six of the eight experimental cells, subjects chose to view an average of 16 cells. 
As the maximum number of cell in the matrix was 16, this means that the variance in these 
conditions was zero. As a result of this ceiling effect, it is impossible to make concrete 
conclusions regarding the depth of encoding in these conditions. 
Aside from examination of the number of cells a subject views, depth of processing can 
also be assessed by the length of time a subject inspects the contents of the chosen cells. 
However, the present data failed to yield any effects of the amount of time spent reading the cell 
contents. In actual fact though, this lack of inspection latency effects is not particularly 
surprising. Using the same stimulus material, the experiment described in Chapter 4 also failed 
to show effects for reading latency. Only in the experiment in Chapter 5 did such effects emerge 
and then only for the examination of inconsistent information. This leads us to conclude 
tentatively that stereotype consistent or stereotype neutral information may not be sufficiently 
unusual or unexpected to elicit differential inspection latencies as a function of external factors. 
Alternatively, other studies using a process tracing paradigm have found differences in 
the time taken to inspect various cells (e.g., Butcher & Scofield, 1984; Isen & Means, 1983; 
Johnson, Payne & Bettman, 1986). However, it is important to keep in mind that subjects' 
goals in these studies were quite different from those in the present study. In other experiments, 
subjects were engaged in tasks involving choosing one of several options such as cereals (e.g., 
Bettman & Jacoby, 1976) or rating job applicants (e.g., Johnson, 1985). It is likely that 
differences in inspection latencies are partially linked to the purpose with which subjects 
approach the task and evaluate the stimulus information. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results obtained in the present study suggest that group membership 
primarily determines the order in which subjects choose to acquire information. As the 
processing of information progresses, the effects of social context exceed those of group 
membership, resulting in the use of differential recall strategies in intra- and intergroup 
contexts, but not differentially for in- and out-group members. 
Though the present study succeeds in shedding a faint glimpse of light on the 
processing of social information at different stages in the process, we have a long way to go 
before any definitive conclusions can be made. Several issues are still open to investigation. 
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For example, exactly when, after encoding, does social context become more important than 
group membership, and what is the nature of processing differences resulting from various 
encoding environments (e.g., passive or active stimulus presentation)? Other issues such as 
changes in stimulus information, motivational concerns, and the presence of unexpected or 
inconsistent group members, to name just a few possibilities, also represent interesting 
additional topics of study. In any event, while the present study does not pretend to provide all 
the answers, it does succeed in providing a springboard for further exploration into this 
alternative area of person perception. 
CHAPTER/ 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation, we set out to investigate the effects of in- and out-group 
membership, and changes in the comparative social context on various aspects of person 
information processing. Now that we have completed the empirical portion of this thesis we 
will attempt to draw conclusions in regard to what we have investigated and what the results of 
this research can teach us about the interaction between the social factors studied and the 
perceptual processes measured. In addition, we also speculate on potential implications for the 
way we think about information encoding versus retrieval, and stereotype development and 
representation. 
Group Membership 
As noted in the introductory chapter, differences between our perceptions of in-group 
and out-group members are probably some of most well documented effects in social 
psychology (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Mackie, Gastardo-
Conaco & Skelly, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Park, Judd & Ryan, 1991; Simon & 
Hamilton, 1994; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990; van Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994; 
Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995; Wilder, 1990). Generally, it is observed that perceivers are 
better able to individuate members of the in-group than members of the out-group. 
By and large, the research presented in this dissertation supports this idea. In all five 
studies, the way subjects processed information about members of the in-group was clearly 
different from the way they processed information about members of the out-group. 
Specifically, subjects were able to either individuate or categorize members of the in-group 
depending on the social contextual circumstances. However, members of the out-group were 
not individuated under any conditions. (Note, though, the exceptional results found in Chapter 
4. These will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.) 
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In the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3, we saw that the clustering of in-group 
information clearly differed from that of out-group information. Moreover, it is important to 
note that the clustering of out-group information was, for all practical purposes, absent. 
Specifically, we had predicted that out-group members would be categorized and that the 
information describing them would be clustered primarily by attribute category. Not only did 
subjects fail to cluster out-group information more by attribute category than by person, but, in 
contrast to the clustering of in-group information, they generally failed to cluster out-group 
information, according to either dimension, more than would be predicted based on chance. We 
speculated that this lack of clustering may have been the result of subjects using idiosyncratic 
clustering dimensions unknown to us, such as in reference to themselves or a familiar other 
(Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Sedikides, Devine 
&Fuhrman, 1991). 
Using a modified information display board paradigm, Chapter 6 explored the order in 
which subjects chose to acquire and recall information about in-group and out-group members. 
Here we observed that, particularly in the information acquisition task, subjects preferred a 
different strategy for the acquisition of in-group information compared to the acquisition of out-
group information. Consistent with the findings in Chapters 2 and 3, subjects in the study in 
Chapter 6 chose to employ an individuating strategy for the acquisition of in-group information 
and a relatively more categorical strategy for out-group information. 
These differential effects of group membership, however, are not limited to information 
clustering and related measures of information organization. In the experiment presented in 
Chapter 5 we focused on the amount of attention allocated to stereotype consistent and 
inconsistent group members and the degree to which they were favorably evaluated, rather than 
to the cognitive organization of person information. The results observed for the favorability 
evaluations are particularly consistent with earlier findings on other measures. When subjects 
were asked to indicate how favorable their impressions were of the various stimulus persons, 
they used a primarily stereotype-based criterion with which to judge the out-group members. 
Subjects uniformly rated stereotype inconsistent out-group members more favorably than 
stereotype consistent out-group members. This is in direct contrast to the findings reported for 
the evaluation of in-group members, whose differential favorability ratings were also based on 
social contextual factors, in addition to group membership. 
Consistent with the existing literature, the present results suggest that the out-group was 
not individuated in any of the experimental situations examined. The perception of in-group 
members, though, may not be so straightforward. The data reported here suggest that the 
degree to which in-group members are individuated or categorized, respectively, may be 
dependent on factors present in the environment in which the communication of information 
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takes place. Specifically, our findings indicate that the social comparative context may play an 
important role in perception of in-group members. 
Social Context 
Predominant, mainly cognitive theories of person perception often argue that an 
increased ability to individuate in-group members, compared to members of the out-group, may 
be the result of increased familiarity with the in-group (Judd, Ryan & Park, 1991; Ostrom, 
Carpenter, Sedikides & Li, 1993), or of having more in-group sub-types or exemplars 
available, compared to the out-group (Brewer, 1988; Linville, Fischer & Salovey, 1989, Park 
& Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Though these explanations seem as such not unlikely, 
research has shown that in-group perceptions, in particular, are also sensitive to changing 
factors in the external environment (Doosje, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1995; 
Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995). 
Complementary to cognitive explanations, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994) posits that it is 
not cognitive restrictions, such as familiarity, that determine the degree to which we individuate 
group members. Rather the salient social context in which information about group members is 
communicated may primarily drive these processes. 
Specifically, self-categorization theory would argue that changes in the social 
comparative context affect the way in which we perceive group members. An intragroup 
context allows perceivers to view group members as individuals without the interference of 
intergroup demands. Conversely, when the social comparative context is intergroup, situational 
demands (i.e., the relative salience of intergroup comparisons) indicate that all group members 
involved be viewed in terms of their group membership. In this way the in-group is kept as 
separate and as distinct as possible from the out-group. As argued throughout this dissertation, 
it is important to note that, theoretically, only the perception of the in-group is sensitive to 
changes in the social comparative context. As out-group presence always inherently implies 
intergroup comparisons regardless of actual in-group presence, comparisons with the out-group 
by an in-group perceiver are always on an intergroup level (Doosje, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, 
Turner & McGarty, 1995; Lemmers & van Knippenberg, 1994; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 
1995). 
Concordant with these arguments, the results reported in this dissertation consistently 
demonstrated that when the social context in which the stimulus information was communicated 
was intragroup, in-group members were likely to be individuated. Conversely, when the 
stimulus configuration indicated intergroup comparisons, members of the in-group were 
categorized. 
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In the study described in Chapter 2, we saw that subjects were generally more likely to 
individuate in-group members than out-group members. The results found in Chapter 3, 
however, showed that when the stimulus configuration in which the information was 
communicated changed from an intragroup context to an intergroup context, the level of 
categorization at which in-group members were perceived also changed. In an intragroup 
situation, subjects could easily individuate members of the in-group. Alternatively, in an 
intergroup situation, subjects were more prone to categorize in-group members, consistent with 
the salient level of comparison. Changes in the social context did not lead to differential 
clustering of out-group information. 
It is interesting to note that a manipulation of the stimulus configuration from intragroup 
to intergroup may have been key in procuring a shift in the salient level of categorization, such 
that subjects would also shift their preferred organizational strategies. In the experiment 
presented in Chapter 2, we had attempted to shift subjects' perceptual level of comparison by 
encouraging them to focus on the stimulus persons either as individuals or as a group as a 
whole. This manipulation of the processing instructions was not strong enough to elicit the 
actual shift in stimulus perception, however. In other words, in order to elicit changes in the 
perceptual level of comparison, it is not enough to just think about individuals as members of a 
group. Rather, the stimulus situation in which information is communicated may have to be 
consistent with the desired level of comparison (but see Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995, 
Experiment 1). 
Similar patterns of results were observed in the study described in Chapter 5. 
Specifically, women allocated more attention to stereotype inconsistent in-group members in an 
intergroup context than in an intragroup context. Furthermore, the favorability evaluations 
given by both men and women to in-group stimulus persons were found to be sensitive to 
changes in the social context, in directions consistent with predictions made by self-
categorization theory. Specifically, in an intragroup context, stereotype consistent and 
stereotype inconsistent in-group members were both evaluated equally favorably. On the other 
hand, in an intergroup context, the salience of intergroup comparisons apparently prompted 
subjects to evaluate stereotype consistent in-group members significantly more positively than 
stereotype inconsistent in-group members. Note again, that changes in the social context did not 
affect attention allocation to or evaluations of stereotype consistent and inconsistent out-group 
members. 
Effects of social context also emerged in the study presented in Chapter 6 but were 
slightly discrepant from those found in earlier studies. In short, we found, consistent with 
predictions, that subjects acquired in-group information more by person than out-group 
information. However, the way in which subjects subsequently preferred to retrieve the 
encoded information was based more on the salient social context than on group membership. 
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Subjects retrieved information more by person in an intragroup context and relatively more by 
attribute category in an intergroup context. Contrary to expectations, we did not find the 
predicted interactions between group membership and social context on either dependent 
measure in this study. 
For the most part, it seems clear that social context plays a large role in determining the 
degree to which information about (in-)group members is individuated or categorized. The one 
experiment in this dissertation in which the data do not conform to this idea, however, is that 
described in Chapter 4. Here, while the results revealed interesting effects of subject gender and 
target gender, the findings were not affected by changes in the social comparative context. 
Gender, Status and Context 
The study in Chapter 4 examined the degree to which male and female subjects used 
individual-based and category-based strategies to organize descriptive information about men 
and women. The results revealed that male subjects individuated other men but categorized 
women. Female subjects, on the other hand, individuated both men and women equally. This 
pattern of results was observed on three separate dependent measures: the degree of information 
clustering, correct name-attribute matches and the amount of information recalled. 
Why, though, should such a gender-asymmetry be so robust across measures? In the 
first chapter of this dissertation, we discussed social context in a relatively broad sense to 
encompass the influence of societal factors, such as group status, on the salience of a particular 
level of categorization. Results reported by other researchers (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Erber & Fiske, 
1984; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & Stewart, 1995; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; D. van Knippenberg, 
Blaauw & Vermunt, 1996) have shown that groups of high status may tend to categorize 
groups of low status and individuate their own group. Groups of low status, however, have 
been found to engage in equal or increased amounts of individuation of the out-group compared 
to the in-group. Consistent with Fiske's (1993) reasoning, low status group members may 
perceive this as a strategy to aid in the creation of accurate expectations of future behaviors by 
those who may affect low status group members' outcomes, and to increase low status group 
members' chances of attaining desired rewards and outcomes. 
Indeed, this analysis is consistent with the pattern of results observed in the study in 
Chapter 4. It seems possible, then, that because men and women occupy different status 
positions in society, they may also show differential categorization and individuation of men 
and women for the very reasons argued above. Indeed, that men and women enjoy differential 
societal status has been argued by several researchers in the past (Berger, 1992; Bums et ai, in 
press; Eagly & Chrvala, 1986; Eagly & Wood, 1982; Echabe, 1990; Fiske, 1993; Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi et ai, 1995; Pichevin & Hurtig, 1996; Vonk & Ellemers, 1993). 
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Note, though, that while the argument that the present findings are the result of gender group 
status differences seems intuitively satisfying, it was not directly tested in this dissertation. 
Certainly, more research would be needed to substantiate the present claims more definitively. 
Aside from the interesting gender asymmetry observed in the study in Chapter 4, 
another surprising effect emerged. Namely, changing the stimulus configuration to manipulate 
the social comparative context did nothing to alter the level of comparison used in subjects' 
perceptions of either in-group or out-group members, as was observed in other chapters. 
Generally speaking, self-categorization theory would posit that a group will strive to achieve 
maximum distinctiveness from other groups (Turner et ai, 1987). To this end, the social 
comparative context may serve to distance two or more groups from each other by increasing 
the salience of intergroup comparisons (Turner et ai, 1994). However, the comparative context 
may not be the only factor that plays a role in the differentiation process. Personal factors, such 
as the importance of a particular category to personal identity, for example, may encourage 
intergroup distinction (Turner & Oakes, 1989). Likewise, factors inherent in a group itself may 
also promote intergroup distinction. 
Some researchers have suggested that categories such as race, age and gender may be 
chronically salient (Messick & Mackie, 1989; van Twuyver, 1996). Assuming this is so, the 
presence of merely one of the two gender groups may be sufficient to activate the implicit 
comparison with the other, and hence an intergroup level of comparison. In terms of the 
experiment reported in Chapter 4, simply observing the stimulus persons' gender [without the 
presence of a competing categorization (e.g., university major)] may have been in and of itself 
enough to maximally distinguish and distance the groups from one another. In other words 
maximum intergroup distinction may have been achieved simply as a result of the implicit 
activation of the comparison gender out-group. As a result, manipulating the social comparative 
context did nothing to change the level of social comparison, which was already at an 
intergroup level. 
In sum, the results observed in Chapter 4 support the notion that individuation is more 
likely to occur for the in-group than the out-group, but that this may be qualified by other 
factors such as gender group (status). In addition, the results tentatively indicate that the use of 
a chronically salient categorization may render changes in the social comparative context 
relatively weak for putting psychological distance between the in-group and the comparison 
out-group in terms of the cognitive organization of person information. 
The experiment reported in Chapter 4, however, is not the only study in which gender 
seemingly played a role. The allocation of attention in Chapter 5, as indicated by reading 
latencies, was also sensitive to subject gender, but not in the same manner as the measures of 
information organization used in Chapter 4. 
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Recall that in the experiment described in Chapter 5, male and female subjects read 
stereotype consistent and inconsistent attitude statements about affirmative action from male and 
female discussants in either an intragroup or an intergroup context. Analysis of the time spent 
reading the attitude statements showed that only female subjects' attention to stereotype 
inconsistent in-group attitude statements was affected by changes in the social context. These 
findings may have been the result of a differential involvement with an issue that could be 
potentially important in women's pursuit of gender equality (cf. Mummendey & Simon, 1989; 
Spears & Manstead, 1989). 
But why would changes in the social context affect the attention allotted to inconsistent 
information at all? The study in Chapter 5 illustrates that increased attention allocation may be a 
strategy by which perceivers attempt to better understand why a perceptual target is inconsistent 
with expectations (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Belmore, 1987; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982; Stern, 
Marrs, Millar & Cole, 1984; Vonk & van Knippenberg, 1995). However, all else being equal, 
this need to resolve inconsistencies may not be equally strong across social context conditions. 
In an intragroup condition, subjects may not perceive stereotype inconsistent in-group 
statements to be particularly deserving of extra attention because inconsistencies may not need 
to be resolved in this situation. Indeed, in a heterogeneous in-group in which the group 
members are seen as separate individuals, it may be acceptable that different members simply 
hold differing opinions. However, in an intergroup context, an inconsistent (in-)group 
member's attitude (the figure) becomes increasingly salient when compared to the stereotypical 
group attitude (the ground). Consequently, subjects may be encouraged to engage in 
inconsistency resolution, thus leading to longer reading latencies of stereotype inconsistent 
attitudes. Hypothetically speaking then, given an intergroup context, longer reading latencies 
would be expected for stereotype inconsistent than for stereotype consistent (in-group) 
information. This is indeed what we observed in the study described in Chapter 5. 
While different patterns of attention allocation were observed for male and female 
subjects, no gender effects were observed for the favorability evaluations. Unlike reading 
latencies, where unexpected information is hypothesized to lead to inconsistency resolution, 
differential evaluations of anomalous group members may be based more on comparisons with 
salient group norms that guide what we believe favorable others should be like (Gilbert, 1995; 
Turner, 1991). Thus in theory, as the salience of a group stereotype increases, aberrant group 
members should be less favorably evaluated than normative group members. 
The data reported in Chapter 5 show that subjects uniformly evaluated stereotype 
consistent out-group members less favorably than stereotype inconsistent out-group members, 
regardless of the salient social context. That is, subjects evaluated out-group members who 
agreed with the in-group standpoint more favorably than those who opposed the in-group 
standpoint. As we have consistently argued throughout this dissertation, an intergroup context 
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may have always been implicitly salient during the evaluation of out-group members. In this 
case, in-group norms regarding expectations of out-group members may have become salient as 
a result of the implicitly or explicitly salient intergroup level of comparison. Subjects may have 
consequently used the salient group norm as a reference point when making favorability 
judgments (Gilbert, 1995; Turner, 1991). That is, when encountering an out-group member, 
subjects compare that person's attitude to the salient in-group norm concerning that attitude 
topic. If the out-group member is consistent with the salient norm, they will be favorably 
evaluated. If they are inconsistent with the norm, they will be unfavorably evaluated. 
The evaluations of stereotype consistent and inconsistent in-group members showed a 
different picture. Here, the evaluations of in-group members were sensitive to changes in the 
social context. Again we would argue that this was the result of a normative process. Only in an 
intergroup context would a group norm governing expectations of in-group attitudes become 
salient, because only then are intergroup comparisons salient. Thus, only in an intergroup 
condition would inconsistent, or anomalous in-group members be unfavorably evaluated 
(Wilder, 1984). In an intragroup condition, group norms would be less salient, and thus 
stereotype consistency of the target in question should not particularly influence evaluations. 
Indeed, evaluations of consistent and inconsistent in-group members in an intragroup context 
do not differ from the mid-point of the evaluation scale, suggesting that, in the absence of a 
salient group norm, stimulus persons' attitudes did not largely affect subjects' evaluations in 
one direction or the other. 
The question remains, however, why changes in the social context would have different 
effects on the allocation of attention to the evaluation of gender group members. It would seem 
that while the two measures are both affected by group membership and social context to some 
degree, the effects may not be the result of one and the same mental process. 
When the in-group/out-group categorization becomes salient as a result of the social 
comparative context, we have argued that the appropriate in-group norm becomes 
simultaneously activated. When this occurs, the norm may consistently be used as a reference 
point against which to evaluate group members. On the other hand, the mere increase in 
salience of a referent norm does not automatically imply that perceivers will also be sufficiently 
motivated or involved with the issues at hand (see earlier in this chapter) to engage in 
inconsistency resolution. Consequently, while male subjects did not show the differential 
attention to stimulus persons' statements found for female subjects, identical patterns of results 
were found for males' and females' evaluations of stimulus persons, which were shown to be 
sensitive to changes in the social context. 
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Implications of the Present Research 
Encoding versus Retrieval 
Throughout most of the first half of this dissertation, we paid relatively little attention to 
the distinction between the encoding and the retrieval of person information. Like several other 
researchers (Brown, Conover, Flores & Goodman, 1991; Holtgraves & Srull, 1990; Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Rothbart, Evans & Fulero, 1979), we assumed that retrieval output was 
representative of encoding processes. In Chapters 5 and 6, however, specific attention was 
given to the effects of group membership and social context on processes at work during the 
encoding of descriptive information, in the form of attention allocation and the tracing of 
strategies used to acquire information. Interestingly, though effects of group membership and 
social context did emerge in these studies, the observed patterns were notably different than 
those found in retrieval processes. Thus, consistent with alternative notions of information 
processing (Klein & Loftus, 1990; Soraci, Franks, Bransford, Chechile, Belli, Carr & Carlin, 
1994), the way information comes out, may not be the same as the way it goes in. 
The study described in Chapter 6 is of particular interest here. Recall that in this study 
we evaluated cognitive organization by assessing the way in which subjects preferred to acquire 
information via an information display board. The idea behind this paradigm is that the strategy 
used to accumulate information is indicative of the way the information is stored in memory. A 
modified information display board was also used in this study as a cued recall task in order to 
assess the differences between information acquisition and information recall. In short, the data 
revealed, consistent with predictions, that subjects acquired in-group information more by 
person than out-group information. However, the way in which subjects subsequently retrieved 
the encoded information was determined more by the salient social context than by group 
membership. Subjects retrieved information by person in an intragroup context and by attribute 
category in an intergroup context. 
The findings in Chapter 6 suggest that, at the very least, information processing is 
flexible (e.g., Fiske & von Hendy, 1992). Clearly, the way subjects reproduced the 
information was not always consistent with the way they had chosen to encode it. In the 
discussion of Chapter 6 we offered two possible explanations for the observed discrepancy 
between encoding and retrieval. First, the discrepancy could have been the result of a 
differential usefulness of group membership and social context at different stages during 
information processing. In this case, this may indicate that encoding and retrieval are indeed 
different processes and that encoding information in a particular order does not necessarily 
preclude a differently ordered retrieval (Klein & Loftus, 1990; Soraci, Franks, Bransford, 
Chechile, Belli, Carr & Carlin, 1994). 
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Alternatively, retrieval may reflect encoding whenever possible (Brown, Conover, 
Flores & Goodman, 1991; Holtgraves & Srall, 1990; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rothbart, 
Evans & Fulero, 1979). However, when the encoding strategy is sufficiently weak so as to be 
rendered essentially ineffective as a retrieval cue, other strategies may be sought with which to 
cue recall (Day & Sulsky, 1995; Srull & Brand, 1983). In other words, if possible, information 
will come out the way it goes in, but if this is hindered in some way, other methods will be 
used thus leading to seemingly differential encoding and retrieval strategies. 
Considering the results reported in Chapter 6, we see that the stimulus information was 
acquired more by person than by attribute category in all conditions (as indicated by positive 
tracing scores). This would suggest the use of encoding by person as a potentially default 
strategy; all else being equal, perceivers prefer to receive information by person, consistent with 
an associative network approach (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Note, though, that information retrieval 
could either reflect encoding (as in the intragroup condition), or not reflect encoding (as in the 
intergroup condition). According to the present argument, the former occurs whenever 
possible. In the case of the latter, however, when the retrieval strategy differs from that used 
during encoding, it may be because subjects are unable to reproduce the information in the way 
it was received, due to the diminished strength of cues used to link the descriptive items in 
memory. When information recall cannot reflect person-based encoding, the perceiver may 
revert to the use of semantic structures or familiar domains as alternative recall cues (e.g., if 
you have remembered one magazine, the names of others may come to mind more easily). 
Potentially, in the intragroup condition in the study in Chapter 6, the salient 
interpersonal level of comparison facilitated the maintenance of links between attributes 
belonging to each individual stimulus person. Thus, at retrieval it was relatively easy for 
subjects to recall the information by person because the information was not only acquired by 
person but also actively stored by person. Alternatively, in the intergroup condition, the lack of 
salient interpersonal level cues may have made it relatively difficult for subjects to maintain 
strong links among an individual stimulus person's attributes. As a result, when subjects in this 
condition were asked to recall the information, they were unable to do so in a person-based 
manner. Given that the recall strategy could not reflect encoding, subjects in the intergroup 
condition were required to seek alternatives. Potentially, because the cued recall task included 
not only person-based but also attribute category-based cues, subjects were relatively inclined 
to opt to use the attribute categories to cue recall. 
Stereotype Development and the Mental Representation of Groups 
As described in the first chapter of this dissertation, exemplar-based (e.g., Linville, 
Fischer & Salovey, 1989; Linville, Salovey & Fischer, 1986; Smith & Zarate, 1992) and 
abstraction-based theories (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Judd, 1990) are two of the most 
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prominent theoretical approaches regarding the cognitive processes involved in the development 
of stereotypes and the mental representation of groups. 
Exemplar-based models posit that when an member of a group is encountered, 
information about him or her is stored in memory. When making a group judgment, all 
exemplars belonging to the group are tallied and a judgment is reached based on these memory-
based calculations. Alternatively, abstraction-based models argue that a running tally of a group 
is maintained and adjusted on-line whenever a new group member is encountered. When giving 
a judgment about the group, a perceiver retrieves the relevant, continuously updated 
information. 
Conceivably, using a person-based strategy to organize information implies that each 
individual is kept separate in memory, consistent with exemplar-based models. When 
perceivers are asked to recall information about stimulus persons, they can employ a person-
based retrieval strategy relatively easily due to the separate representation of each individual in 
memory. In the present research this type of organizational strategy was observed only in 
intragroup conditions with in-group stimulus persons. Consistent with our earlier arguments, 
the individuation of in-group members and the creation of separate mental representations for 
each member may be linked to the presence of relatively salient interpersonal comparison cues 
in an intragroup situation with the in-group. 
However, in conditions other than intragroup contexts with the in-group (i.e., an 
intragroup context with the out-group and intergroup contexts with both the in-group and the 
out-group) little or no person organization of the information describing the stimulus persons 
was found. This would seem to indicate that an exemplar-based strategy is not being used to 
process the incoming information in these instances. For whatever reason, subjects in these 
conditions did not retrieve information by person indicating, in tum, that it was probably not 
being stored by person. 
Note, though, that while we may argue that the stimulus information was not organized 
using an exemplar-based strategy in these conditions, we are unable to make any statements 
regarding the use of abstraction-based strategies. If subjects did indeed use an abstraction-based 
strategy to process the information, then it is possible that retrieval could occur according to 
attribute category or according to other non-person-based retrieval strategies. However, the use 
of these strategies would not necessarily indicate abstraction-based processing. Subjects may 
have alternatively stored information according to attribute categories rather than an abstraction-
based repository, for example, but this cannot be detected given the present data. 
In past research, the use of exemplar-based processing strategies has generally been 
found to lead to more heterogeneous perceptions of target groups (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Messick & Mackie, 1989; van Twuyver, 1996). Our research suggests that exemplar strategies 
are only used when the target group is an in-group. Thus, supposedly, in-groups should be 
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perceived to be more heterogeneous than out-groups (about which information was not found 
to be processed using an exemplar-based strategy). Indeed, all else being equal, studies 
examining perceived group homogeneity generally report that the out-group is judged to be less 
heterogeneous than the in-group. Consequently, the way descriptive information is cognitively 
organized (i.e., by person or in a more group-based manner such as by attribute category) 
could play a potential role in determining the degree to which a group is judged to be hetero- or 
homogeneous. 
Specifically, when information about group members is organized by person, the 
perceivers are potentially able to individuate the various group members in order to see the 
differences between them and incorporate these differences into an overall group impression. 
As a result, perceivers may see the group as heterogeneous and when asked, may render a 
correspondingly heterogeneous group judgment. Alternatively, when information is not 
cognitively organized by person, perceivers may be unable to accurately assess the degree of 
variation among group members. As a result, it would be relatively unlikely for perceivers to be 
able to render an accurate, heterogeneous judgment of the group. 
While the present research did not attempt to assess perceived group homogeneity (or 
heterogeneity) the findings reported here may be of potential importance for such areas of 
study. Specifically, the variability judgments perceivers make may be linked to the way 
information about group members is cognitively organized. Consequently, studying these 
organizational processes may give us additional insight into the processes occurring during the 
judgment of group variability. 
Conclusion 
By way of the five experimental studies described in this dissertation we have attempted 
to gain insight into the way in which perceivers process information about members of groups 
to which they belong (in-groups) and groups to which they do not belong (out-groups), in 
settings that are conducive to interpersonal comparisons (intragroup contexts) and those that are 
conducive to intergroup comparisons (intergroup contexts). Our results mainly support 
positions brought forth by self-categorization theory. When the situation is conducive to 
interpersonal comparisons, such as in an intragroup context with the in-group, subjects will 
individuate group members. However, when salient cues indicate intergroup comparisons, 
such as an intergroup condition with the in-group or whenever the out-group is present, group 
members will not be individuated. 
In addition, we found that person information is not always organized in recall 
according to one particular dimension, such as by individual person. Instead, we found that 
external factors (such as social context) play a considerable role in determining the order in 
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which subjects prefer to recall previously stored information; both organization by individual 
and according to a more group-based strategy were observed. However, whether this 
organization was the result of the structuring of incoming information during encoding or of a 
retrieval strategy employed during recall remains open to discussion. 
The assessment of attention allocation in terms of reading latencies showed us that even 
though information may be inconsistent with stereotype-based expectations, it does not always 
elicit additional attention as a function of group membership and social context. This occurred 
only, it would seem, when the low status group was highly involved with the topic, as was the 
case with female subjects. 
Finally, we examined favorability evaluations which proved to be differentially sensitive 
to context when it came to evaluating the in-group, but always appeared to be based on the 
salient in-group norm when evaluations of the out-group were made. These data are particularly 
interesting compared to other measures, in terms of what they tell us about the role of social 
context. We have seen that social context can influence cognitive and potentially unconscious 
processes, such as the way information is cognitively organized, and to a lesser extent, the 
degree of attention allotted to different kinds of information. However, the evaluation data 
show that social context may also influence the degree to which we like people, a process 
which is potentially more social and motivational in nature. 
Admittedly, the present dissertation does not focus on an in depth analysis of the effects 
of social context and group membership on, for example, memorial organization. Rather, we 
have chosen to examine the effects of the relevant independent variables on a breadth of aspects 
of social information processing. Taken together though, the variety of measures and 
paradigms used in the present studies do nothing if not testify to the robustness and importance 
of the influence of group membership and social context on the perception of groups and their 
members. 
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APPENDIX 
Several procedures were used to create the stimulus material used in mis dissertation. In 
a series of studies conducted prior to the research presented here, various combinations of 
attributes and attribute categories were employed to describe the stimulus persons. From the 
results of these studies, it was clear that some stimulus sets were more flexible in terms of 
clustering than others. Stimulus sets which proved to be clusterable by person as well as by 
attribute category were used in subsequent experiments (e.g., studies presented in Chapters 2, 
3 and 6). However, prior research did not yield enough satisfactory stimulus sets with which to 
conduct the research presented here. Consequently, additional piloting was necessary to insure 
the clustering flexibility of the stimulus sets. This appendix describes the additional piloting 
procedures used in the creation of flexible stimulus sets in terms of there ability to be clustered 
both by person and by attribute category. 
The Creation of Stimulus Material Used in Chapters 2 and 3 
The stimulus material employed in Chapters 2 and 3 described eight different people, 
using four attributes per person. One stimulus set was used to describe four of the stimulus 
persons (Set A) and one to describe the other four stimulus persons (Set B). Each set used 
different attribute categories. The following is a description of the pilot study used to create 
Stimulus Set A, which was pre-tested for both within-person and within-attribute category 
coherence, in order to ensure flexibility of clustering by both person and attribute category (pre­
test set A: N = 30). Stimulus Set В was taken directly from prior research. 
Рте-testing was accomplished in the following way. Subjects were given three booklets, 
each containing a separate part of the pilot experiment. The first two booklets were used for the 
assessment of within-attribute category coherence and the third for within-person coherence. 
When subjects had completed a booklet, it was passed to the experimenter, thus guaranteeing 
that subjects were unable to turn back to previous parts of the pilot experiment. 
In order to estimate within-attribute category coherence, the degree to which attributes 
from the same category are likely to be consistently produced in a listing task, must be 
assessed. The more often two or more attributes from one category are jointly produced in a 
listing task, the higher their within-category coherence. Thus, for example, if skiing and 
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skating are both consistently listed when subjects are asked to list winter sports, we may 
assume that the within-attnbute category coherence between skiing and skating is high 
Conversely, if a particular attribute is never mentioned, one may conclude that this particular 
attribute is not a representative exemplar of its category and that its within-attnbute category 
coherence is low Thus, if luging is never mentioned in the subjects' lists of winter sports, we 
can assume that the within-attnbute category coherence between luging and other winter sports 
is low The main goal of the attribute category coherence pre-test was to determine the four 
attributes from each of four categories that had the highest possible within-attnbute category 
coherence, as indicated by the frequency with which they were listed in a listing task. 
To this end, the expenmenters first generated five attnbutes for each of four attribute 
categories part-time job, favonte reading matenal, favonte music and favorite game. These 
attributes were presented to subjects blocked by attnbute category on individual pages of 
Booklet 1 Subjects were asked to read through all the attributes, page by page, at their own 
pace. When subjects had finished reading the material in Booklet 1, they passed it to the 
experimenter, and continued with Booklet 2 Booklet 2 contained the listing task in which 
subjects were asked to list seven attributes belonging to each of the four categories that had 
been presented in Booklet 1 They were told that they were free to list the attnbutes which they 
had just read, but that they were also free to generate new attnbutes ' 
Within-attnbute category coherence was assessed by counting how frequently the 
various attributes were listed The attributes listed most frequently across subjects were 
assumed to have the highest within-attnbute category coherence Conversely, if subjects rarely 
listed a particular attnbute, we concluded that the links between this attnbute and others from 
the same category were weak and that within-attnbute category coherence was low The four 
most frequently listed attnbutes from each category were assumed to have the highest degree of 
within-category consistency and were used to create the Stimulus Set A 2 
Booklet 3 contained the pilot used to assess within-person coherence We assumed that 
items from different categones, which were rated as likely to be characteristic of the same 
person, were high in within-person consistency In order to measure this, favorite reading 
matenal was chosen as the "anchor" category, the five reading preferences presented in Booklet 
1 were used here as a basis (anchor) upon which to assess the attnbutes belonging to the other 
three categones. Subjects were instructed to rank order three of seven available attnbutes from 
the other three categones (part-time job, favorite music and favonte game), which were most 
1
 By presenting subjects with a ready-made list of attnbutes before the listing task itself, we were able to 
increase the salience of the attributes which were also evaluated in the within-person coherence pre-test In this 
way, combining the results from the two pre tests to create four stimulus persons was facilitated 
2
 It is conceivable that one or more of the most frequently listed attributes had not been presented in Booklet 1 
However, this was not the case All of the most frequently listed attnbutes had been attributes which had been 
previously pnmed 
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likely to be found in someone who had a particular reading preference. For example, if 
Panorama magazine were the reading preference, subjects would be asked to select the three 
part-time jobs that someone who read Panorama was most likely to hold. A ranking of 1 
reflected what the subject thought to be the part-time job most likely to be held by a Panorama 
reader, out of the seven part-time jobs presented. Rankings of 2 and 3 reflected the second and 
third most likely jobs to be held by a Panorama reader, respectively. This procedure was 
repeated for the other four reading preferences presented in Booklet 1 and subsequently, for the 
remaining two attribute categories (favorite music and favorite game). The attributes which 
received the highest rankings, across subjects, were considered to have the highest within-
person coherence with the anchor attribute. 
By combining the results from the within-attribute coherence pilot and the within-person 
coherence pilot, to reflect those attributes which rated highest on both dimensions, we were 
able to create Stimulus Set A. 
The Creation of Stimulus Material Used in Chapter 4 
The piloting of both stimulus sets used in Chapter 4 was conducted using the same basic 
procedure as described above, with various extensions. Of primary importance in creating the 
stimulus material for the study presented in Chapter 4 was the creation of two target sets which 
were gender stereotypical in addition to a target set which was gender neutral. This was 
accomplished using two separate pilots, Pilot A and Pilot B.3 
Before within-person and within-category coherence were assessed, it was important to 
acquire and appraise potential stimulus attributes for gender stereotypicality. In Pilot A subjects 
were asked to generate attributes which were typical of men, typical of women and gender 
neutral (N = 14). Essentially, Pilot A consisted of two tasks. In the first task, subjects were 
instructed to write a short paragraph in which they described men in terms of what men are like, 
what type of things they enjoy, and what they say and think. Subsequently, subjects were 
asked to write similar paragraphs about women and about both men and women. In the second 
task, subjects were asked to generate at least eight specific attributes belonging to five different 
attribute categories (sports, part-time jobs, TV programs, reading material and college major) 
which they found typical of men, women, and both men and women. 
Once we had obtained an extensive collection of potential stimulus attributes, we 
conducted Pilot В to assess these attributes for within-person and within-category coherence (N 
= 33). The procedure used for Pilot В was completely identical to the procedure described 
3
 The filler stimulus set used in the study in Chapter 4 was created using attributes and attribute categories 
employed in Chapters 2 and 3. As it was only used to manipulate the social context in which the experiment 
occurred and to control for primacy and recency effects, the filler stimulus set was not piloted separately for the 
study m Chapter 4. 
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above for piloting of the stimulus information used in Chapters 2 and 3. Naturally though, the 
attributes and attribute categories assessed were different. 
Here, to assess within-category coherence, subjects read five attributes from each of 
five categories (reading materials, TV programs, sports, part-time jobs and character traits). 
Subjects were subsequently asked to list eight attributes belonging to each of the five categories 
presented in the first task. To assess within-person coherence, the category, character traits, 
was used as the anchor category. Subjects were asked to rank order the three of seven available 
attributes most likely to co-occur with the five character traits presented in the first part of Pilot 
B. This procedure was repeated for the other four character traits presented in the first part of 
Pilot В and for all of the remaining four attribute categories (reading materials, TV programs, 
sports and part-time jobs). Eighteen subjects completed Pilot В for attributes describing women 
and gender neutral attributes. Fifteen considered attributes describing men and gender neutral 
attributes. 
The Creation of Stimulus Material Used in Chapter 5 
In the study described in Chapter 5, the stimulus material consisted of a total of 12 
statements, six of which were in favor of affirmative action in employment procedures, and six 
of which were opposed to affirmative action. These 12 statements were chosen from a larger 
pool of 30 statements which were piloted on several dimensions. 
In this particular pilot (N = 32) subjects were asked to rate 30 statements on six 
dimensions on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The 
questions assessed the statements on the position they represented in terms of their support for 
affirmative action; their clarity; how persuasive each statement was; the chance that a man 
would hold that particular opinion; the chance that a women would hold that particular opinion; 
and to what degree the pilot subjects themselves agreed with the statement. 
Criteria for inclusion of a statement in the stimulus material were the following: an 
opposing statement had to score lower than 4 on the question assessing the represented position 
on affirmative action; a supporting statement had to score higher than 5.5; the statement had to 
have a clarity rating of at least 4; and the statement had to rate at least 4.25 in terms of its 
persuasiveness. 
Based on these criteria, six statements opposing affirmative action and six statements 




Stimulus Material Employed in Chapter 5 
Statements in favor of affirmative action 
The belief that women are the weaker sex is a fabrication; women can perform as well as men. 
The role pattern must be broken. Let men keep house and let women be the breadwinners. 
Modem society is too male oriented. This needs to change by allowing more women in the job market. 
Women are at least as qualified for management positions as men. They should get the chance to prove 
that they can do it. 
Men are scared to lose their job to a woman; affirmative action can help set the record straight. 
It is absurd to think that women cannot do the same work as men just because they are built differently. 
Statements opposing affirmative action 
Striving for equal gender representation in jobs is unreasonable because men are usually the family 
breadwinners. 
Women feel more attached to their families than to their employers. This could hurt a company. 
Because men generally make a more positive impression during interviews, it is reasonable that they 
are given preference above women. 
The existing division of men's and women's roles is not coincidental. It is ridiculous to force it to 
change. 
Men are more willing to take on responsibility at work. Affirmative action for women is therefore not 
fair. 
Women are too gentle and cannot handle job-related stress. Let them prove otherwise before 
implementing affirmative action. 
SUMMARY 
This thesis is a collection of studies designed to investigate the effects of group 
membership and changes in the social context, in which information about group members is 
communicated, on various aspects of information processing. 
Central to this dissertation is that social groups can be divided into in-groups and out-
groups. Past work has demonstrated that often in-group members are better individuated than 
members of out-groups. Researchers have speculated as to the cause of this differential 
individuation and have posited many plausible hypotheses based, for example, on differential 
familiarity, salient level of comparison or exemplar and sub-type availability. In the end, 
whatever the reason, this effect seems to be quite robust across studies. 
The social context in which information is communicated can be defined in several 
different ways. In the present thesis, however, we draw mainly on self-categorization theory, 
in which "social context" refers to the situational configuration (i.e., the physical or 
psychological presence or absence of the in-group and comparison out-groups), which cues the 
use of a particular level of comparison upon which group members can be perceived. 
Specifically, we distinguish two contexts: intragroup and intergroup contexts. In an intragroup 
context, one single group is perceived, without the explicit presence of a comparison group. 
Here, the individuation of group members is facilitated, as there are no cues present to indicate 
an intergroup comparison. In an intergroup context, both the in-group and a comparison out-
group are explicitly present. Consequently, group-wise perceptions are likely to lead to 
increased categorization of the group members. Note that even in a situation in which only the 
out-group is explicitly present (an intragroup context with the out-group), psychological in-
group presence is automatically implied, thus resulting in social categorization regardless of an 
explicit intergroup context. 
In Chapter 1 we offer a theoretical introduction in which we define the central concepts, 
group membership and social context. In addition, current theories of person perception, such 
as those proposed by Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Judd and Park (1988), are discussed in 
relation to the present work. In several empirical chapters, the cognitive organization of person 
information is measured as the main dependent variable. Thus, in Chapter 1, we devote extra 
attention to models concerning person memory and the organization of person information such 
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as the associative network model of person memory (Hastie, 1980; Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
Finally, short descriptions of the remaining chapters are given. 
Chapter 2 describes a study in which we investigated the effects of group membership 
and processing instructions on the clustering of descriptive attributes in free recall. In regards to 
clustering, the dependent measure, we distinguish between person clustering (i.e., the tendency 
to recall consecutively pieces of information describing the same person which is thought to 
indicate individuated processing of group member information), and attribute clustering (i.e., 
the tendency to recall consecutively pieces of information from the same attribute category, such 
as favorite sports, which is thought to indicate categorical processing of group member 
information). Both indices can be extracted from one and the same recall protocol. Subjects 
read about either in-group or out-group stimulus persons, who were each described by several 
attributes. Group membership was operationalized by indicating that stimulus persons had 
either the same college major as the subject or a different major. To manipulate the salient level 
of comparison, subjects were instructed to form impressions of the group members as 
individuals or as a group as a whole. We predicted that focusing subjects' attention on 
individual impressions would lead to more individuation of the stimulus persons, while 
focusing subjects' attention on the group would lead to increased categorization. The data show 
that while subjects were more prone to individuate in-group members than out-group members, 
as indicated by higher levels of person clustering in free recall, this was not differentially 
sensitive to changes in the processing instructions. 
Chapter 3, in a direct continuation of Chapter 2, speculated that the lack of effects of 
manipulation of the comparison level was due to the relatively weak nature of the manipulation 
of the processing instructions. In Chapter 3 we employed a stronger social context manipulation 
by varying the stimulus configuration to represent either an intragroup situation in which 
information about only the in-group or the out-group was presented, or an intergroup situation 
in which information about both groups was presented. Again we assessed the clustering of 
descriptive attributes in free recall. The results showed, as expected, that while in-group 
members were individuated in the intragroup context (person clustering), they were socially 
categorized in the intergroup context (attribute clustering). Alternatively, members of the out-
group were not differentially individuated across context conditions. 
Chapter 4 describes a study similar to that presented in Chapter 3 except that whereas 
the stimulus information in Chapters 2 and 3 concerned college major, in Chapter 4, it 
concerned gender groups. Several researchers have argued that members of high status groups 
individuate members of the in-group while categorizing members of the out-group. Conversely, 
members of low status groups individuate high status out-group members as much or more 
than they do members of their own group. Additionally, it has been posited that men generally 
occupy positions of higher status in our society than do women. As a result, one would expect 
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that men would individuate men but categorize women, while women would individuate men 
and women equally. In addition to gender group membership, social context was also 
manipulated in this study in a way similar to that used in Chapter 3. The results support the 
hypotheses regarding the individuation and social categorization of men and women. The 
manipulation of social context, however, had no effect on the social categorization or 
individuation of members of either gender in-groups or out-groups. 
In the first half of this dissertation, we implicitly suggest that the organization of 
stimulus information in free recall is a direct result of the fashion in which the information is 
encoded when it is encountered. However, it is also possible that the ordering of information in 
recall is not the result of ordering during encoding, but rather the result of retrieval strategies. In 
the last two empirical chapters we address issues regarding the encoding versus retrieval of 
stimulus information. 
Chapter 5 examines the attention and favorability ratings allocated to stimulus persons 
who are either consistent or inconsistent with stereotype-based expectations, in either an 
intragroup or an intergroup context. Subjects read male and/or female stimulus persons' 
attitudes regarding affirmative action in employment procedures. Data show that attention 
allocation was affected by group membership and social context. Specifically, female subjects 
in an intergroup context took more time to read information from stereotype inconsistent 
women than information from stereotype consistent women. This effect was notably absent in 
the intragroup context. Analysis of the favorability ratings showed that in an intragroup context 
stereotype consistent and inconsistent in-group members were both given equally favorable 
ratings. In an intergroup context, however, inconsistent in-group members were rated less 
favorably than consistent in-group members. Ratings of inconsistent out-group members were 
always more favorable than those given to consistent out-group members, regardless of social 
context. Tentative conclusions suggest that group membership and social context affect both 
attention allocation and favorability ratings. However, in particular the effects observed for 
attention allocation (indicating encoding processes) seem to have a different nature than those 
observed for the organization of information in free recall measured in earlier chapters. 
In Chapter 6, we directly study the relationship between the encoding and retrieval of 
information using a modified information display board paradigm. Subjects were instructed to 
actively acquire information about either men or women in an impression formation task. Either 
an intragroup or an intergroup context was made salient during the task. Subjects were 
subsequently asked to recall the information. The findings reveal that subjects preferred to 
acquire in-group information more by person than out-group information. However, the 
strategy employed during retrieval did not differ according to group membership, as it had 
during encoding, but rather according to the salient social context. Subjects in the intragroup 
context recalled information more by person than subjects in the intergroup context. The most 
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important finding in this study is that information retrieval does not always reflect encoding, 
but, for whatever reason, it may on occasion be guided by other processes. 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, offers a summary of the most important results discussed 
in terms of self-categorization theory and theories concerning person perception. Issues related 
to the diverse effects of gender groups are put into perspective, together with a discussion of 
their relationship to changes in the social context. Finally, the implications of the present 
research are discussed in terms of the way we think about information encoding and retrieval, 
and stereotype development and mental representations. 
In the end the present research examines a breadth of factors concerning the influence of 
group membership and social context on the processing of information about in- and out-group 
members. Though the details of the effects may differ from study to study, patterns emerge 
which indicate the consistent importance of these two factors in determining the way in which 
we perceive others. 
SAMEN VAIT I NC 
Dit proefschrift is een verzameling onderzoeken ontworpen om effecten van 
groepslidmaatschap en de sociale context waarin informatie wordt gecommuniceerd te 
bestuderen op verscheidene aspecten van informatieverwerking. 
Centraal in dit werk is de verdeling van sociale groepen in zogenaamde ingroups en 
outgroups. Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat ingroupleden beter worden geïndividueerd 
dan outgroupleden. Onderzoekers hebben gespeculeerd over de oorzaak van deze differentiële 
verwerking en hebben een aantal verklarende hypotheses voorgedragen gebaseerd op 
differentiële bekendheid, saillant vergelijkingsniveau of beschikbaarheid van exemplaren en 
subtypes. Ongeacht de achterliggende processen, toont onderzoek de robuustheid van dit effect 
in vele studies aan. 
De sociale context waarin informatie wordt overgedragen kan op verschillende wijzen 
worden gedefinieerd. In dit werk baseren wij de definitie voornamelijk op zelf-
categorisatietheorie waarin "sociale context" betrekking heeft op de situationele configuratie (de 
reële of psychologische aanwezigheid van de ingroup en vergelijkende outgroups) waardoor het 
meest relevante vergelijkingsniveau gecued wordt om groepsleden waar te kunnen nemen. In 
het bijzonder onderscheiden wij twee contexten: intragroeps- en intergroepscontexten. In een 
intragroepscontext wordt één enkele groep waargenomen zonder de expliciete aanwezigheid van 
een vergelijkingsgroep. Hier wordt de individuatie van groepsleden vergemakkelijkt door het 
ontbreken van cues die anders op een intergroepsvergelijking zouden wijzen. In een 
intergroepscontext zijn zowel de ingroup als de outgroup expliciet aanwezig. Als gevolg 
daarvan leiden waarnemingen op groepsniveau tot een verhoogde categorisatie van de 
groepsleden. Het moet worden opgemerkt dat in elke situatie waarin de outgroup expliciet 
aanwezig is psychologische ingroupaanwezigheid automatisch wordt geïmpliceerd. Hierdoor 
vindt een verhoogde sociale categorisatie plaats ondanks het feit dat een expliciete 
intergroepscontext niet aanwezig is. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 geven wij een theoretische inleiding waarin wij de centrale concepten 
groepslidmaatschap en sociale context definiëren. Verder worden eigentijdse theorieën van 
persoonsperceptie zoals die van Fiske en Neuberg (1990) en Park en Judd (1988) besproken in 
relatie tot het huidige werk. In verscheidene empirische hoofdstukken is de cognitieve 
organisatie van persoonsinformatie de hoofdzakelijk afhankelijke variabele. Daarom schenken 
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wij in Hoofdstuk 1 extra aandacht aan enkele modellen van "person memory" en de organisatie 
van persoonsinformatie zoals bijvoorbeeld het associatieve netwerkmodel van person memory 
(Hastie, 1980; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Tenslotte worden met korte omschrijvingen de verdere 
hoofdstukken weergegeven. 
Hoofdstuk 2 omschrijft een onderzoek waarin de effecten bestudeert worden van 
groepslidmaatschap en verwerkingsinstructies op de clustering van omschrijvende attributen in 
vrije herinnering. Met betrekking tot de afhankelijke variabele clustering onderscheiden wij 
persoonsclustering (het opeenvolgend herinneren van stukken informatie waardoor één individu 
wordt omschreven, duidend op geïndividueerde informatieverwerking) en attribuutclustering 
(het opeenvolgend herinneren van stukken informatie van één attribuutcategorie, bijvoorbeeld 
favoriete sporten, duidend op categorische informatieverwerking). Beide indexen kunnen uit 
één en hetzelfde herinneringsprotocol worden berekend. Proefpersonen lazen over óf ingroup-
óf outgroupstimuluspersonen die ieder omschreven werden door enkele attributen. 
Groepslidmaatschap werd geoperationaliseerd door aan te geven dat de Stimuluspersonen óf 
dezelfde studie volgden als de proefpersoon óf een andere studie. Om het saillante 
vergelijkingsniveau te manipuleren werden proefpersonen gevraagd impressies te vormen van 
de groepsleden als individuen of als groep als geheel. Wij voorspelden dat door de aandacht 
van proefpersonen op individuele impressies te vestigen Stimuluspersonen meer geïndividueerd 
zouden worden, terwijl door de aandacht van proefpersonen op de groep te vestigen 
Stimuluspersonen meer gecategoriseerd zouden worden. De data laten zien dat terwijl de 
proefpersonen meer geneigd waren tot de individuatie van ingroupleden dan outgroupleden, 
blijkend uit verhoogde niveaus van persoonsclustering in vrije herinnering, verschillen in 
verwerkingsinstructies niet tot verschillen in clustering leidden. 
In een direct vervolg op Hoofdstuk 2 speculeren wij in Hoofdstuk 3 dat het ontbreken 
van effecten van de manipulatie van de vergelijkingsniveau het gevolg is van de relatief zwakke 
aard van de manipulatie van verwerkingsinstructies. In Hoofdstuk 3 gebruiken wij een sterkere 
manipulatie van sociale context door de stimulusconfiguratie te variëren om een 
intragroepssituatie (waarin informatie over de ingroup of de outgroup gepresenteerd wordt) of 
een intergroepssituatie (waarin informatie over beide groepen gepresenteerd wordt) weer te 
geven. Het clusteren van omschrijvende attributen in vrije herinnering vormde weer de 
afhankelijke variabele. De resultaten lieten zien dat terwijl ingroupleden in de intragroepscontext 
geïndividueerd werden (persoonsclustering), zij in de intergroepscontext gecategoriseerd 
werden (attribuutclustering). Outgroupleden werden niet differentieel geïndividueerd over 
context condities. 
Hoofdstuk 4 omschrijft een studie vergelijkbaar met die omschreven in Hoofdstuk 3 
behalve dat waar de stimulusinformatie in Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 studierichting betrof, betreft de 
stimulusinformatie in Hoofdstuk 4 geslachtsgroepen. Verscheiden onderzoekers hebben 
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beweerd dat leden van hoge status groepen ingroupleden individueren en lage status 
outgroupleden categoriseren. Omgekeerd individueren leden van lage status groepen hoge 
status outgroupleden even veel of meer dan ingroupleden. Verder is het voorgesteld dat mannen 
in onze samenleving een hogere status hebben dan vrouwen. Als gevolg zou men verwachten 
dat mannen andere mannen zouden individueren en vrouwen zouden categoriseren terwijl 
vrouwen zowel mannen als vrouwen zouden individueren. Naast geslachtsgroepslidmaatschap 
werd in deze studie opnieuw sociale context gemanipuleerd op dezelfde wijze als in Hoofdstuk 
3. De resultaten steunen de hypotheses betreffend de individuatie en categorisatie van mannen 
en vrouwen. De manipulatie van sociale context had echter geen effect op de categorisatie of 
individuatie van leden van beiden geslachtsgroepen. 
In de eerste helft van deze dissertatie impliceren wij dat de organisatie van stimulus 
informatie in vrije herinnering een direct gevolg is op de wijze waarop informatie geëncodeerd 
wordt wanneer men de informatie tegenkomt. Het is echter ook mogelijk dat de ordening van 
informatie in herinnering eerder het gevolg is van herinneringsstrategieën. In de laatste twee 
empirische hoofdstukken bespreken wij onderwerpen die verband houden met het encoderen 
versus herinneren van stimulus informatie. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen wij de aandacht voor en de waardering van 
Stimuluspersonen die óf consistent óf inconsistent zijn met op stereotype gebaseerde 
verwachtingen in een intragroeps- of intergroepscontext. Proefpersonen lazen attitudes van 
mannelijke en/of vrouwelijke Stimuluspersonen over voorkeursbeleid bij sollicitatieprocedures. 
Data laten zien dat aandacht beïnvloed werd door groepslidmaatschap en sociale context. Met 
name lazen vrouwelijke proefpersonen in een intergroepscontext informatie van stereotype 
inconsistente vrouwen langer dan van stereotype consistente vrouwen. Dit effect ontbrak in de 
intragroepscontext. Analyse van de waarderingsmeting liet zien dat in een intragroepscontext 
stereotype consistente en inconsistente ingroupleden even positief gewaardeerd werden. In een 
intergroepscontext werden inconsistente ingroupleden echter minder positief gewaardeerd dan 
consistente ingroupleden. De waardering van inconsistente outgroupleden was altijd positiever 
dan van stereotype consistente outgroupleden ongeacht sociale context. Voorlopige conclusies 
zijn dat groepslidmaatschap en sociale context beide invloed hebben op aandacht en waardering. 
De effecten gevonden voor aandacht (wijzend op encoderingsprocessen) hebben echter een 
andere aard dan de effecten gevonden voor informatieorganisatie omschreven in eerder 
hoofdstukken. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 bestuderen wij direct de relatie tussen de encodering en herinnering van 
informatie door gebruik te maken van een aangepaste "information display board" paradigma. 
Proefpersonen zochten actief informatie over mannen of vrouwen in een impressieformatietaak 
in óf een intragroeps- óf een intergroepscontext. Vervolgens kregen proefpersonen een 
herinneringstaak. De vindingen laten zien dat proefpersonen ingroupinformatie meer per 
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persoon zochten dan outgroupinformatie. De herinneringsstrategie verschilde echter niet op 
basis van groepslidmaatschap maar op basis van saillante sociale context. Proefpersonen in de 
intragroepscontext herinnerde zich de informatie meer per persoon dan proefpersonen in de 
intergroepscontext. De belangrijkste vinding in dit onderzoek is dat informatie herinnering niet 
altijd encodering weergeeft maar misschien door andere processen gestuurd wordt. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk biedt een samenvatting van de belangrijkste resultaten besproken 
in termen van zelf-categorisatietheorie en theorieën over persoonsperceptie. Onderwerpen 
gerelateerd aan de diverse effecten van geslachtsgroepen worden in perspectief gebracht samen 
met een discussie over hun relatie tot veranderingen in de sociale context. Tenslotte worden de 
implicaties van het huidige onderzoek besproken in termen van stereotypeontwikkeling en 
mentale representaties evenals de manier waarop wij over informatie-encodering en -herinnering 
denken. 
In het huidige onderzoek wordt een breed scala van factoren bestudeerd betreffend de 
invloed van groepslidmaatschap en sociale context op de verwerking van informatie over 
ingroup- en outgroupleden. Terwijl de details van studie tot studie kunnen verschillen, komen 
patronen duidelijk naar voren die wijzen op het consequente belang van deze twee factoren bij 
het bepalen van onze waarneming van anderen. 
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STELLINGEN 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
"Social Context and the Processing of In-Group and Out-Group Information" 
van Heather Young 
1. De manier waarop informatie over personen wordt opgeslagen in het geheugen 
hangt mede af van het groepslidmaatschap. 
2. De organisatie van informatie over ingroupleden in het geheugen is mede een 
functie van de waamemingscontext. 
3. Herinnering lijkt niet noodzakelijk een weerspiegeling te zijn van de 
oorspronkelijke waarneming. 
4. Mannen en vrouwen verschillen in de manier waarop ze informatie organiseren over 
mannen en vrouwen. 
5. Het is opmerkelijk dat het bijzonder moeilijk blijkt te zijn om sommige klassieke 
experimenten succesvol te repliceren. 
6. It is neither what you know nor who you know but rather what others assume you 
are able to do. 
7. De hoeveelheid schandalen rond een Amerikaanse president lijkt niet gecorreleerd te 
zíjn met de kans herkozen te worden. 
8. Veel bedrijven hebben een sociaal psycholoog nodig, alleen weten ze het niet. 
9. "There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of 
conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact." (Mark Twain, Life on the 
Mississippi, 1883/1980) 



